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ABSTRACT
Today there are two theories attempting to explain 
ownership of the corporation, the proprietary theory and the 
entity theory. There are numerous conflicting ideas about 
the meanings of these theories. This dissertation attempts 
to determine what is meant by each of these.
The problem was approached by studying the proprietary 
theory and the entity theory of corporate enterprise as pre­
sented by writers in fields of law, taxes, investments, 
management, economics, and accounting, and by analyzing the 
position of stockholders, creditors, managers, employees, 
and government under the proprietary and entity theories 
of corporations.
Two theories pertaining to the granting of authority 
to the corporation are recognized in law. The association 
theorists hold that the stockholders associated together 
transfer to the corporation the rights necessary to carry 
on the business. This is a proprietary theory approach to 
corporate theory. The fiction theorists state that the 
state gives the necessary authority to the corporation as 
an impersonal being to carry on business activity. In so 
doing the state does not recognize what already exists, as 
proprietary theorists hold, but, following the entity theory, 
the state creates a new being separate and distinct from its
viii
stockholders and other interested parties.
In the field of taxation, one finds a common dispute 
among authors. The proprietary theorists claim there is a 
double tax on corporate and stockholders’ income because 
both stockholders and corporations are taxed on the same 
income. The entity theorists claim there is no double tax 
because the income tax is levied on the corporation as a 
separate and distinct being from the stockholders and other 
interested parties.
In investments some authors speak of stockholders 
as merely investors and not as owners of the corporation. 
When the stockholders take a passive attitude and do not 
participate in corporate matters-, following the entity- 
theory, they act like creditors. Although the stockholder 
may not exercise his rights in the corporation, this is no 
reason for saying the rights do not exist or that he is not 
the owner of the corporation, according to the proprietary 
theory.
Management plays an important role in the corporate 
enterprise. Although management performs the function of 
managing corporate affairs, with authority delegated by the 
stockholders, some consider management as an entity in itself 
rather than an employee of the stockholders. The part owners 
previously played in the corporation has been taken over by
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management. Therefore, the divorce of ownership and control 
seems to indicate the entity theory or a managerial approach 
to corporate enterprise theory.
Economists usually take a broad view of the corporate 
enterprise because they consider the corporation in relation 
to the whole economy. Some economists hold that there is 
little difference between the interested parties (stock­
holders and creditors). In so doing they seem to follow an 
entity approach. However, there are other economists who 
follow the proprietary theory because they make a marked 
distinction between the stockholders and creditors.
The accountant must decide whether to follow a pro­
prietary approach or an entity approach when accounting for 
corporate transactions. The proprietary theory is a stock­
holders’ approach and the formula A - L = C is appropriate 
because it demonstrates the stockholders as the residual 
claimants. The entity theory is a managerial approach and 
the formula A = (L / C) is appropriate because it demon­
strates the oneness of the unit and shows the obligations 
to all claimants together.
There are many conflicting ideas among authors in 
various fields regarding the proprietary and entity theories. 
A great deal of benefit could be gained if a more uniform 
approach to the ownership problem of the corporation was
followed by theorists in law, taxes, investments, management 
economics, and accounting.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
There exist in accounting two theories pertaining to 
ownership of the corporation enterprise. One is called the 
entity theory and the other is called the proprietary theory. 
The studies made of these two theories in the past started 
with the corporate enterprise but the results differed con­
siderably from each other.
Problem. The problem of this dissertation is to make 
valid comparisons of the existing material about the corpo­
rate enterprise to see what is meant by the entity theory 
and by the proprietary theory of corporate enterprise.
Importance. Accounting must operate within a sphere 
of certain basic assumptions. A basic assumption of para­
mount importance is whether or not to follow the entity theory 
or the proprietary theory of corporate enterprise. The ac­
counting procedures followed in handling certain transactions 
will vary depending upon the assumptions made. Hence, an 
understanding of the entity theory and the proprietary theory 
is important.
It is not clear what is meant by either the entity 
theory or the proprietary theory of corporate enterprise
because of the different ideas presented by numerous well- 
known authors* Each author establishes his own hypotheses 
which usually change the whole situation. Hence, his analysis 
will differ from the studies of the other authors and spe­
cial care must be taken when comparing their works*
Scope* In order to present a study of the corporate 
entity theories it is important to analyze the literature 
pertaining to such theories. Therefore, the problem is 
approached by studying the entity theory and the proprietary 
theory of corporate enterprise as expressed by authors in 
the areas of law, taxes, investments, management, economics, 
and accounting*
Method. Each of the first seven chapters is planned 
to give the reader the different concepts of a specific area 
of thought pertaining to the entity and proprietary theories 
with specific reference to the stockholder, the creditor, 
the manager, the employee, and the government. No conclusions 
are attempted in these chapters because the purpose is not to 
determine the legal, tax, accounting, economicy. management 
entity or proprietary theory of corporate enterprise but the 
purpose is to combine all the sources presented into a uniform 
idea of entity and proprietary theories of corporate enter­
prise. The various ideas are analyzed and combined in the 
final chapters of this dissertation*
3History. The entity theory is often developed in
accounting literature by referring to the time of the Roman
Empire where there were slaves acting in business ventures
for their masters. A master would give his slave a certain
amount of money or goods which the slave was to invest wisely.
When profits were made, the gains were turned over to the
master. The slave was owned by the master and all that the
slave possessed belonged to the master but the slave carried
on the business of the enterprise as a separate party. Such
an example can illustrate the entity or proprietary theory
depending on how it is used. If the slave is considered as
a person independent of his master*s actions, the entity
theory of enterprise results. By definition, however, a
slave has no right to own property in his own name, and hence,
the illustration is more suitable to the proprietary theory
because the property ownership was in the hands of the slave
owner, with the slave being merely an appendage of the owner.
The idea of the corporate entity as it is used today
began in the seventeenth century.
It is generally agreed that the corporate concept 
as we understand it today was first promulgated 
by Lord Coke about 1600; and his declaration that 
the-corporation is an entity, an artificial person 
created by the sovereign, found expression by Chief 
Justice John Marshall in the famous Dartmouth College 
case (Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U.S.7 
51S (IS19) )• There is still, however, controversy 
whether the-corporation is an entity created by the 
law or whether it is merely a group of persons bound
together by a contractual relationship.
Thus, in the seventeenth century, the double meaning of the
corporate enterprise was introduced— the entity as such and
the proprietary concept*
The forms of business organization which were found
in England during the eighteenth century did not help to
clarify the entity and proprietary theories because
. • * business organizations were for the most part 
simple in structure and personal in nature. Sole 
proprietorships predominated. For legal and economic 
purposes the individual owner and his business were 
identical. Partnerships were also numerous. The 
need to collect more capital or the need to divide 
important management tasks among several owner- 
participants as the scale of business operations 
increased gave the partnership considerable popularity. 
Frequently organizations sprang up in the form of 
unincorporated joint-stock associations.*
Thus, when the new entity doctrine was introduced, it was 
difficult to comprehend the idea of a separate and distinct 
entity existing independent of its owners, which this new 
theory of an impersonal being connotes.
The greatest reason for the corporate form of business 
organization was for the protection of the investors or stock­
holders. With the introduction of this new form of business
1 Erwin W. Boehmler and others, Financial Institutions 
(Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1951), p. 231.
2 Harry L. Purdy, Martin L. Lindahl, and William A.
P o n t i c e ^ aS l , l n c g 0n i9to?atpOn4^  ?Ubli° Policy *New York:
organization, n. . • the liability of the stockholder is 
limited to the possible loss of his investments in the corpo­
ration, provided the stock has been fully paid and is non­
assessable The greatest loss that the owner of capital 
stock in a corporation can suffer is his capital contribution.^- 
None of his other personal assets can be attached as they 
might be in the other forms of business enterprise.
The union of investors into a corporate enterprise for 
the express purpose of carrying on business activities usually 
facilitates the borrowing of capital as well as protecting 
the other investments of the stockholders. With this new 
form of business organization, large amounts of wealth can be 
accumulated and the borrowing of more needed capital is 
facilitated because the resources of the new business unit 
are much greater than the usual resources of a sole proprietor 
or a partnership.
The corporation offered the most effective device 
for combining the separate investments of many 
individuals under unified business control in a 
single business entity, while preserving the safety
3 William R. Spriegal and Ernest C. Davis, Principles 
&£ Business Organization (New York: Prentice-Hall, inc., 1946),
^ Hhere are exceptions to this general rule and the 
exceptions will be considered in a later chapter.
of the wealth of the individual owners not directly 
invested in the corporation.5
The concept of the corporate entity according to French
doctrine is entirely different from the English and American
ideas. The entity unit is called a societe in France and a
description is as follows:
A soci^t4 (the generic name for all types of profit 
seeking associations from a partnership up to a true 
share capital corporation) was constituted by an 
active contract between the parties, and the parties 
were considered the stockholders. The entity results 
only from the segregation of a common enterprise and 
a common body of property coupled with a common 
administration. In this aspect the administration 
of the concern was more nearly a joint agency. 
Continental law, however, found the entity not in 
the legal form,bi}t in the enterprise; thus although 
the legal societe may be reformed or entirely broken 
up, as by bankruptcy, the entity may persist where 
there is a defined enterprise which continues in 
existence. This realization that an economic unit 
maintains its existence in large measure irrespective 
of individuals or of legal machinery for its adminis­
tration is well known now to economists in England 
and America, although its legal implications have 
never been adopted into Anglo-American law.®
Definitions. An interesting comment made by Bowers 
in an article in The Accounting Review with respect to the 
terminology used by acco ntants is as follows: "Accounting
and social economics deal with concepts which may be somewhat
5 Melvin Anshen, An Introduction to Business (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 191.
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1937)7 III, P« 4l67"
alike, but are not much alike. Some use of common terms 
has tended to confuse important differences.1'^  This state­
ment expresses one of the greatest problems found in the 
research for this dissertation. Some authors define the 
terms used but others take the definitions for granted.
In the latter case, the reader must assume that the author 
means this or that and at times an incorrect conclusion 
results.
Because the following definitions are fundamental, 
they are given to establish a foundation for other definitions 
which are to follow.
An asset is anything, tangible or intangible, of 
value owned and title to the good rests in the owner.
A liability is a claim against a person or a business.
Net worth or owner1s equity in a corporation repre­
sents the total capital stock and surplus.
Investors are personal or impersonal beings who own 
captial stock or bonds. The terms stockholder and bondholder, 
however, will be used unless the meaning is obvious.
Stockholder is a person who owns capital stock of a 
corporation.
Bondholder is a person who owns bonds of a corporation.
*7
Russell Bowers, "Economic and Accounting Concepts." 
The Accounting Review. XX.(1945), p. 430. ,
Creditors sire the possessors of the corporate debt 
which includes short term creditors (current liabilities) 
and bondholders.
The government refers to the federal government and 
when a state government is referred to, it is expressly 
stated.
Employee refers to the non-management group who are 
sometimes referred to as the workers or laborers.
Management refers to the managing group of the corpo­
rate enterprise. For purposes here, management refers to 
the board of directors and officers of the corporation.
Enterprise is a business venture organized to make 
a profit and to provide a service.
Corporate enterprise is an incorporated business 
organization and is used synonymously with corporation.
Corporation is a chartered business enterprise organ­
ized under the laws of a state which gives the corporation 
its charter.
Formulas. In studying principles, it is sometimes 
feasible to use mathematical formulas. There are two formu­
las that are used in accounting to show the relationship of 
the separate parts of the balance sheet. These formulas are 
also used to express the interest and claims against the 
assets of the corporation. Most authors use both formulas
synonymously or in some cases, only one formula is presented.
At first glance, both formulas appear to be identical but 
upon closer examination, there is a decided mathematical 
difference between the two. The formulas are as follows:
Assets equal Liabilities plus Net Worth.
Assets minus Liabilities equal Net Worth.
If each part were considered separately, there would not be 
any difference between the formulas according to the princi­
ples of algebra. However, according to algebra, if liabilities 
plus net worth are considered as one complete unit, the trans­
position that took place in the second formula could not be 
made. Hence, two separate formulas for two separate concepts.
The formula, assets equal liabilities plus net worth—  
usually written, A = L / C (net vrorth or capital)— presents 
the entity theory. The corporation has all of the assets 
and the total interest and claims against the assets are 
represented by the liabilities and the owner*s equity or net 
worth.
The formula, assets minus liabilities equals net worth—  
usually written, A - L 2 c— presents the proprietary theory 
of corporate enterprise. The contention here is that the 
corporation is owned by the stockholders and that their claims 
are residual in nature. After the obligations of the creditors 
have been satisfied, the stockholders have that which is left.
10
Stockholders and taxpayers. In order to understand a 
situation, it is sometimes appropriate to compare it to some­
thing else. The stockholder of a corporation is quite similar 
to a citizen taxpayer of a country. The taxpayer invests 
money in the government through his contribution of taxes 
and it is often said that the taxpayer is the government.
The intent is not that the people as such are the govern­
ment but taken collectively, the people are. the government. 
Since the masses could not hope to operate the government 
effectively, men are elected and appointed who do the bidding 
of the people as the board of directors and officers of a 
corporate enterprise do the bidding of the stockholders. It 
would be impossible in cases where there are numerous stock­
holders for each owner to exercise control. The.operations 
of the corporations business are placed in the hands of a 
few men who have a fiduciary responsibility to carry on the 
business of the corporation for the best interest of all 
parties concerned.
CHAPTER II
LEGAL VIEWPOINT 
OF THE PROPRIETARY THEORY AND THE ENTITY THEORY 
OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE
The corporation is an enterprise chartered by the
state according to state law. The laws of the state limit
the extent of the activities, the rights, and privileges
of the corporate enterprise. Thus, the study of the legal
aspect of the corporate enterprise is important.
Pegrum^ presents the following definition of a
corporate enterprise.
•Corporation1 is really a generic term used to 
denote that form of business organization which 
uses the legal device of a separate personality, 
as distinct from the real owners of the enter­
prise. . . .  It is a single unit operating inde­
pendently, and although this unit may engage in 
many different types of business activity, it does 
so through a single corporate charter.
Since the corporate enterprise is established by 
law and operates by virtue of a state charter, the only 
way in which a corporation can be dissolved is by an act 
of the state government. According to the law, the corpo­
rate enterprise which is established by law, the legal
(Chicago :DU&ceL ? d  f - W
11
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entity, is not considered abolished ”. . .  because of 
insolvency, a failure to elect officers, a cessation of 
business, or a sale or disposal of all of the corporate
o
property." The corporate enterprise still exists, if in 
name only, and can sue or be sued as any other corporate 
enterprise which is doing business regularly.
Following are some of the comments made by different 
authors in law with respect to the ownership of the corpo­
rate enterprise. As can be seen, the comments vary widely 
when considering the entity theory, the proprietary theory, 
the stockholder, the management, the creditor, the employee, 
and the government. The final analysis as to the contri­
bution of the authors to the complete entity theory and the 
proprietary theory of corporate enterprise is presented in 
the eighth chapter.
Two theories. In law there are two distinct theories 
regarding the granting of power or the recognition of au­
thority in the corporate enterprise. The fiction theory 
considers the law of the land as the source of authority 
and the association theory considers the union of personal 
beings as the authority and the law as purely a regulatory
2
"Corporations— Corporate Entity— Dissolution- 
Disregarding the Corporate Entity in De Facto Dissolution," 
Mnxwap.ta Law Review, XV (1930-31), pp. 217-213.
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power. The fiction theory has the government giving the 
power to act to the corporate enterprise and the association 
theory states that the rights of the stockholders are trans­
ferred from the stockholders to the corporate enterprise.
It can be said that the fiction theory is the entity theory 
and the association theory is the proprietary theory.^
Stockholders. In small corporations, it is difficult
at times to distinguish between the owners of the corporate 
enterprise and the corporate enterprise itself because the 
owners are usually the managers. In large corporate enter­
prises, the distinction is more easily recognized because 
of the divorce of ownership and management. Because of the 
size and power of large corporate enterprises, it is said
 ^Pegrum, op. cit.. pp. 56-57 and 59. Within these 
pages, Pegrum describes the fiction theory and the associ­
ation theory.
Richard Goode, in his book, The Corporation Income 
Tax (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1951), p. • 10,' held that
the law only recognizes what men have created for their own 
purpose and benefit.
^Corporations— Corporate Entity— Dissolution— Disre­
garding.the Corporate Entity in De Facto Dissolution, *» o p . 
cit., pp. 210-211. Within these pages are found the follow­
ing two expressions of the fiction theory and the association 
theory.
1. The state gives the corporate enterprise the 
power to act.
2. The state recognizes the power to act of the corpo­
rate enterprise which already exists by virtue of the corporate 
stockholders.
14
that the stockholder i3 merely an investor^ and not a true 
ovmer. This position would derive its foundation in the 
fiction theory because the authority and power of the 
corporate enterprise arises from the state and no transfer 
of authority from individuals is necessary as is the case 
with the association theory.
The fiction theory holds that the law of the land is 
the important factor in corporate enterprise theory because 
the law gives birth to the corporate enterprise. Some ideas 
are presented here which serve to bolster the fiction theory.
The possession of capital stock by a stockholder does 
not represent ownership but it is evidence of a right.^ The 
right or bundle of rights of the stockholder in the corporate 
enterprise entitles the stockholder to share in the profits 
of the corporation when dividends are declared, to attend 
stockholders* meetings, to vote on corporate enterprise 
policies and business, to share in the management of the 
corporate enterprise, and many other privileges which may 
accrue to the stockholder because of the corporate charter 
and bylaws.
When it is impossible to distinguish between the
^ The term investor is being used here in the sense 
of an inferior creditor rather than a stockholder.
5 Dwight A. Pomeroy, Business Law (Cincinnati, Ohio: 
South Western Publishing Co., 1931)* P* 49.
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business of the stockholder and that of the corporate enter­
prise or the business of the parent corporation and the 
subsidiary corporation, no corporate entity exists but the 
combination is just one enterprise*^ The identity t'heory 
which identifies the two corporate enterprises as one, 
would be invoked. Even though the two corporate enterprises 
operate as separate units, they would be considered as one 
entity by the law.
The law is very specific when it says that the corpo­
rate entity is a separate and distinct creature. This is 
exemplified by the fact that a stockholder can sue a corpo­
ration in which he owns stock or the stockholder can be 
sued by the corporate enterprise in which he has invested#? 
Legally, the two persons, the stockholder and the corporate 
enterprise, are separate in the eyes of the law.
If the stockholder owes the corporate enterprise 
money, the stockholder is liable for the payment of the debt
to the corporation and it must be paid to the corporate
$
enterprise, especially, if the creditors sue. Here again,
6 Frederick J. Powell, t a t  &&£ gttkaU&flEy Corpo­
rations (Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 193 D , p. 7* •'
...... 7
Thomas Conyngton and Louis Berg, Business Law 
(Third Revised Edition; New York: The Ronald Press-Co.,
1935), p. 269.
& A. Lavine and Morris Mandel, Business Law for Every­
day Use (Philadelphia: The John C. Winston- Co., *1940),....
pp. 430-431.
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the law is very specific in the division between the corpo­
ration and the stockholders of the corporate enterprise* 
There are cases where there are several classes of 
common stock and some of the classes of common stock do not 
have voting rights attached. Thus, the nonvoting common 
stockholder has limited rights in the corporate enterprise 
and in a sense, his position is weaker than the bondholder. 
This stockholder does not possess the right to elect direc­
tors which means he has no voice in the management of the 
corporate enterprise. Hence, he is just an investor and 
similar to the bondholder with the exception that the bond­
holder receives a fixed return each year and the nonvoting 
common stockholder depends on the directors to declare a 
dividend in order to receive a return on his investment.
Pegrum brings out the idea that the corporate enter­
prise occupies an important position in American business 
life. He continues to say that the corporate enterprise
is a true form of business organization and • not a
9method of doing business.” The corporate form of organi­
zation has been ”• • • selected for purposes of convenience 
without altering the structure of the particular enterprise 
and without presenting any unique questions of public
Q
7 Pegrum, £&t., p. 67.
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policy* This attitude is in contradiction to other authors
who claim that the corporate enterprise is just a method of
doing business*
If all of a corporation’3 capital stock is owned by 
11 'one person, Anderson A states, the courts have held that 
the entity does exist when there is evidence of separation 
of ownership and control. However, Anderson*^ further points 
out that in cases where there is ownership of a corporate 
enterprise by one person and this one individual exercises 
control, the courts have decided against the corporate enter­
prise and the enterprise is treated as a sole proprietorship*
A corporate enterprise has far reaching authority 
in the distribution of its wealth. In making donations to 
institutions of learning as the Princeton University case 
shows, the minority stockholders sued the corporate enter­
prise but the court
. • • reviewed the various decisions and articles 
which have justified such donations on the basis 
of the direct benefits available to the corporation 
by way of assisting in providing a reservoir of
10 aid., p. 68.
^  Walter H. Anderson, limitations a£ iilfi g-orporate 
Entity (St. Louis: Thomas Law Book Co.,- 1931), p. 16; - - •
12 Ibid.. pp. 23-J-24.
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trained personnel and creating goodwill and friendly- 
public relations for the corporation.■L3
Since the corporate enterprise has grown to such
enormous size, both physically and financially, lav/s have
been passed to protect people who deal with the corporate
enterprises. Protective laws have been passed restricting
the corporate enterprise but not the stockholder.
The emergence of the concept of protection of 
individuals, be they suppliers or customers, along 
with the emerging system of rights of labor and 
workmen, means in substance a system of protection 
for the individuals constituting all of the groups., 
with which a great corporation comes into contact. *
If it were possible for stockholders to bind the
corporate enterprise in any contract, it would be an easy
matter to say that the stockholder owned the business
organization. However, this is not the case, for only
the board of directors or their agents can act to bind
the corporate enterprise.^
Wie association theory holds that the stockholder
is an integral part of the corporate enterprise since
13^ Herbert Rubin, "Corporations,” Rutgers Law Review 
VIII (1952-53), p. 131.
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., "The Developing Law of 
Corporate Concentration." The University of Chicago Law 
Review. XIX (1951-52), p. 660.
15 Robert S. Stevens, Handbook on the Law of Private
Corporations (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1936),
p. 548.
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the organization receives its power and authority from the 
stockholders. Some of the following comments by different 
authors are given here to bolster the association theory.
In two specific cases, the stockholder may be held
16directly liable for the debts of a corporate enterprise.
When the wages of the employees are not paid, the stock­
holders are liable up to a certain amount— generally wages 
for three months— and when the double liability clause is 
in effect, which is found in banking and other restricted 
forms of business, the stockholders are liable to an amount 
equal to their capital contribution if no surplus provision 
has been made.
Stevens says that, ,r0ne is brought to the conclusion 
that corporateness is more nearly a method than a thing.”^7 
This corporate form is used to the advantage of the stock­
holders and represents only a method of organization rather 
than a completely new form of business organization com­
pletely distinct from its stockholders.
When the court says that the stockholders are liable 
for the acts of the corporate enterprise, it does not mean 
that the entity*s responsibility is that of the stockholders. 
But, the court is saying that the entity does not exist in
^  Lavine and Mandel, oj). cit. r p. 432. 
•^7 Stevens, afi. c£t., p. 91.
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this case and hence, the stockholders are treated as partners
and the stockholders are personally responsible for the acts
IBof the so-called corporate enterprise.
Even though the stockholders cannot override a direc­
tor -when he is acting within his authority, the stockholders 
may increase the number of directors or remove a director 
if the bylaws permit such a c t i o n * T h e  usual case is that 
a new group of stockholders will win control of the necessary 
votes and this new group, as a solid voting block, will 
determine the new directorate. Although the stockholders 
do not directly control the corporate enterprise, the stock­
holders can vote in a directorate which will be more favor­
able to them. By so doing, the new directorate usually bows 
to the dictates of the stockholders holding the majority of 
votes.
In Texas, there was a case which permitted the stock­
holders of a corporate enterprise to examine not only the 
books of the corporation but also the books of its subsidiary 
because the board of directors of the subsidiary company were
working indirectly for the stockholders of the parent corpo-
20rate enterprise. Such a decision would follow the association
IB Powell, cit.. pp. 1-2.
19 Stevens, sp. s£t., pp. 549-550.
20 Ikid., p. S5.
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theory since the stockholder is the authority behind the 
corporation. Usually, however, the activity of the parent 
is the responsibility of the board of directors and it 
would be the board-of directors who would inspect the books
of the subsidiary.
0*1
Israel points out that when there are two corporate 
enterprises doing business with one another and both corpo­
rate enterprises are owned by the same stockholders, these 
same stockholders may be prevented from claiming separate 
entities in the eyes of the law, in order to protect third 
parties. Hence, the owners cannot set up two separate 
corporate enterprises because the law will deem both organi­
zations as a single corporate enterprise or entity. It is 
possible, however, to have two separate corporate enter­
prises owned by the same stockholders and considered legal, 
as was previously pointed out.
Creditors. The creditors of a corporate enterprise, 
according to law, have no positive position in a corporation 
until there is a default in the payment of debts. The rela­
tion of the creditors to the corporate enterprise is a 
debtor-creditor relationship. The creditors must make their
21 Abner M. Israel, "The Legal Fiction of Corporate 
Entity and Modern Law," Georgia Bar Journal. Ill (1940-41), 
p. 52. , ■ -
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claims against the corporate enterprise except in a few 
restricted cases which are brought out in this chapter.
Under certain conditions, bondholders have been
22given the right to vote in a corporate enterprise. This 
usually occurs when the corporate enterprise is in finan­
cial difficulties and the company fails to meet the obli­
gation of interest payments to the bondholders. Most bond 
indentures stipulate that the trustees of the bondholders 
will have the right to vote until the interest debt is 
settled in full or until other action is taken.
Since the creditors have loaned money or have extended 
credit to the corporation, some claim that the creditors 
possess rights against the assets of the corporate enter­
prise.^ ja the use of double entry bookkeeping, they hold 
that this right can be seen for there must be a credit for 
liability or equity against all of the assets otherwise the 
debits and credits would not be equal. Spencer24 brings 
out the same idea when he says that it can be further stated 
that the claims of the creditors are against the assets of
22 Stevens, ££. sit., pp. 449-450.
23 Pomeroy, pp. p. 50.
24 William Spencer, A Textbook oq Lgtf Business 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929),' pp.- 1066-1073.
a corporate enterprise and not against the stockholders.
This is a truism if there is no fraud present and the corpo­
rate enterprise is considered a valid entity.
To further the cause of the creditor, the laws for 
the State of Oregon state that management may work for the 
benefit of the creditor when the corporate enterprise is 
in financial difficulty and until the corporate enterprise 
is out of debt.2'* The laws in the State of Oregon were 
passed with the intent of protecting the creditor against 
any irregularities on the part of the stockholders.
When dividends are declared payable, the stockholders 
become bona fide creditors of the corporate enterprise. In 
cases of insolvency, the stockholders then share, pro rata, 
with the other creditors of the corporate enterprise for 
their rights as creditors.
Stockholders may be creditors of a corporate enter­
prise in which they possess capital stock and they may carry 
on business with this corporate enterprise like any other 
corporate enterprise. This practice is good business, in 
most cases, as long as no minority stockholder is injured 
and all the transactions are legitimate.
At times, the subsidiary corporate enterprises have
25 Saul Gordon, Gordon's Modern Annotated Forms of 
Agreement (New York: Prentice-Hall, -Inc.* 1943), 'pp.- *126-129.
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been denied the right to collect claims they have against 
the parent corporate enterprise vihen the parent has become 
insolvent.2^ The position of the subsidiary corporate enter­
prise is the same as for all other creditors.
Government. The governments of country and state 
are immune from the suits that must be faced by others. 
Permission for suing a governing body must be granted by 
that governing body before the claimant can go to court. 
However, in cases where the government is the sole owner 
of the corporate enterprise, the courts have held that the 
entity theory exists and the claimant is suing the corporate 
enterprise and not the governing body which does not neces­
sitate the request of permission to sue. Hence, ownership 
by the government of a corporate enterprise^? does not give 
the corporate enterprise immunity but it must be remembered 
that these government owned corporate enterprises cannot 
be taxed by other governing bodies. Thus, some inconsistency 
is present since the reason for no tax is because the corpo-
o
rate enterprise is owned by a governing body.
26 Stevens, 2£. cit.. pp. S5-S6.
27 Although some government businesses take on a 
corporate form.they do not possess sovereign powers as the 
state and federal government bodies do.
Stevens, , pp. 76-79.
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Management. There is little doubt that management 
plays an extremely important part in the corporate enter­
prise structure. Since the growth of the corporate enter­
prises and the division of interest which has taken place 
in the last century, management has been given the part of 
directing the activities of the large corporate enterprises. 
The corporate organizations which were owned and operated 
by large family interests do not exist today as they did 
in the past. There are still a few family corporate enter­
prises but even here, the trend is to give management more 
and more power.
The authority of professional managers has been
increasing because of the efficiency and good management
which has been developing. In some of the large corporate
enterprises, the officers* power has become so great that
,f. • . the more usual situation is for management to select
29the directors." It is a right of the stockholder to 
select and elect the board of directors.
Management has been given a direct interest in some 
corporate enterprises with the introduction of a new policy 
for paying their salaries, partly in cash and partly in 
the capital stock of the corporate enterprise. Another 
method of salary payments is the paying of a regular salary
29 Goode, cit.. p. 21.
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plus a percentage of the corporate profits. Actually, the 
profits of the corporate enterprise belong to the owners of 
the business but now some claim that the earnings are being 
divided between the owners and the officers.-^
The direct powers of corporate management vary with 
the different states and the individual cases within the 
states. However, managements power has increased tremen­
dously over the years. Following are a few examples of 
management's strength in the corporate enterprise.
Some cases have held that although preferred stock
was noncumulative, if dividends were earned they could not
be withheld. However, "• • • corporate management demanded 
* ■> 
and got not merely a power to manage business, but also a
power to determine the stockholders' property rights.
In order to set up the best and most profitable 
organizations, " . . .  corporation lawyers at the insistence 
of organizers and corporate managements, have endeavored 
to give such managements the widest possible scope of power.H^2
Even though management shares in the profits 
of a corporate enterprise, they do not share in the losses.
The true test for ownership is the sharing of losses and 
gains. Hence, it can be argued that since management does 
not share in the losses of a corporate enterprise, their 
position is not on a par with the stockholders.
** ?er teV Jr-> gfejittsa in  J a il Si Corporate 
finance (Chicago: Callaghan and Company* 192#), p.-31.......
32 ]&U»> PP. 2#-29.
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It is not possible for the stockholders of a corpo­
rate enterprise to bind the company for it is only manage­
ment who can bind the corporate enterprise.33 No matter 
what contract a stockholder makes in the corporate name, 
it is not binding unless that stockholder is acting by 
virtue of authority granted by management.
There are cases where the power of management is 
much greater than the power of the stockholders and this 
authority has been given by the corporate charter.
The statute authorizing incorporation, in most 
instances, permits great latitude in drafting the 
charter, so that it may include permission t.o 
handle the corporate business and to deal with 
stockholders* rights almost as the management 
chooses. ■?**■
The duties of a director in a corporate enterprise 
some hold are to the corporation he is affiliated with and 
his responsibility is not to the stockholder.33 In cases 
where there is a question as to policy of the corporate 
enterprise, MThe judgment of the directors is in most 
circumstances controlling.
The right of action against the directors of a
23 Pomeroy, q&. cit.. p. 581.
BerlS» ifl t]ie Lgj* o£ Corporate Finance,
fifi. £it., p. 28. ............. ..............
32 Stevens, gp. cdjt., p. 58I.
36 Goode, pp. £it., p. 21.
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corporate enterprise belongs to the corporation and/or the 
stockholders when the directors are being accused of mis­
management. In the case of bankruptcy action may be brought 
by receivers or trustees for the benefit of the creditors 
of the corporate enterprise.37
An interesting theory dealing with the powers of the 
directors, was that the directors received all of their 
powers from the state.' This theory is not held today.
Since the state gives the corporate enterprise its rights 
according to the fiction theory, it is not too unreasonable 
to believe that the authority of the directors also derives 
from the state. It is a logical conclusion from the fiction
theory.39
A director of a company may carry on separate busi­
ness with the company of which he is a director if permission 
is obtained from the disinterested directors or a majority 
of the stockholders. However, in cases of insolvency or 
when the corporate enterprise is on the verge of insolvency, 
the director cannot have a position of preference over the
37 Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Editor, Problems in 
Law (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1949), p.' 355.
Stevens, op>. cit., p. 547.
39 Even though the state may grant the authority 
to the directors it is still the stockholders who permit 
the exercising of this authority.
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general creditors by having the corporate enterprise liqui­
date his debt.^®
In Maryland, Berle^ relates, the board of directors 
have the following powers:
1. To sell no par stock at whatever price they 
deem appropriate.
2. To buy and sell treasury stock.
3. With permission granted in the charter, they 
can buy treasury stock and cancel it out of 
capital funds.
4. If the corporate enterprise has unissued capital 
stock, the directors can reclassify the stock 
ahead of the outstanding stock and place the 
stock on the market.
Even though the corporate enterprise is a separate 
entity, it must act through someone since it is an imper­
sonal being. The board of directors are elected by the 
stockholders to represent them in all the ventures of the 
corporate enterprise and hence, the members of the board 
have a fiduciary responsibility to the owners or stock­
holders.
In our society, Berle points out that, n. . . the 
power of corporate management is becoming practically 
absolute, while social controls upon their power remain 
almost e m b r y o n i c . H e  also says, 11 • • . a  man with
Spencer, <2E* cit.« pp. 1072-1073*
^  Berle, Studies in the Law of Corporate Finance,. 
o p . cit.. p. 30.
42 Ibid., p. 27.
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$1,000 to invest places this in the hands of a corporate 
management, taking in return the obligation of the corporate 
management to give him some stipulated share of the results 
of the enterprise.”43
Miscellaneous. Because of the need for mass production 
and the development of industry, corporations have become an 
integral part of soc-ety. Countries have found a need for 
the establishment of business organizations throughout history 
and the corporate enterprise form.of business organization 
seems to have solved the problem.
The purpose of the corporate entity and the reason 
that the laws have given the corporations the limited lia­
bility is for a justifiable reason and this privilege should 
not be misused.44 If a corporate enterprise is used for 
fraudulent purposes, the courts have held that no entity 
exists and the guilty parties themselves are liable directly 
since there is no corporate existence.45 Stevens^ contends 
that the purpose of incorporation is not to defraud creditors,
43 Berle, loc. cit.
44 Powell, pp. cit., p. 2.
45 Conyngton and Berg, op, pip., pp. 269-270.
46 stevens, pp. cit., p. £9. Incorporation costs may 
be paid for by the corporation if the directors and stock­
holders so choose.
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incorporators, stockholders, or other interested parties 
and when fraud is brought out, it is not tolerated by the 
courts.
The courts are usually very specific in their lan­
guage when reference is made to the corporate enterprise.
The laws have established the corporation and the courts 
so interpret the laws. In the Weatherford Ry, v. Granger,
£6 Tex. 350, 24 S. W. 795 (1&94) case, it was held that 
charges before a corporation is formed could not be collected 
from the corporation after it was incorporated. Only those 
charges that are incurred after the incorporation date are 
considered collectible.^ Hence, the corporate entity as 
set up by the law is extremely difficult to break and 
”. . . if at all, only where the entity is formed or used 
for some improper purpose.*1^
took place in New Jersey when, in 1339, a general incorpo­
ration law was passed which permitted corporate enterprises 
to be incorporated with the express purpose of owning stock 
in other corporate enterprises. Thus, some corporate enter­
prises w e  formed for the express purpose of becoming
The birth of the holding company in the United States
Adolf A, Berle, Jr., "The Theory of Enterprise 
Entity," Columbia L§n Review. XLVII (1947), 353.
in-TT „olH?5?rt1S*in> "Corporations." Rutgers law
VIII (1952-53), 129.
32
stockholders of other corporate enterprises. However, 
when control is considered between the parent and the sub­
sidiary corporations, n. . • the parent corporation will 
be responsible for the obligations of its subsidiary when 
its control has been exercised to such a degree that the 
subsidiary has become its mere instrumentality•^9
The corporate enterprise of the Roman Empire is quite 
different from the corporation in Germany. The corporate 
enterprise was in existence in the Roman Empire and it was 
called a university. Because the Roman government feared 
revolts, these universities were licensed. Although the 
university did exist as a business organization before this 
time, the license permitted the universities to carry on 
business activities legally.^ Thus, the Roman government 
recognized the corporate enterprise which was in existence 
and hence, the association theory in law. The German idea 
of corporate enterprise is perhaps the closest to the entity 
theory because the corporation almost takes on a real person­
ality. In most of the other European countries, however, 
the corporate enterprise is a persona ficta. ^
^9 Powell, op. cit.. p. B.
50 ^ Berle, Studies in the Law of Corporate Finance, 
op. cit., pp. 2-4*
51 Anderson, pp. cit., p. 4»
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Several states have passed laws in regard to corporate 
enterprises which are interesting and worth mentioning.
In Virginia, Negroes who could not own realty accord­
ing to a covenant in a deed could become owners of property 
indirectly by purchasing stock in a corporate enterprise.
A corporate enterprise, even though it was owned entirely by 
Negroes, could own realty.52
Maine has a unique concept of capital. Maine law 
holds that the w. . . capital of a corporation is a trust 
fund for the creditors."^ The Maine courts have also 
decided that premiums received on the sale of capital stock 
is not surplus but a capital contribution. The attitude of 
the Maine courts was brought about because the problem arose 
when dividends were paid because the law stipulated that 
dividends must be paid out of profits.54 Other states, 
however, would permit the classification of premiums from 
the sale of capital stock as capital surplus and even permit 
the payment of dividends from this capital surplus.
52 William L. Clark, Jr., Handbook on the Law of 
Private Corporations (Third Edition; St, Paul, Minn.: West 
Publishing Company, 1946), pp. 6-7.
53 Ballantine, gp. cit., p. 411*
54 ibid.. pp. 411-413.
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Snmrnfl-ry. The corporate enterprise is chartered by 
the state according to state law. The corporation enjoys 
all the rights and privileges granted by law and exists 
independently of its stockholders, management, creditors, 
employees, and the government.
Two theories are found in law pertaining to the 
authority of the corporation. The fiction theory considers 
the law of the land as the source of authority and the 
association theory considers the union of stockholders as 
the source of authority.
Following the fiction line of reasoning, the corpo­
rate enterprise is a separate and distinct entity with the 
corporation as the important factor and not the interested 
parties. The stockholders are completely distinct from the 
corporation and the corporation can even sue the stockholders. 
The corporation is not merely a method of doing business and 
can even make donations to institutions over the objections 
of some stockholders. Because of the physical and financial 
size of corporations, laws have been passed restricting the 
corporate enterprise, which laws, however, have no effect 
on the stockholders. Also, a stockholder cannot bind the 
corporation but only management or their agents can contract 
for the corporate enterprise. Whenever the stockholders 
are held personally liable for the corporations debts, the 
courts are not saying that there is generally no distinction
between the corporation and its stockholders, but the courts 
Are saying that in this case there is no separation because 
of the circumstances.
The association theory is a proprietary approach and 
has authority coming from the stockholders. Stockholders 
can be held personally liable for corporate debts for back 
wages and when the double liability clause is in effect.
Under this approach, the corporation is considered as merely 
a method of doing business. Although the stockholders can­
not override management, they can change the directorate or 
even increase or decrease it. Thus, the new directorate will 
be more favorable to the stockholders.
The creditors have no positive position in the corpo­
ration except in a few rare instances. However, since they 
loan funds or sell goods to the corporate enterprise, they 
do possess certain rights. They have the right to demand 
payment for debts when due and in some cases they can force 
the corporation into receivership or liquidation.
Corporations that are owned by the government enjoy 
many special privileges but the courts have held that the 
corporate entity exists and individuals can sue government 
owned corporations without asking permission from the govern­
ment.
Managements duty is to operate the corporation for 
the interest of stockholders according to the proprietary
theorists or for all interested parties according to the 
entity theorists. Some management groups have grown in 
power to a point where they have perpetuated themselves 
in their positions. Although it is still the right of 
the stockholders to select and elect the board of directors, 
some managements have selected the directorate. One of 
management’s functions is to make contracts which bind the 
corporation. Some hold that the duty of the board of 
directors is to the corporation and not to the stockholders, 
which would be an entity approach.
The laws are very specific when they define the 
corporation as a separate entity. However, the law leaves 
much room for interpretation of authority when the whole 
theory of corporate enterprise is considered. The fiction 
theory follows an entity concept and the association theory 
follows a proprietary concept.
CHAPTER III
TAX VIEWPOINT
OF THE PROPRIETARY 'THEORY AND THE ENTITY THEORY 
OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE
Since the passage of the Federal Income Tax lav; in 
1913, taxes have played a more important part in business 
each succeeding year, and any study of the corporate enter­
prise necessitates considering income taxes. The tax 
advantages or disadvantages are always considered when a 
sole proprietor or a partnership is considering whether 
or not to incorporate.
There are two methods for taxing the income of 
corporate enterprises, income tax and capital gains tax.
The capital gains tax is the less significant from a corpo­
rate enterprise point of view because the larger tax bill 
is generally on the income. The tax on income— on the 
profits from the operations of the corporate enterprise—  
is divided into two parts, normal tax and surtax. The 
normal tax is the rate levied against the normal income, and 
the surtax^ is an added rate levied against the income.
1 A condensed history of the surtax can be found in 
Roy G. Blakey and Gladys C. Blakev. The Federal Income Tax 
(New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1940), pp. 523-526.
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Problem of double taxation. In the income tax laws 
today, there exists a distinct difficulty which is double 
taxation. The corporate enterprise pays income tax on all 
of its taxable income, and when dividends are distributed 
to the stockholders of the corporate enterprise, they too 
pay income tax on the income of the corporate enterprise.
The paying of income tax by the corporate enterprise and the 
stockholder on the same earnings distributed to the stock­
holder is called double taxation.
There are many pros and cons to the problem of double 
taxation. According to the entity theory, the tax does seem 
justified because it is being levied against two distinct 
units. However, according to the proprietary theory, there 
seems to be an injustice because the tax is levied first on 
the corporate enterpriser earnings and secondly, the tax 
is levied on the dividends distributed to the owners of the 
corporate enterprise which is a discriminatory action between 
forms of business enterprises. The proprietary theory extrem­
ists state that whatever the corporate enterprise owns, the 
stockholders own. Thus, the income of the corporate enter­
prise is the income of the stockholders and when this corpo­
rate income is taxed, the stockholders of the corporate 
enterprise are also indirectly taxed because it is their 
income in the corporate enterprise that is being reduced by 
the amount of the corporate income tax.
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Following are some of the comments made by different 
authors with respect to the double taxation problem. As 
can be seen, the comments vary considerably when consider­
ing the entity theory, the proprietary theory, the stock­
holder, the management, the creditor, the employee, and 
the government. The final analysis as to the contribution 
of the authors to the complete entity theory and the pro­
prietary theory of corporate enterprise is presented in the 
eighth chapter.
Double taxation is not equitable. According to the
2
National Tax Association 1947 Proceedings it does not seem 
equitable to levy an income tax on both the corporate enter­
prise and the stockholders, since non-corporate enterprises 
are not taxed on profits. All the business profits are 
taxed as part of the individuals* income, thus, only one< 
return is filed. In par tner ships,3 each partner is taxed 
for his share of the profits whether or not the profits are 
distributed and no matter how many partners there are. At 
no time is the share of profit taxed again by the government.
o
Ronald B. Welch, Editor', National Tax Association 
19 A7 Proceedings-at Miami Beach. Floridar November 17- 2 0 r 
19A7 (Sacramento, California: National Tax Association),
pp. 106-10 7 .
3
Certain business organizations even though they are 
considered as partnerships, such as a cooperative, are given 
special privileges under the tax laws.
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One of the major criticisms of the double taxation 
theory is that the corporate enterprise stockholders and the 
corporation itself a re one economic entity.^ The stock­
holders furnish the capital and the corporate managers furnish 
the managerial techniques. Here, the corporation’s charter is 
considered merely a piece of worthless paper and there is no 
separate entity but it is just a method of doing business.
A corporation is subject to a double tax. More 
accurately, when there is a corporation the owners 
are subject to a double tax. There is a tax on the 
corporation, and when the owners want to get their 
money out there is a tax all over again on the same 
profits. The doubling up will come either in the 
form of a tax on the dividends that are paid out 
when t he company winds up or when the owners sell 
their stock in the company. You don’t run into a 
double tax when you have a partnership.5
According to the theory of corporate taxation about
the year 1939, "The Corporation was thus regarded as a
conduit for transmitting earnings from the business to its
owners, not as a tax paying unit entirely apart from its
owners."^ The theory has changed today, and now, the entity
approach is in effect v/ith a tax on corporate earnings and
a tax on the stockholder for the distributed profits received
^ Paul E. Randolph, Taxation for Prosperity (New York: 
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1947/, p» 352.
 ^J. S. Seidman, "A Comparison of Tax Advantages of a , 
Corporation v. Partnership or Sole Proprietorship,” The 
Journal of Accountancy. XC (1950), 105*
^ Roswell Magill, The Impact of Federal Taxes (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1943), p. 127*
afrom the corporate enterprise.
After the first World War, the government made an 
attempt to follow the proprietary theory of corporate enter­
prise when it divided the income tax on its citizens into 
normal tax and surtax.
Since the World War the taxes on incomes of 
citizens of the United States have been separated 
into two divisions— the normal taxes and the sur­
taxes, the surtaxes being in addition to the normal 
tax and graded in accordance with the amount of net 
income.
When this provision was originally adopted the 
main reason given for it was that income received 
from corporation dividends had already been taxed 
and that to apply the income tax in full to divi­
dends would be inequitable. A recent revenue act, 
however, made an important change in the law by 
making dividends taxable in the same manner as 
other income.7
The new revenue act of 1954 makes an attempt to re­
turn in part to the proprietary theory by allowing a $50 
deduction to the stockholder for the first $50 of income 
received from dividends that are distributed by the corpo­
rate enterprise. This tax exclusion may be considered as 
a relief measure rather than a return in part, by the govern­
ment, to the proprietary theory. The tax credit which is 
allowed on dividends is of dividends received after 
July 31, 1954. This 1$ credit cannot exceed the amount of
7 William Raymond Green, The Theory and Practice of 
Modern Taxation (New York: Commerce Clearing House. Inc..
1938;Second Edition), p. 5g. *
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tax to be paid for the year, which is reduced by any foreign 
tax credits or 7$ of all the taxable income before January 1, 
1955 or after January 1, 1955. The $50 dividends exclu-
c>
sion is not to be used to calculate this credit.0
No double taxation present. Some authors hold that 
the stockholders of corporate enterprises are only the 
theoretical sovereign power, and their position is that of 
creditors who have given up some of the security of ordinary 
creditors in order to obtain greater gains.9 Although the 
stockholder is considered the owner of a corporate enter­
prise, this fact appears only theoretical in the large corpo­
rate enterprise. With so many outstanding shares of capital 
stock, the voice of one share in several hundred thousand 
is but a whisper. The stockholder when he purchases one 
share of corporate stock is looking to the corporate enter­
prise for a return on his investment and his concern with 
the actual management of the corporate enterprise is only ex­
pressed when returns on his investment are not forthcoming. 
The corporate enterprise has a duty to safeguard the invest­
ment of the owner as well as remunerate him for the funds
^ Prentice-Hall 1955 Federal Tax Coursesf Students 
Edition (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954)> sec. 1701-b,
v i t ?ic£ ^ d Goodei Corporation Income Tax (New
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1951), pp. 16-18.
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being used. The same is true with creditors but the creditors 
do not expect an extra return on their investment, only the 
payment of the original debt which usually includes the cost 
of the goods sold plus a profit. The corporate enterprise 
from an entity approach has claimants in the creditor as well 
as the stockholder and anything they receive is a reduction 
of the corporate wealth. Hence, the payments to the creditor 
and to the stockholder by the corporate enterprise represent 
a reduction in the total assets of the corporate enterprise.
If this double taxation feature were eliminated in 
total or in part, Randolph1^ states, there would be many 
stockholders who would receive a large sura of dividends and 
an-, increase of capital appreciation on the value of their 
stock which the stockholders never did anticipate. The 
present condition of double taxation is known by all and 
expected to continue. Thus if a change in the law occured 
it would lead to a new interpretation of the existing tax 
concept of the corporate entity. Also, Randolph11 further 
states, that if the corporate income taxes were to be elimi­
nated, there would be large accumulations of untaxed profits 
and it would not be practical nor possible in some cases
10 Randolph, £&. cit., p. 354.
11 Ibid.. pp. 357-353.
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12to distribute all of the corporate enterprise’s profits.
Hence, if a corporate enterprise could be classified as a 
separate economic entity which would be distinct from the 
stockholders, according to Randolph,^ then it should be
taxed substantially./
Considering both arguments. The income tax of 1909 
and before the passage of the sixteenth amendment, states 
the National Tax Association 1946 Proceedings,^ was con­
sidered as a tax on the stockholder and not a tax on the 
corporate enterprise as such. However, after the sixteenth 
amendment was passed, there was introduced a new concept to 
corporate taxation, and now, the tax is considered as being 
levied against the corporate enterprise and not a tax on the 
stockholder. This new attitude was an about-face in the 
theory of taxation.
Between 1913 and 1935, dividends were exempt from
15normal tax but not from a surtax in the United States.
Hence, when the normal tax rate for corporations and the
^  There is always the possibility of reducing the 
price of the product which in turn would reduce future income.
Randolph, op. cit., p. 373*
^  Ronald B. Welch, Editor, National Tax Association 
1946 Proceedings at Chicago. June 3-6. 1946 (Sacramento, 
California: National Tax Association, 1946), p. 3&5.
Blough, op. cit.. pp. 314-315.
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normal tax rate for individuals is the same and either the 
corporate enterprise^ income or the dividends received by
A
the stockholder are exempt from normal tax, there is no 
double taxation problem.
The corporate income tax is levied on the source and 
with a tax on the dividends which the individuals receive, 
the stockholders are being taxed twice on that part of the 
income which is returned to the stockholders in the form of 
cash dividends, A different rate between the stockholder*s
A
normal tax and the corporate normal tax with the corporate 
lower would reduce some of this double taxation. Although 
part of the tax would be double, the total tax paid by the 
stockholder and the corporate enterprise would not be twice 
the normal tax of the stockholder. Thus, some relief is 
offered to the stockholder,
A possible solution to the problem of double taxation 
would be to eliminate the corporate tax on income and con­
sider the distribution of profits from the corporate enter­
prise along with all undistributed profits as income to the 
stockholder In this way, the treatment of income taxes 
would be the same as that which now exists for the sole 
proprietor and the partnership. Hence, there would be no 
double taxation problem because taxes would be assessed
16 P. 316.
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directly on the stockholder. This solution would, however, 
cause many other problems— an example being record keeping—  
and such a solution does not seem too practical.
If all the dividends of the corporation could be 
treated as interest expense, there would be little trouble 
and the investor would be quite satisfied.1? It would 
alleviate a great number of problems when a corporate enter­
prise is considering the possibilities of new capital. Hence, 
for tax purposes, the corporate enterprise would not be con­
sidered a separate entity but only a method of doing business.
The consideration of interest as an expense and divi-
1$dends as a distribution of profits, Seligman states, is 
strictly a tax point of view. From an economic standpoint, 
the distribution of dividends and interest would be a return 
on the investment and hence, a distribution of income. The 
law allows the deduction of interest but it does not allow 
the deduction of dividends. It is understandable why some 
economists hold that there is little difference between the 
stockholder and the bondholderj1^ contributors of capital
^  Magill, 0£. cit., pp. 127-123.
it*
Edwin R. A. Seligman, The Income Tax (New York;
The Macmillan Company, 1911), p. 513.
“9 Frank H. Knight, Risk. Uncertainty and Profit 
(Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1933; Re-issue), pp. 
300-301, and 350.
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are concerned because both receive as payment for funds ad­
vanced to the corporate enterprise a division of the corpo­
rate enterprise's income.
Deductions that are allowed for income tax purposes
are only those which are necessary to produce income or
20which cause losses. But, there is a distinction made 
between the income that is obtained from borrowed capital 
and that which is obtained from equity capital. Interest 
on borrowed capital is a deductible expense but dividends, 
which have the same function as interest as far as the corpo­
rate entity is concerned because the dividends constitute 
a charge for the use of money and from the stockholder's 
point of view it is a return on his investment, are not 
deductible expenses.
Stockholders. The equity of the stockholders in a 
corporate enterprise is represented by their capital contri­
bution and retained earnings. The capital contribution is 
the capital stock plus any paid-in-surplus; the accumulation 
of past profits in the retained earnings account is what 
has cause the greatest problem from a tax point of view. 
Dividends are a reduction of the owners’ equity in the
20 Blough, o£. cit., p. 317.
4S
corporate enterprise.
The stockholders " . . .  have inchoated ownership of 
the corporate assets and earnings, but that is quite dif­
ferent from the direct type of ownership enjoyed by part­
ners. Therefore, the corporate enterprises . . have
22
become economic reality protected by law.”
Bondholders. The bondholders are little concerned 
with the dispute about double taxation. The interest paid 
to the bondholders is a deductible expense for the corpo­
rate enterprise and the income received by the bondholders 
is taxable to them. The position of the bondholders is one 
that the stockholders would like to have as far as income 
taxes are concerned because then, according to the proprietary 
approach, their income would not be taxed twice.
Management. Today, in the study of the corporate 
enterprise and the theories that have been presented in the 
last twenty years, is found a great deal of confusion. How­
ever, one thing .is certain and it is that in the case of 
the large corporate enterprise, there is a division between 
ownership and management. This positive division of owner­
ship and management has led the writers in the tax field
21 Randolph, ££. cit.. p. 353.
22 XiQ>c» cit.
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to follow the entity approach to the problem and deem that
there is distinctly an income tax levy on two separate units*
Ra n d o l p h 2^ presents the following comments on the subject.
Do the stockholders have a real voice in the for­
mation of important corporate policies, such as 
wages, price and dividend policies? Does the fact 
of incorporation bestow substantial economic ad­
vantage, such-as accessibility to national, and 
perhaps world, capital markets? Are corporate 
characteristics— such as limited liability of stock­
holders, easy transfer of ownership and perpetual 
life— essential to the very manner of doing business? 
These attributes suggest the economic separateness 
of the corporation and justification for a corpo­
ration tax.
Before the twentieth century, the problem of income 
taxes was nonexistent because there .was no income tax on 
the corporate enterprise and the managers of the corporate 
enterprises were usually the owners. The problem arose, how­
ever, with the introduction of income taxes on personal and 
corporate incomes and the divorce of management and ownership# 
In cases where management is paid a percentage of the 
profits for their efforts, this extra salary is tax deducti­
ble for the corporate enterprise. Even though this salary 
is admitted by the corporate enterprise as a distribution 
of the corporate profits, it is still tax deductible for 
the corporate enterprise as a portion of the gross salary 
of the officers. There is no reason why, Goode24 states,
23 Ib£&*, p. 373.
2^ G 6 o o p. -cit.. p. 17.
50
the management of corporate enterprises should not receive 
this added compensation for superior managerial skill. This 
extra remuneration which is calculated as a percentage of 
the profit increase of the corporate enterprise is paid as 
a reward for superior management and it is also an induce­
ment to increase the efficiency within the corporate enter­
prise. Even though this extra remuneration to management 
is calculated on the added profits of the corporate enter­
prise because of management^ efficiency it is considered 
as a cost to obtain higher profits and hence, tax deductible.
Employees. The employees of a corporate enterprise 
are little concerned with the corporate income tax. The 
wages of the employees are deductible expenses of the corpo­
rate enterprise. However, some have claimed that if the 
proprietary theory was to be invoked in taxing the corporate 
enterprise, the employees may benefit by a higher wage which 
would be made possible because of the reduced tax. This 
contention, however, does not seem likely.
Government. The purpose of income taxes is to obtain 
money in order to operate the government. The basis for the 
tax levies, Magill25 states, is on the privilege to do business
25 Magill, ££• cit.f p. 128.
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and not on the ability to pay. Some economists hold that
the income tax is levied on the corporate enterprise be-
26cause the corporation is in a position to pay, 0 and hence,
the injustice of double taxation can be excused only by the
fact that the government needs the revenue n. . • and the
27difficulty in raising it elsewhere.1'
Miscellaneous. There are many other comments that 
have been made with regard to the income tax on corporate 
enterprises. Some of these statements follow.
Goode^ points out that Great Britain, Australia,
New Zealand, and other countries of the world which have 
an income tax, have integrated the corporate and individual 
income tax. These countries have adjusted the rates so 
that the proprietary theory of ownership is followed. The 
relief from the payment of the normal tax by both the stock­
holder and the corporate enterprise is in force and hence,
a normal tax is paid by one party only and it is usually the
29corporate enterprise.
26
National Tax Association 1946 Proceedings, o p . cit., 
PP. 3S7-36S.
^7 Green, op. cit.. p. 59.
^  Goode, op. cit.. p. 9.
29
? Magill, pp. cit., pp. 122-123, points out that 
Great Britain has a normal tax paid by the corporate enter­
prise and the rate is the same as the rate paid by individual
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Although the stockholders of large corporations clamor 
for relief from the double taxation problem they are quite 
satisfied with the protection given them by the corporate 
enterprise laws of the country. The corporate enterprise 
is a separate entity established by lav; and as such is taxed 
by the federal and state governments.
Summary. Taxes play a large part in the corporate 
enterprise. In the tax laws today, some people believe 
that income taxes on the corporation result in double taxa­
tion. Income taxes are levied first on the corporation and, 
when dividends are declared and paid to the stockholders, 
the stockholders are taxed again on the dividend income* 
Hence, the corporation pays a tax on its income and the 
stockholder pays a tax on his income received from the corpo­
ration which has already been taxed.
A double tax is not equitable. In the partnership or 
sole proprietorship, the income of the business is only taxed 
once. The stockholders are the owners, following a propri­
etary approach, and hence, there is discrimination between 
forms of organizations. Also, the corporation is considered
taxpayers. When dividends are paid by the corporate enter­
prise to its stockholders, the tax on the dividends is paid 
by the corporation so when the stockholder reports this 
dividend income he,is given a tax credit on the normal tax 
dividends3 P&y y 8 surtax on the income received in
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merely a method of doing business with the corporate charter 
merely a piece of worthless paper. The tax laws do provide 
room for believing double taxation is practiced, because in 
the first years of income tax the stockholders were exempt 
from paying the normal tax on dividends received from a 
corporation. This has changed, and in the recent tax law 
the stockholder is given a dividend exclusion and tax credit 
for dividends.
Following an entity approach, there is no double 
taxation situation, because the tax is levied on a separate 
and distinct entity which can be so identified. The law 
permits deductions which are necessary to produce income or 
which cause losses. Dividends are not considered deductible 
but interest on borrowed capital is a deductible expense.
The stockholder is in the middle of the problem and 
following the proprietary theory he is being unjustly treated. 
However, according to the entity theory there is no injustice.
Management has taken over the reins of operating the 
business. The salaries received by management are deductible 
for income tax purposes even though the compensation is con­
sidered a distribution of corporate profits. The managements 
are not only the operators of the corporate enterprise but 
they are also creditors for their salary.
The creditors and employees are also creditors of the 
corporate enterprise and the stockholders would prefer a
5k
position of creditor for tax purposes, because dividends 
would be deducted as an expense rather than being considered 
distributed income.
The government is a tax collector and does not try 
to apply the entity or proprietary theory, because the pur­
pose for income taxes is to obtain money in order to operate 
the government.
CHAFTER IV
INVESTMENT VIEWPOINT
OF THE PROPRIETARY THEORY AND THE ENTITY THEORY 
OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE
Do the stockholders of a corporate enterprise really 
own the corporate enterprise or are they just investors?^- 
In large corporate enterprises it would seem foolish to 
think that a stockholder with one share of stock out of 
several thousand shares outstanding would have an effective 
voice in the corporate affairs. But ownership means the 
right to possess or at least to have a voice in the manage- 
ment of the corporate enterprise, and each stockholder who 
owns voting stock does have a voice in the corporation even 
though that voice may not always be heard.
Following are some of the comments made by different 
authors with respect to the theory that the stockholder is 
an owner as opposed to an investor. As can be seen, the 
comments vary widely when considering the entity theory, 
the proprietary theory, the stockholder, the management, 
the creditor, the employee, and the government. The final 
analysis as to the contribution of the authors to the complete
**• Stockholders as mere investors implies that the 
stockholder is a type of creditor.
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entity theory and the proprietary theory of corporate enter­
prise will be presented in the eighth chapter.
A corporation is a voluntary association of persons 
natural or legal, organized under and recognized by 
the law as a person, fictitious in character, having 
a corporate name and being entirely separate and 
distinct from the persons who compose it, for the 
accomplishment of some specified purpose or purposes. 
It has continuous succession during the period of 
life assigned by its charter and the right to perform 
as a natural person all the functions expressed in 
its charter, or implied thereby, or incidental there­
to.
This definition brings out the fact that a corpo­
ration is not an organization formed by the state, 
as many say, but it is one formed by persons in • 
accordance with the provisions of the state laws, 
and then duly recognized by the state as a corporation
The above definition of the corporate enterprise favors the 
association theory of entity as stated in law or the more 
common term, proprietary theory of corporate enterprise.
The term securities as used in financial circles can 
mean capital stocks or bonds or both. The ownership in a 
corporate enterprise is evidenced by a stock certificate and 
the debt of a corporate enterprise is shown by a bond cer­
tificate. Hence, because one owns securities does not mean 
he owns a part in the corporate enterprise unless these 
securities are capital stocks.
2 Joseph Howard Bonneville and Lloyd Ellis Dewey, 
Organizing and Financing Business (New York: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1945; Third Revised Edition), p. 56.
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In past years, Daniels-^ relates, the term liabilities 
applied to all accounts on the right-hand side of the balance 
sheet which would include the owners’ equity section. As 
theory progressed, the accountants and businessmen realized' 
that the capital stock of the corporate enterprise did not 
represent a liability in the same manner as the other claims 
but that the liability of the owners’ equity was just an 
accountability trust. Thus, the introduction of the many 
new words— net worth, capital section, owners’ equity, invest­
ed capital, and so forth— served to represent the owners’ 
equity section of the balance sheet and the presentation of 
the balance sheet with a division between liabilities and 
net worth.
Douglas, Skar, and Price present the following com­
parison between a corporate enterprise and a partnership.
Corporation
1. Exists in its own name as an individual.
2. Has continuous existence regardless of change 
in stockholders.
3« Stockholders have limited liability.
4. Obligations arise only from acts of agents or 
officers.
5« Profits belong to the corporation until dividends 
are declared.
3 M. B. Daniels, Financial Statements (Chicago:
American Accounting Association, 1939; Monograph No. 2), p. 9*
Partnership
1. Exists as a group of individuals. The members, 
as such, constitute the partnership.
2. Automatic dissolution arising from death, with­
drawal, or incapacity of a partner.
3. Each partner has unlimited personal liability.
4. Obligation arises from the acts of any partner.
5. Profits belong to the individual partners as 
soon as earned. 4-
It is interesting to note, especially, the fifth comparison 
made by the authors. The partner has title to the profits of 
the partnership but the stockholder has no claim on profits 
and receives no remuneration until dividends are paid. Ac­
cording to some followers of the proprietary theory, the stock­
holder is a claimant to the assets subject to the debts and 
the theory resembles the theory of partnership. However, there 
is a marked distinction when ownership and profits are con­
sidered, and the theory of corporate enterprise then leans 
toward the entity approach.
Although the stockholders may try to use the corpo­
rate enterprise for a front, this does not mean that a 
corporate entity exists. In such cases, a corporate enter­
prise will be considered not as a legal entity by the courts 
but as a partnership or a sole proprietorship whichever the 
case may be. The courts are very emphatic, in cases where 
stockholders try to use the cloak of incorporation for their
4- Lloyd V. Douglas, Robert 0. Skar, and Ray G. Price, ' 
Modern Business (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1948),
p. 112.
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own personal gains.^
When ownership is considered in sole proprietorships 
and partnerships, the sole owners or partners have title to 
the property of the business. In the corporate enterprise, 
however, the title to the property is in the hands of the 
corporate enterprise and the stockholders in turn possess 
title to the corporation. The corporate enterprise owns 
all of the property whereas the stockholder owns only a 
pro rata share in the corporate enterprise according to the 
number of stock shares in his portfolio. This pro rata 
share in the corporate enterprise is in turn a pro rata 
share in the total assets less debts and income of the 
corporate enterprise.
The term capital is defined in numerous ways when 
it refers to corporate enterprise.
In the accounting and investment sense, capital 
means the excess of the assets over the liabilities. 
This definition applies whether the organization is 
a corporation or some other type such as a partner­
ship or individual proprietorship. Capital in the 
business sense, however, is used to mean the total 
assets of the business organization. Capital in 
the legal sense is usually interpreted as the par or 
stated value of the capital stock.'
5 Elvin R. Latty, Subsidiaries and Affiliated-Corpo- 
rations (Chicago: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1939), pp. 5-6.
^ Edwin W. Boehmler and others, Financial Institutions 
(Chicago: Richard D. Irwifa, Inc., 1951), P. 313.
7 Joseph 0. Kamm, ^QQRQmlSS qX Investment (New York: 
American Book Company, 1951), p. 107.
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When Kamm defines capital in the accounting and investment
sense, he uses the proprietary approach because capital is
assets less liabilities or to use the equation, A - L * C.
Capital as used in this sense represents the residue in
assets after-the liabilities have been deducted. Capital
in the business sense is equivalent to the entity theory
because the stress here is on the assets of the corporate
enterprise. The liabilities to the creditors and the equity
claims of the stockholders are against the assets collectively
or the equation A = L / C, according to the entity theory
of corporate enterprise. 
a
Shultz contributes the following concept of capital.
In the financial world the term "capitalization" 
means the aggregate dollar amount of the various 
securities issued by a company, including bonds, 
preferred and common stock; the term "owners’ capital" 
means the investment represented by the stock issues 
and surplus; the term "capital structure" means the 
division of the capitalization as between bonds, 
preferred stock, common stock, and surplus. Gross 
capital is the total amount invested by everyone—  
bondholders, stockholders, trade creditors, etc.
Thus, gross capital as used by Shultz would define the entity
approach to the corporate entity.
In considering the contributors of capital the term
modern corporation or modern industry is being widely used
today. The t erm became famous after t he publishing of Berle
^ Birl E. Shultz, The Securities Market and How It 
Works (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1942), p. 59.
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and Means’ book, The Modern Corporation and Private Property.
Modern Industry is largely indirectly owned: inves­
tors own corporations, and corporations own the 
physical properties employed in producing goods and 
rendering services.9
Thus, Burtchett brings out the new look in corporate enter­
prise theory which was introduced by Berle and Means. This 
new look is an entity approach and from an investment view­
point, the stockholder has taken the position of merely an 
investor (creditor) rather than a true owner. The investor 
owns an interest in the corporate enterprise and because of 
this ownership has a vested interest in the assets of the 
corporate enterprise but he does not own the assets. The 
assets are owned by the corporate enterprise only.
Stockholders. The actual ownership in a corporate 
enterprise is represented by stock certificates and the 
rights attached thereto are defined in the charter of the 
corporate enterprise. The interest of .t he stockholder in 
the assets and earnings of the corporate enterprise are in 
direct proportion to the number of shares owned. However, 
one stock certificate may be issued for one or more shares 
of stock.
9 Floyd F. Burtchett, Investments and Investment 
Policy (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 193B), p. llB.
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As long as a corporation is profitable, the stock­
holders, both common and preferred, are entitledto share in 
the distributed profits of the corporate enterprise accord­
ing to their pro rata share of ownership.^* Even though 
the stockholders may not share in the earnings because divi­
dends are not declared, the surplus account is credited with 
the profits and hence, in most cases, continued accumulation 
of earnings may cause an increase in the price of the capi­
tal stock on the securities market. If earnings are high, 
the price of the capital stock will usually advance and if 
earnings are low the price of the capital stock may decline. 
There are other factors which may cause a rise or fall in 
the stock market prices but earnings are an important 
consideration.
Preferred s took and common stock are the two classes 
of capital stock issued by a corporate enterprise. "Common 
stock represents ownership pure and simple, ownership un­
restricted by special limitations and uncomplicated by 
particular privileges. Preferred stock is ownership with 
preference but also with certain limitations."^ Since the 
preferred stockholder has been given preferential treatment,
— — — — I I > I I II l ~ X i —
Shultz, op. cit.. p. 46.
Harry C. Sauvain* Investment Management (New York: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1953), P* 22.
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the common stockholders stand the greatest risk because they 
receive dividends only after the preferred stock obligation 
is met. The common stockholder usually receives the largest 
gain because he is not limited to a percentage of capital 
investment as the preferred stockholder; conversely, the 
common stockholders are liable to suffer the greatest loss 
because of the uncertainties of business. Also, the common 
stockholder is the last recipient when a corporate enter­
prise is being liquidated.
A comparison between a corporate enterprise and a 
partnership reveals that the partners supply most of the 
capital, or in some cases, all of the capital in a partner­
ship and they usually receive all of the gains and suffer 
all of the losses. In a corporate enterprise, however, the 
individual stockholders usually supply all of the total 
capital contribution made to the corporate enterprise, but 
the stockholder receives only his proportionate share of
the gains when dividends are declared and his losses will
12be only to the extent of his capital contribution.
One of the greatest advantages of the corporate form 
of business organization is tne limited liability feature, 
although in specific cases it may be a disadvantage. Usually,
Harry L. Purdy, Martin L. Lindahl, and William A. 
Carter, Corporate Concentration and Public Policy (New York: 
Prentic-Hall, Inc., 1950), p. 55.
>
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the only amount a stockholder can lose is his capital contri­
bution. A partnership has unlimited liability but n. • ». it 
is possible in most states to limit the liability of partners 
through formation of a limited partnership; but even here,
there must be at least one partner who has unlimited lia- 
13bility.’1 Although the partnership must have one member 
with unlimited liability, the stockholders all have limited 
liability in a corporate enterprise. The corporate enter­
prise, on the other hand, has unlimited liability.
The authors in the field of investments follow either 
the entity theory or the proprietary theory of corporate 
enterprise. Following the entity theory reasoning, the 
authors hold that the position of the stockholder is quite 
similar to the other contributors of capital or stated an­
other way, the stockholder is just an investor in the corpo­
ration. The proprietary theory which is held by some authors 
is presented with the idea of ownership of the corporation 
as such by the stockholders. Both theories are included 
here with comments by the various authors.
4
Entity theory. Leavitt and Hansen in their book, 
Personal Finance, say, "In a sense, ownership of a business
^  Boehmler, ££>. cit.. p. 209.
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corporation is divided between two groups of people; stock­
holders and creditors."^ This is directly in line with the 
entity theory because ownership is not limited to the stock­
holders.
Boehmler and others in their book, Financial Institu­
tions f present the following description of stockholders.
A very large proportion of stockholders are inarticu­
late as owners. They do not seek to have a voice in 
management, do not attend stockholder meetings, and 
often do not trouble to send in a written authoriza­
tion (called a ’proxy1) delegating some other person 
to vote the stock for them at the meeting. Their 
motivation is undoubtedly found in the hope of income 
and appreciation in value rather than in managerial 
ambitions. In effect, the great mass of stockholders 
conduct themselves more nearly like creditors than 
owners. In fact, this is but a manifestation of the 
separation of ownership and control (management) 
that has so frequently been noted as characteristic 
of our times. For this reason some writers have 
called stocks 'investment credit instruments.1 The 
time nature of stock should, however; be clearly 
understood— they represent ownership, not credit. ?
The authors do imply that the stockholders' position is quite 
similar to the creditors because of their own actions although 
the legal fact is the stockholders do own the corporate enter­
prise.
Considering the stocks and bonds of the corporate 
enterprise, Burtchett says,
John A. Leavitt and Carl 0. Hansen; Personal 
Financq (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950),
p< 157.
^  Boehmler and others, Qjp,. fiii,., p. 222.
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Between stocks and bonds there exist differences 
both of a legal and an economic nature; there are, 
some overlappings. While it is true that shares are 
evidences of ownership and bonds are credit contracts, 
it must not be forgotten that both are legally re­
garded as being contracts and that both exist between 
the corporation on the one fagnd and the shareholder 
or bondholder on the other.
The retention of earnings by the corporate enterprise, 
according to the literature on corporate finance,1? deprives 
the stockholder of the right to decide which is to be the 
best disposition of the funds that have been retained by 
the corporate enterprise. In a great many cases, the stock­
holders would prefer receiving the retained earnings in the 
form of dividends but the power exercised by the majority 
of individual stockholders is indeed small in the large 
corporate enterprise because of their passive attitude.
When a stockholder invests in a corporate enterprise, 
there is never a promise to return the invested capital at 
any time by anyone. If the stockholder wishes to regain 
his original investment, he can sell his stock to some other 
person or in some cases, the corporate enterprise may be 
liquidated and then the stockholder will receive his pro
16 Burtchett, op. cit., p. 140.
1? Sergei P. Dobrovolsky. "Corporate Retained Earn­
ings and Cyclical Fluctuations," The American Economic Review 
XXXV (19453, p. 571.
Sauvain, pp. cit.. p. 21.
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rata share of the corporate assets along with the other 
stockholders. If thecorporate enterprise was merely a 
form of doing business, the stockholder would not have to 
wait for the corporation to declare the dividend. The 
declaration of dividends would be only a formality. How­
ever, with the corporate entity in existence, the stock­
holder must wait for the declaration of dividends by the 
corporate enterprise and this procedure fosters the entity 
theory.
Proprietary theory. Burtchett defines the stock­
holder's position in the following way. "The owner of 
one of these shares is a partial owner of the proprietor­
ship interest; but he is not a partial owner of the corpo­
ration's assets. The stockholders collectively own the 
corporation which, in turn, owns the assets."^
Louis Engel, in his book, How to Buy Stocks, says,
The stockholders of America are the people who own, 
operate, and finance much of its business— virtually 
all its more important business. As that business 
has grown, stock owners have prospered. As it con­
tinues to grow, they will continue to prosper.20
One can add that as the business decreases, the stockholders
will suffer the losses.
^  Burtchett, £p. cit.. pp. 11S-119.
20 Louis Engel, How to Buy Stocks (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1953)* p« 6.
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An investor in a company who has one share has just
as much ownership as any other share. With the one share,
the stockholder is a part owner of the business and with
21the other stockholders he becomes an owner in common.
The rights per share of capital stock are equal but it is 
the number of shares owned in a corporate enterprise which 
determines who controls. The capital stock of a corpo­
ration represents the actual ownership of a corporate enter­
prise.
The holders of capital stock own the equity in the 
assets which remain after the debts of the corpo­
ration are paid. Capital stock, therefore, means 
proprietorship, ownership, or per cent control of 
the business. A share is a fractional interest in 
the equity of a corporation.22
Although stocks and bonds represent contributions of 
capital to a corporation, they are entirely different in 
nature. The stockholder in a sense owes the bondholders 
because the stockholders1 capital contribution will be used 
to 'pay the debt if the obligation cannot be met from opera­
tions although the bonds are a corporate obligation.2  ^ The 
purchase of stock by an investor is not a loan to the corpo­
rate enterprise but it represents ownership of the corporation’s
21 Ibid.. p. 8.
22 Shultz, op. cit., p. 43*
23 Elvin F. Donaldson, Personal Finance (New York:
The Ronald Press Company, 1948), p. 378.
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capital stock.
Engel states the difference between stocks and bonds 
quite simply when he says,
The man who buys stock in a company actually 
buys a part of that company. The man who buys a 
company’s bonds simply lends his money to the company. 
The stockholder expects to collect dividends on his 
stock and thus share in the company’s profits. The 
bondholder expects to earn a fixed return on his 
investment in the form of interest payments.24
Although the majority group of stockholders are in a 
position to rule in the large corporate enterprise because 
of the total number of shares owned, the minority group of 
stockholders usually are the ruling body because of the 
passive attitude of the other stockholders. The stockholders 
maintain control of the corporate enterprise through the 
board of directors whom they elect. With the great disper­
sion of ownership in the large corporations, a small concen­
tration of votes can control the election. The results of 
this dispersion of stockholders has caused a few stockholders, 
to exercise their right to vote and few investors are inter­
ested in corporate affairs as long as the dividend check 
keeps coming, and hence all parties are usually happy. This 
passive attitude of the stockholders has caused the concen­
tration of power in the hands of a few who are able to rule
Engel, op. cit.. p. 34.
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the corporate enterprise by setting up a board of directors 
of their own choosing, and thus, control the corporation, 
which is not directly related to their proportionate share 
of ownership. ^
When the stockholder tries to maintain control in 
a corporate enterprise, he is confronted with many diffi­
culties. The stockholder transfers to the directors of the 
corporation his right to operate the corporate enterprise, 
and the directors in turn, transfer the responsibility to 
the officers of the corporation. "As a result, the extent 
to which the owner has lost control and the present location 
of that control are matters of general social c o n c e r n , " ^
Creditors. The sale of bonds by a corporate enter­
prise represents an obligation of the issuing corporation. 
The obligation is to repay the principal and a stated amount 
of interest within a given length of time. The corporation 
has borrowed the money from the bondholders and the corpo­
rate enterprise must pay back to the bondholders the amount 
borrowed plus all the interest which the bondholders are 
entitled to— the amount of redemption is the stated value 
or face value if the bonds are redeemed at maturity but at
25 Purdy, Lindahl, and Carter, ££. cit.. pp. 72-73.
^  Ibid., pp. 61-62.
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any time preceding that date, there may be a premium or 
discount to consider.
The interest of the bondholders must be paid whereas 
the dividends of the preferred stock and common stock may 
be passed. The interest payment is a direct obligation of 
the corporation to the bondholders. However, if the direc­
tors decide not to pay dividends, the stockholders will 
receive no return on their investment. As long as there is 
money to pay interest, this obligation will be met by the 
corporate enterprise. Failure to meet this obligation may 
result in forced liquidation of the corporation. Failure 
to meet the anticipated dividend declaration, if a policy 
of annual dividends has been adhered to in the past, will 
not affect the corporation directly because the stockholders 
cannot force liquidation when the corporate enterprise does 
not declare dividends whereas the bondholders can force dis­
solution if interest payments are not made.
The holders of corporate bonds are creditors of the 
issuing corporate enterprise. The claim of the bondholders is 
against the assets of the corporation and the bondholders have 
priority over the stockholders in case of liquidation. When 
bonds of a corporate enterprise are secured, the claims of 
the bondholders are against particular assets and are before 
the other general creditors.
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The creditors of a corporate enterprise, Boehmler2? 
states, are in a poorer position than the creditors of a 
partnership in that the creditors can look only to the 
assets of a corporation for payment but in a partnership, 
the creditors can look to the assets of the partnership 
and all the free assets of each individual partner. There­
fore, the position of the creditor would depend directly 
on the assets of the corporate enterprise or partnership.
Liabilities are " . . .  obligations of the enterprise; 
equities in the assets other than interests of stockholders, 
(or other proprietary interests)."2^ Daniels would give to 
the owners of the liabilities against the corporate enter­
prise a vested interest which is equivalent to the claims 
of the stockholders. The only rights which the debtors do 
not possess would be a claim to the dividends of the corpo­
ration along with the right to vote and the preemptive right 
which all stockholders do not possess.
The plan of customer-ownership of corporate enterprises 
has gained much impetus in certain fields in the last few 
years.2^ The greatest evidence of the plan is in the electric
27 Boehmler, pp. cit.. p. 211.
2^ Daniels, op. cit.. p. 2.
2^ Chelcie C. Bosland, Corporate Finance and Regulation 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1949)> P« 194*
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power and light utilities. However, industrial corporations 
have sometimes tried this method of ownership and the best 
example is the United Drug Company. The Rexall Drug stores 
are privately owned organizations but they have affiliated 
themselves with the United Drug Company, through the pur­
chase of the corporation^ capital stock. In the grocery 
business the small neighborhood stores have had to join 
together into larger groups in order to compete with the 
large chain stores. The Nation Wide Stores is such an ex­
ample of independent grocers joining a national organization. 
Because of such practices, the corporation could be in a 
better position financially if the customers were stock­
holders for when the corporation became financially embar­
rassed, the corporate enterprise could look to its owners, 
especially the custoraer-owners, for assistance. The possi­
bility for aid could be quite good because the customers 
have a double interest in the corporation, one as a customer 
and one as an owner.^
Management. One of the greatest rights of the stock­
holder is his control over the management of the corporate 
enterprise. In large corporations this control is not evi­
denced because of the large number of stockholders but there
30 The plan for customer-ownership would also apply 
to creditor-ownership.
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are groups within the corporation who exercise the control
and often there are proxy battles to unseat the faction in
power. Although the stockholder can exercise control over
the management, as astockholder he cannot transact business
in the corporation’s name even if he owns one hundred per
cent of the capital stock outstanding, ’’Because of this
separation, a wedding of ’money and brains,’ not always
31possessed by the same person, is feasible,’’
Before the securities and exchange laws were passed, 
most of the stockholders were not in a position to know 
what was going on in the corporate enterprise in which the 
stockholders owned stock.^ The management and the directors 
had a day to day account of activities but financial state­
ments were seldom if ever published. When statements were 
published they were confusing to the stockholders and there 
were few if any requirements to conform to uniform standards. 
After the SEC was born, requirements were set up to protect 
the stockholders from the abuse that might exist because of 
unscrupulous officers and directors.
Although the corporation is owned by the stockholders, 
”. . . their right to manage the corporate affais must be
31 Bosland, o£. cit., p.
32 Alden Winthrop, Are You a Stockholder? (New York: 
Covici, Friede, Inc., 1937)» p« 2ST*
75
exercised through the board of d i r e c t o r s . T h u s ,  the 
entity theory might be favored here because even though the 
stockholders own the corporate enterprise they cannot exer­
cise the power of control over the corporation directly.
Berle and Means^4 point out that some states have 
provided in their corporate laws provisions which would per­
mit the election of the directors by the bondholders and by 
the employees of the corporation. In most states where a 
corporate enterprise has been in financial difficulty, the 
bondholders may usually elect the whole board of directors 
until the interest which is owed them is paid and the corpo­
ration is apparently out of danger. The bond indenture will 
usually set the rules governing the rights of the bond­
holders along with the state laws governing the sale of 
bonds.
Although the rights of the stockholder are defined 
in the corporate charter, his right to the earnings in the 
corporation, which is pro rata according to the number of 
shares owned, is determined by the board of directors who 
order the payment of dividends.
33 Leavitt and Hansen, ££. cit.r p. 337.
34 Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1934)» P* 220.
Employees. A new policy that is being adopted in 
the corporate enterprise is to have employees purchase the 
corporation’s capital stock so that the employees may be­
come an integral part of the organization. As stockholders, 
the employees will benefit indirectly because of their 
efforts as employees. Savings on the part of employees may 
be reflected in increased profits for the corporate enter­
prise and as stockholders, the employees’ dividends may be 
increased because of the greater corporate profits.
Eecause of the uncertainty of the stock market, 
management has not fully endorsed the stock purchase plans 
for the employees, nor have the employees looked with great 
favor to the idea.-^ When the day arrives that capital 
stock prices are relatively stable, there may be a large 
increase in the employee-ownership idea. However, some 
companies have set aside funds to repurchase at a fixed 
price the capital stock which the employees own. Also, 
some corporations have set up special classes of stock just 
for employee purchases and this stock is not traded on the 
market but does earn a return. This is also a proprietary 
idea with the stockholders trying to bring the employees 
into the field of owners.
Dividends« The stockholder, when he purchases capital 
stock does not purchase a right which guarantees that divi- 
dends will be paid. There is not a promise or a right in 
the nature of a stock issue in regard to the payment of divi­
dends. However, the stockholder does have a right to divi­
dends when they are declared but not until that time is 
reached. In case of preferred stock dividends over common 
stock dividends, the relationship is not a right but only 
a preference with preferred stockholders receiving their 
dividends before the common stockholders. This is a prefer­
ence as to payment of dividends when declared but nothing 
compels directors to declare dividends. There is one excep­
tion to the rule because • « the courts of equity have 
required corporations to pay dividends to stockholders when 
failure to do so was clearly unjustified and inequitable."^
The laws of the land will not compel a corporate 
enterprise to pay dividends when earnings are large unless 
the stockholders can prove bad faith amongthe directors.^ 
Usually, when the directors wish to retain earnings for the
36 Sauvain, o£. cit.. p. 21.
37 Loc.-cit*
38 Bosland, oj>. cit.. p. 54.
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benefit of business, the courts will allow such practices.39 
Some people are under the impression that by invest­
ing in common stock they will make a fortune. However,
There is nothing inherent in stock which will cause 
it to earn dividends or go up in price in the market. 
When a business incorporates there is no reason why 
the owners will earn more on their equity than they
did before incorporation.40
Following the entity theory, the stockholder invests in the 
possible action of another and the profits accruing to the 
stockholder will depend on this other impersonal being, the 
corporate enterprise.
The dividends on preferred stock, Badgar and Guthmann^ 
state, may be considered as part interest and part profit.^
39 In the Dodge v. Ford Motor Car Co., 204 Mich. 459 
(1919) the court ordered dividends paid to the stockholders. 
The court decided that the minority stockholders were being 
unjustly treated and since there were sufficient profits, 
dividends must be distributed to the stockholders. In Jones 
v. Van Heusen Charles Co., 246 New York Supp. 204 (1936) the 
court allowed the recovery of salaries from the directors 
during the period that dividends were not paid. The court 
also ordered the payment of dividends to the stockholders.
Donaldson, op. cit.. p. 37#.
41 Ralph Eastman Badgar and Harry G. Guthmann, Invest 
mentsf Principles and Practices (Third Edition; New York! 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1942), p. 64.
^  There is also the theory that even with common 
stock the dividend should be considered as part interest and 
part profit.
Preferred stock represents ownership but the rate of return 
on the investment is fixed— in participating preferred stock 
the regular or fixed return is paid plus a percentage of 
the profits remaining after the common stockholders have 
been paid their proportionate share— as is the interest rate 
on bonds. Thus, the average investor probably thinks that 
the return on preferred stock is a return on his capital 
investment, as he would think if he owned the bonds of a 
corporate enterprise.
Maynard, Weidler, and Burley wrote in their book,
An Introduction to Business Management f the following about 
the stockholder.
Common stock is also residual as to dividends. 
Preferred stockholders have prior claims to amounts 
available for distribution to stockholders to the 
extent and in the same manner prescribed by the 
corporation. All other dividend funds go to the 
common stockholders. Thus, it may be said that the 
rights of common stockholders are junior to both 
bondholders and to preferred stock owners, in assets, 
and junior to preferred stock owners in the case of 
dividends.43
With the investment in common stock and preferred 
stock comes the risk of loss. The return on common stock 
is usually the highest with preferred stock second and the 
corporate bonds last. The degree of risk involved in the
43 Harold H. Maynard, Walter C. Weidler, and Orin E. 
Burley, An Introduction to Business Management (Third Edition 
Hew York: The Ronald Press Company, 1941), p. 17#.
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investment is just the reverse which accounts for the great­
est potential return going to the common stockholders since
their risk is the greatest.
The reason many people invest in common stocks—  
thus becoming owners of a proprietary interest 
instead of creditors by investing in bonds or 
lending their money— is the hope for a higher return 
on their investment. Most people are unwilling to 
bear the risk of ownership unless they can expect 
the maintenance of the original investment and
secure a return on the investment commensurate with
.the risk involved*44
Stock dividends can be considered from two separate 
points of view. A dividend in stock will increase the 
capital account by the amount of the dividend and it usu­
ally satisfies the s tockholders because they do receive 
something even though it is just on paper, Shultz^ states. 
However, the corporation could sell new securities instead 
of retaining the earnings in order to increase the capital 
account but in this case, the stockholders’ pro rata share 
would be reduced in the corporation if the stockholder did 
not purchase additional shares.^ Either way, stock dividends
44 William R. Spriegel and Ernest C. Davis.•Principles 
of Business Organization (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1946), p. 12.
_45 Shultz, op. cit., pp. 46-47*
46 With the pre-emptive right attached to the capital 
stock, the new issues of capital stock must first be offered 
to the stockholders. Thus, they may retain their propor­
tionate share in the corporation.
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or the sale of new securities would not affect the objective 
of the corporate enterprise.
The participation of the stockholders in the divi-
i ± n
dends of the corporation, Badgar and Guthmann relate, 
results from a residual and not a fixed claim. The divi­
dends are a distribution of the profits which are residual 
in nature whereas the interest paid to the bondholders, 
noteholders, and other interest claimants represent a direct 
claim against the income of the corporate enterprise. The 
interest along with the other expenses of the corporation 
must be deducted from gross income before the net income 
can be determined and hence, to see if dividends can be 
distributed to the stockholders.
Miscellaneous. The reason why a corporate enter­
prise is organized and, generally speaking, the reason for 
its continuation is n. . . that a profit will result; and 
from this profit the stockholders— the corporation’s creators 
and their successors— may derive a benefit.”^  No matter 
which theory you consider, either the entity theory or the 
proprietary theory, the ultimate goal is usually a profit.
47 Badgar and Guthmann, op. cit.f pp. 64-65.
4^ Arthur Stone Dewing, The Financial Policy o£ 
Corporations (New York: The Ronald Press Company; Fifth
Edition), I, p. 509.
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When dealing in the study of the credit market, it 
is wise to consider the stockholder as a creditor. The 
creditors viewpoint would be considered superior here be­
cause when a corporation is considering borrowing new capital, 
it can either issue new stock or issue bonds. The operation 
is one of credit and not the idea of securing new or more
owners. The funds are needed and a way out is being con-
49sidered* The persons purchasing the stock, Machlup 
relates, would not be looked on as new entrepreneurs but 
as creditors. However, their rights are the same as the 
old stockholders and the funds supplied are equity capital 
but the purchase is still considered from a credit point of 
view as a borrowed feature. Also, when an investor pur­
chases stocks or bonds of a corporate enterprise, he usu­
ally considers his action as b eing a loan and not an entre- 
preneural function even if he purchases stock.
Under the common law code, the right to vote was 
given to the stockholder and not to the stock itself. Thus, 
a stockholder owning one share of capital stock had one vote 
and a stockholder owning one hundred shares of stock had 
but one vote. However, statutory laws were passed which 
gave the right to vote to each share of stock held and if
•^9 Fritz Machlup, The Stock Market. Credit and Capital 
Formation (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940), pp. 22-23.
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one hundred shares of stock were owned, the stockholder had
50one hundred votes. Under the old common law interpretation 
of stock ownership, the proprietary theory was followed when 
the vote was attached to the stockholder and not to the 
capital stock. The state as such did not give the corporate 
enterprise anything but it was the stockholder who trans­
fer ed his rights to the corporation, thus giving it the 
right to operate after being recognized by the state. The 
corporation was an association of stockholders.
Although the corporation is a separate entity and is 
treated as an individual in the eyes of the law, the states
have passed laws which go above and beyond the laws which
51cover the regular individual. These laws do not affect 
the stockholder but only the corporate enterprise. Hence, 
the separateness of the corporation and thus, the entity 
theory of corporate enterprise is further exemplified in 
the laws of the land.
In dealing with the corporate enterprise concept, 
Bosland^ relates, it is imperative that the stockholders 
exist, because without stockholders there is no corporate
50 Kamm, op. cit., p. 128.
5^ Francis Cooper, Financing an Enterprise (Third 
Edition; New York: The Ronald Press, 1909), II, p. 5H»
Bosland, op. cit.. p. 51*
enterprise. Perhaps those most concerned with the corpo­
ration outside of the stockholders are management. However, 
a corporation, as such, does not need a management group
for its existence but it must have stockholders to be a
53corporate enterprise.^
The life of the corporation is usually unlimited 
except when a limitation is placed on it in the charter or 
by state or federal law. Hence, if the life of the corpo­
ration is greater than that of the stockholder, the corpo­
rate enterprise would seem to be greater as to existence 
at least. The individual stockholders may continually 
change but the corporation can go on forever. Hence, the 
authority received by virtue of the proprietary theory would 
be constantly changing with a change in the stockholders 
whereas according to the entity theory, a change in the 
stockholders has no effect on the corporation because author­
ity to act is state given.
The corporate enterprise as a separate entity re­
ceives money to operate from the stockholders of the corpo­
ration and from bondholders with the current liabilities 
supplying the short term credit. The suppliers of the
53 There must be a management group if the corpo­
ration is to operate unless the stockholders perform this 
task. However, the stockholders would then be performing 
the functions of management.
investment capital— stockholders— may regain their cash 
investment at any time by selling their stock on the open 
market. The stockholder will receive a price fdr his 
capital stock which may be higher or lower than his origi­
nal investment. This transaction has no visa&le effect 
on the corporate enterprise and the entity continues to 
do business as usual. The corporation will now have a new 
investor or owner and there is no visible change in the 
organization. There may be some effect upon the corporation 
which would result because of the influence of the new owner 
or the loss of the old owner as well as the amount of stock 
purchased or sold. However, the entity as such does not 
change. If such a transaction was made in a partnership, 
the partnership would be dissolved.
Summary. Two major points are brought out and they 
are, first, that the stockholder is an owner, and secondly, 
that the stockholder is a mere investor (creditor). The 
idea that the stockholder is an owner is a proprietary 
approach and the idea that he is a mere investor is an en­
tity approach.
Following the entity approach, ownership has been 
divided between the stockholders and creditors. Because of 
their passive attitude as stockholders, by not taking an 
active part in the annual meetings and showing little interest
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in the corporation^ activities, the stockholders conduct 
themselves more nearly like creditors. Another reason is 
that the stockholders have no claim to corporate income 
and only receive a return on their investment when divi­
dends are declared. Hence, their position is inferior 
to creditors.
Following the proprietary approach, a stockholder 
has as much ownership as any other stockholder and collec­
tively" they own the corporation. The stockholder owns the 
equity in the corporate assets after all debts of the corpo­
rate enterprise are met. The stockholder receives dividends 
which are a distribution of corporate profits.
The sale of bonds represents a liability to the 
issuing corporation for a specific amount within a specific 
time period. The interest on the bonds must be paid or the 
bondholders may force the corporation into receivership. 
Dividends on the other hand do not have to be declared and 
the stockholder cannot force the corporation to declare 
dividends whereas t he bondholders can force payment of 
interest.
The general creditors of a corporation can look to 
just the a-sets for payment of debts whereas the creditors 
of a partnership or sole proprietorship can look to all the 
individuals1 free assets.
37
The stockholders elect a board of directors who 
appoint the officers. It is the right of the stockholders 
to elect this board and not the creditors or other interested 
parties. Once management has taken the reins of the corpo­
ration, they perform the managerial function for the stock­
holders.
Some corporations have set up plans whereby employees 
can purchase corporate stock. The reasons are numerous for 
such a program. Where corporations go so far as to guaran­
tee the purchase price to the employee, the employee is not 
only a stockholder but a creditor for any losses suffered.
The distribution of dividends has been considered in 
two different lights, one as a distribution of corporate 
profits and the other as an expense to the corporation. 
Although there is no right inherent in capital stock which 
requires that dividends be paid, the entity approach con­
siders the dividends as an expense when they are paid. The 
proprietary theory considers dividends a distribution of 
profits.
Under common law, the right to vote in a corporation 
was not inherent in the capital stock but the right was 
given to the stockholder. Thus, it made no difference how 
many shares of stock you owned, you just had one vote. To­
day, however, the right to vote is attached to the shares of 
stock and not to the stockholders.
Laws are passed to govern corporations directly and 
these laws have no effect upon the stockholders. The stock­
holder and the corporation are considered separate entities.
The corporation receives funds from stockholders and 
creditors in order to operate. Although the stockholders and 
the creditors continually change, the corporate enterprise 
remains in existence.
CHAPTER V
MANAGEMENT VIEWPOINT
OF THE PROPRIETARY THEORY AND THE ENTITY THEORY 
OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE
The importance of management in the whole network of 
corporate enterprise is unquestioned. The officers who 
govern the corporation and guide it through all of its ills 
and good fortune are in the center of the whole problem of 
the entity and the proprietary theories.
With the growth of industry and business, ownership 
became less and less important, with the management group 
actually gaining in importance. It is impossible for the 
large corporations with hundreds of stockholders to have 
the stockholders play an active part in the administration 
of corporate business. Hence, more and more of the usual 
duties of tne owners are being taken over by tne management 
element of the corporation. With the divorce of ownership 
and control, it is only logical that management should 
exercise the control necessary to operate the corporate 
enterprise which was formally in the hands of a few stock­
holders.
One of the ways in which management has been able 
to retain control in the large corporate enterprises is
39
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through the use of the proxy machinery. Since ownership 
in the large corporations is so widespread, management has 
been able to control a corporate enterprise without an 
appreciable amount of stock in its actual possession.I As 
long as the present management acts in favor of the major­
ity of stockholders, there is usually no one individual or 
small group of individuals who can gain control of the 
corporate enterprise and thus, replace the present manage­
ment. The stockholders will usually go along with the 
present management unless and until the time they become 
dissatisfied.
Managements increase in power can be directly 
attributed to the growth of the corporation. As the corpo­
rate enterprise grew in financial and physical resources, 
there was a need for professional men to operate the enter­
prise. • The wealthy were not able to contribute all of the 
necessary capital nor were they able to operate the large 
specialized corporations efficiently. Thus, professional 
management groups began to spring up and operate the corpo­
rations and funds began to flow into the corporate enter­
prises from small investors as well. In order to operate
^ Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1937) > m »  P» 419*
2 Ibid.. p. 413.
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these large corporations, the management groups needed 
sufficient authority and they received it. Hence, this 
new power of management gives strength to the entity theory 
in the present corporate enterprise system.
The development of the corporate system as it exists 
today with regard to the large corporations is quite similar 
to the development of the democratic form of government in 
this country. When the country first received its start, 
the government was by direct rule and in the form of town 
council meetings. As time progressed, and the country be­
gan to spread in territory and increase in population, it 
became necessary to form a centralized government. The 
people in the districts would elect their representatives 
who would represent the voters in Washington. When there 
were but a few voters, one vote meant a great deal but with 
the increase in population and hence, the number of voters, 
the power of one vote or even many votes became less and 
less important. This same situation exists in the corporate 
enterprise system today. The stockholder, as such, with 
one vote in a large corporation is not too important from 
a total organization point of view but he is an essential 
contributor to the whole picture of corporate enterprise 
theory. The evolution of the system of government is similar 
to the proprietary and entity theories of corporate enter­
prise. The proprietary theory resembles the government
92
when it was young, and the government in its present status 
resembles the entity theory.
The term management has been defined in many different 
ways with a number of different connotations. Berle and 
Means define management ", , • as that body of men who, in 
law, have formally assumed the duties of exercising domi­
nation over the corporate business and assets,Usually, 
the contributors of equity capital to the corporate enter­
prise before 1900 were the operators of the business. There 
was no dispute over control of a corporation and the owner­
ship of a corporate enterprise ,f. . . as so frequently 
happens t o d a y . T h e  idea of capitalism and the corporation 
which existed before 1900 served the proprietary theory.
The corporate enterprise was an organization of the stock­
holders and they not only played an important part in the 
operations of the corporation but they also controlled it. 
However, today there is less certainty among the stockholders 
as to who can exercise authority or control. Hence, the 
management group has taken over the reins and now the entity 
theory is present.
3 Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and Gardiner C. Means, The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1934), p. 220.
4 Frederick Lewis Allen, The Big Change (New York: 
Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1952), p. 70.
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Following are some of the comments made by different 
authors in management with respect to the ownership of the 
corporate enterprise. As can be seen, the comments vary 
widely when considering the entity theory, the proprietary 
theory, the stockholder, the management, the creditor, the 
employee, and the government. The final analysis as to the 
contribution of the authors to the complete entity theory 
and the proprietary theory of corporate enterprise will be 
presented in the eighth chapter.
Stockholders. The stockholder very seldom takes an 
active part in the management of the corporate enterprise.
In a small concern, the owners are usually the managers but 
asthe firm begins to grow and the number of stockholders 
increases, the stockholders individually take a less and 
less active part. The only active part that a stockholder 
usually takes in the corporate enterprise is when the stock­
holder is elected to the board of directors or is an officer 
of the corporation. There are cases where employees pur­
chase capital stock of a corporation and thus play an active 
part in the operations of the corporate enterprise but this 
activity is usually not on the management level. It is not 
necessary for the stockholder to take an active part in the 
management of the business affairs because he can delegate 
the authority to the directors of the corporation who in
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turn delegate authority to the officers of the corporate 
enterprise.^ Thus, the lack of interest on the stockholder's 
part follows the entity theory.
When voting rights of one class of stock are equal 
to the voting rights of another class of stock, this does 
not mean that both classes of stock are the sarae.^  For 
instance, if one class of capital stock has equal voting 
rights with another class but the first class of stock has 
preference as to income and assets— preferred capital stock—  
there is no division of control but the difference is in 
the risk. Hence, the voting rights may be the same but 
the ownership rights represented by each class of stock may 
be different in other respects.
In a corporation, the preferred stockholders' position
7
is between the common stockholders and the bondholders. The 
preferred stockholder is an owner of the corporate enterprise 
but he usually receives a stated rate of return, and pre­
ferred stock is spoken of as 6% preferred stock— the 6% 
being used as an example. Thus, a $100 par value 6% preferred
5 Harold H. Maynard, Walter C. Weidler, and Orin E. 
Burley, An Introduction to Business Management (Third Edition; 
Mew York:■ The Ronald Press Company, 1941), PP» 37-3#.
^ Leon Carroll Marshall, Business Administration 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1921), p. 43S.
7 The preferred stockholder is willing t o receive 
less income in order to receive more protection for his 
investment•
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stock will return a dividend each year of sp6 to its owner 
if dividends are declared. This return is a dividend and 
not an interest payment by the corporate enterprise to the 
preferred stockholder3 and it is not an expense of the 
corporation as the interest payments on the corporate bonds 
are. Therefore, if the corporation should pass the payment 
of the preferred stock dividends, the preferred stockholders 
could not force the corporate enterprise into bankruptcy 
as the bondholders could do if the interest payments on the
d
bonds were passed.
When a corporation has common stock, preferred stock, 
and bonds, the management is usually selected by the common 
stockholders. Even when voting rights are given to the above 
three classes of capital contributors, the common stock­
holders' votes usually outnumber the other security owners 
and hence, the common stockholders control the board of 
directors of the corporate enterprise. When there are 
several types or classes of common stock which have no 
voting rights, there must be one class of common that has 
the right to vote.9 The usual designation for several classes 
of common stock is A and B< and C capital stock. Thus, in
^ Lewis A. Froman, Introduction to Business (Chicago: 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 194&), p. 337*
9 Ibid., p. 339.
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cases where voting rights are given to the creditors, and 
as a result, a voice in the management, the entity theory 
is invoked \irithout question.
In the corporate enterprise there is frequently a 
dual situation with a large number of stockholders owning 
a small number of shares on the one hand and a few stock­
holders owning a large number of shares on the other. Thus, 
there is a concentration of corporate ownership in the hands 
of M• • • small groups of large stockholders.
As long as the officers are carrying out their duties 
according to the charter and the by-laws of the corporate 
enterprise, the stockholders cannot interfere.^ However, 
if tne officers are performing acts which infringe upon the 
rights of the stockholders, the stockholder has recourse 
against the officers. Thus, if a stockholder does not like 
the way in which the corporation is being managed, he can­
not go to court unless his rights as an owner are being 
violated. This is another point in favor of the entity 
theory because the stockholder is only a small part of the 
whole corporate structure.
Robert Aaron Gordon, Business Leadership in the- 
Large■Corporation (Washington: The Brookings Institution,
19457, p. 159.
^  Edmond N . Cahn, The Powers and Duties of Corporate 
Management (New York: New York University School of Law, 1950),
III, p. 221.
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If the stockholder does not agree with the policies 
of management and he has no recourse in the courts, he 
always possesses the right to sell his shares of capital 
stock in the corporate enterprise and hence, he will no 
longer be an owner but will transfer his rights in the
ip
corporation to another party. ’ Such action marks the 
continuity of the corporation and as a result, fosters the 
entity theory of corporate enterprise.
Because a stockholder purchases a share of voting 
capital stock, he is entitled to a vote for every share he 
owns in the corporation according to the law. Until he 
sells his capital stock or all of the stockholders of the 
corporate enterprise relinquish their voting rights together, 
the stockholders can participate in the corporate annual 
meetings. Hence, from a legal point of view, the voting 
stockholders are in control of the corporate enterprise by 
virtue of their power to vote.
Allen once said that the stockholder’s stock in a 
corporation
. . .  does not in the great majority of cases repre­
sent to him a part ownership and control of the 
mighty enterprise; it represents a way of getting 
some income lor profits), his right to which is 
attested by a prettily decorated sheet of paper which 
he keeps in his safedeposit box; and his interest in 
the corporation’s fate is likely to take principally
12 Ibid., p. 222.
9S
the form of looking at the stock-market page from
time to time to see how the price is doing. If
he doesn’t like what he sees, he sells.13
The old idea that the minority stockholder is not 
important has passed and today, the managements are giving 
full information to the stockholders of the corporate enter­
prise, Allen^4 points out. Annual reports are published 
which give extensive data about the corporation’s past, 
present, and future plans. This sort of information was 
almost non-existent in the years past. nThe stockholder is 
viewed very much as the customer is viewed: not as an
owner but as someone who had better be wooed lest he take 
his patronage elsewhere.
Although the stockholders must make the final decisions 
as t o some actions of the c orporate enterprise, the ,r. . • 
annual meeting is ordinarily a farce.”^  It is the duty of 
the stockholder to vote and maintain an interest in corpo­
rate affairs under the proprietary theory. However, as a 
mere investor, the stockholder is only interested in the 
return on his securities which fosters the entity idea of 
corporate enterprise.
13AHen, 0£. cit., p. 236.
14 Jbid.. pp. 236-237.
^  Lqc. cit.
16 Ibid.. p. 236.
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Some hold that even though the traditional idea of 
corporate enterprise is that the stockholders own and control 
the corporations, this idea holds true only in the small and 
usually young corporations which need capital today. As to 
the older and larger corporate enterprises, ”. . .  the stock­
holders are no longer in control in any real sense: they
are subordinate in authority and importance to the manage­
ment.”^
Creditors. There is a fundamental difference between 
the bondholders of a corporation and its stockholders. The 
bondholders are creditors of the corporate enterprise and 
the stockholders are the owners. The bondholders have all 
of the rights to which a creditor is entitled under the law 
and the stockholder is entitled to all of the privileges 
of an owner. Even tnough both bondholders and stockholders 
provide capital to the corporate enterprise, Froman^ states, 
their respective positions differ if for no other reason 
than risk. In rights of claim against the corporation, the 
bondholders take their place along with all the other credi­
tors and receive their share before the stockholders. The 
stockholders as owners receive what is left if anything.
17 Ibid.. p. 235.
IS Froman, o£. cit.. p. 335.
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The concern of the bondholders is quite limited 
in the corporate enterprise and as long as the interest on 
the bonds is paid by the corporation, the bondholders never 
take an active part in the operations of the corporate enter­
prise.
The holders of corporate bonds have all the rights 
of creditors unless limited and these limitations ”. . .
19usually appear or are referred to on the bond certificate.” 
The stockholders are not creditors because they are owners 
of capital stock but they may become creditors when divi­
dends are declared but not yet paid.
The creditors of a corporate enterprise take no
20direct part in the management of corporate affairs. The 
position of the creditor gives a right to first claim for 
payment of debts but it does not provide for the exercising 
of control in the business of the corporation. Also, there 
are degrees of priority which may exist among the creditors. 
There are cases where creditors have been extremely influen­
tial in corporate matters but this is the exception rather 
than the rule. The right to operate the corporation belongs 
to the stockholders and not to the creditors even though the 
stockholders and the creditors both supply the capital in
19 Edwin M. Robinson, Business Organization and 
Practice (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1945),
p. 41 •
^  Froman, pp. cit., p. 399*
101
one form or another.
The capital stockholders1 claims are ", . . repre­
sented by the value of those assets which remain after the 
claims of the creditors have been met. In other words,
assets minus claims of the creditors equal claims of owners, 
21or net worth.” Thus, stockholders1 claims are residual 
in nature. The rights in the corporate assets are first 
to the creditors and then to the stockholders. Such a state­
ment seems to follow the proprietary theory and uses the 
formula so often used to express the proprietary theory of 
corporate enterprise, A - L = C.
Management. The chief executive or president in a 
number of large corporate enterprises usually is a most 
influential person. It is often said that the board of 
directors chooses the president, and yet, in some corpo­
rations, the president picks the board of directors. "Such 
companies are frequently spoken of as being ’management con­
trolled.’”^  If such bethe case, there is little difference 
between a sole proprietor and this president in regard to . 
control because the president has all the power. There is, 
however, a big difference between owner and president for
21 Ibid., p. 399.
22 Gordon, op. cit., p. 109.
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the president could pay himself a large salary only if the 
stockholders did not protest. Such a case would usually 
exist only if the president was operating the corporate enter­
prise efficiently and dividends were being paid to the stock­
holders. However, the president does not suffer the losses 
which may accrue to the owners which the sole proprietor 
does suffer. The owner will suffer the loss of all his 
capital whereas the president will suffer the loss of only 
his salary and position.
_As a governor governs a state or a president rules 
a' country, management operates a corporation. The manage­
ment of a corporation supervises the corporations activity,
23
Cahn states, and protects the interests of the stockholders, 
vendors or suppliers, customers, and employees. If the 
vendors are to do business with the company, they must ac­
cept the contracts of the corporation,2 '^ customers must 
accept the offerings of the corporate enterprise,2^
employees of the corporation must accept the wage contracts
26
of the corporate enterprise, if these interested parties 
wish to deal with the corporation. Thus, whenever anyone
2-^ Cahn, ojd. cit.. p. 220.
24 Ibid., pp. 222-223.
25 Ibid*> PP* 223-224.
Ibid., pp. 224-226.
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does business with the corporation, they must accept the 
offer of the corporation or there will be no business trans­
acted. The stockholders are treated as other interested 
parties of the corporate enterprise as well, for if the 
stockholder does not like the procedure, he can sell his 
interest in the corporate entity. Hence, the complete divi­
sion of the entity from all interested parties is accomplished 
and thus, the entity theory of corporate enterprise.
Although the boards of directors are considered as 
the overseers of the corporate enterprise, ". . . their 
contribution to the actual running of the corporation tends 
to be somewhat negative, if only because few of them are
27
living from day to day with the problems laid before them."
The actual influence in the corporate enterprise is usually 
in the hands of the officers although at times, there are 
directors who play an important part in the operations of the 
corporation.
Another author hastiie opposite opinion with respect 
to the powers of the board of directors for he says, " . . .  
for, practically all purposes, the board of directors is 
supreme." However, even though the board of directors 
may have- supreme power, the analysis can be extended one
^  Allen, ojd. cit.. p. 235.
28 Cahn, cit.. p. 22&.
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step further. The control or power can be divided between 
two officials, the chairman of the board of directors and 
the president of the corporate enterprise. At times, the 
control lies in the hands of the chairman of the board and 
at other times the power rests with the president of the 
corporation. Each corporate enterprise is different and an 
examination of the facts is necessary to determine ju.st who 
exercises control of the corporation.2^ Whether it be the 
president or the chairman of the board it is still manage­
ment who would exercise supreme power here.
It is possible for a corporate enterprise to borrow 
money in many ways and it is usually up to the board of 
directors to determine the superior method. The officials 
can provide funds for the corporation without floating a 
new bond issue or requesting new stockholder's capital. 
Management sometimes is able to maintain good short-term 
sources of capital by credit from suppliers, short-term 
loans, and through payroll intervals.^ 9 During the periods 
that these debts are outstanding, management is able to use 
this cash for other purposes. The officers can extend the 
credit potentials of the corporate enterprise and they do
29 Ibid.. p. 230.
William H. Spriegel and Ernest C. Davis. Principles 
of Business Organization (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1946), p. 30.
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not have to request capital from the stockholders. Hence, 
when considering the obtaining of capital, the corporation 
can exist without the intervention of the stockholders and 
the divorce of ownership and control further exemplifies 
the entity theory of corporate enterprise.
Employees. Since one of management's leading problems 
today is labor, this problem becomes the concern of corpo­
rate enterprise theory. Part of the answer is in many of 
the new developments of the whole employee picture.
There are corporations which have a profit sharing 
program in their organization. "As an educational program 
Profit Sharing helps workers understand the necessary role 
and function of capital supplied by others, instead of 
leading them to believe that they can supplant that contri­
bution by assuming the dual role of w o r ker-owner.Under 
the profit sharing method of distributing extra wages or 
bonuses, the employee does not become an owner because he 
shares in the profits of the corporate enterprise. There 
are many other factors which must be considered before a 
person can be considered an owner.
The idea of employee ownership of capital stock in 
the corporation in which he is employed is favored because
H  Kenneth M. Thompson, Profit Sharing (New York:
Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1949)>p. I09.
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it is intended to give the employee a feeling of belonging. 
"Although often advanced as a means of bringing control of 
companies to the workers, the ownership of a majority of 
stock ha3 seldom been realized."32 The usual practice is 
to sell to employees a nonvoting type stock or limit the 
amount of stock the employees can buy through the company. 
There are employee stock purchase plans which call for the 
redemption of the corporate stock at a stated price when the 
employee leaves the corporate enterprise so that the 
employee is guaranteed the purchase price of his corporate 
investment and thus, he will not feel cheated.
Government. An interesting point about corporate 
theory in regard to actions which the corporate enterprise 
may perform is that natural persons can do anything which is 
not prohibited by law whereas the corporation can perform 
only those acts which are permitted by the corporate charter. 
"It follows that a corporation may enter into such contracts 
in such manner as it is permitted by its creator, the govern­
ment."33
There are two important considerations when dealing 
with corporate theory. The law of the land determines the
32 Ibid.. p. 167.
33 Marshall, oj>. cit., p. 436. This follows the 
entity idea of the government giving the corporation the 
power to act.
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the acts of the corporate enterprise but the corporation 
determines the terms of the contracts.34 The state and 
federal laws determine those acts which the corporation may 
perform and the corporate enterprise can only perform those 
acts which the government expressly permits. Citizens, on 
the other hand, can perform any acts that are not expressly 
prohibited by law. In making contracts, the corporation 
acts as any other individual and sets the terms of the con­
tract. However, the terms and nature of the contracts must 
be in accord with the rights to contract given the corpo­
ration by the laws of the land and the corporate charter.
Many variations of the contracts are possible and these 
variations usually reflect the policies of the business unit.
Miscellaneous. Although the stockholders are the 
owners of the corporate enterprise, Cahn^ states, they 
become the governed after the board of directors has been 
elected. This situation is similar to the national govern­
ment because after the representatives are elected to congress, 
congress governs the people whom they represent and who have 
elected them.
34 Marshall, loc. cit.
35 Cahn, cit.., pp. 220-221.
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In large corporate enterprises, Gordon^ states, not 
all of the members of the board of directors are chosen by 
the stockholders. In most cases, the board members are 
elected by tne stockholders but there are cases where non­
stockholding groups have insisted on naming some of the 
directors of the corporation. Investment bankers are an 
example of a non-stockholding group who have at times been 
instrumental in placing some directors on the board of a 
corporate enterprise with the approval of the stockholders.
One of the simplest ways to see the difference
between the corporate entity and the claimants is in the
balance sheet of the corporation which is prepared by the
accountant. On the left hand side of the balance sheet
are found the assets of the corporation and on the right are
found the creditors and owners’ equity accounts. "This sort
of analysis sets up the business unit as separate from its
37entrepreneurs, and shows the relation betv/een the two."-'' 
Thus, the entity theory of corporate enterprise is served 
because the entity is the whole whereas the claimants repre­
sent only a part of the whole.
36 Gordon, op. cit.. p. 121.
37 John D. Black and Albert G. Black, Production 
Organization (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1929/, 
pp. 267-268.
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The entity as such, Robinson^ relates, has an exist­
ence entirely separate from the owners and the managers.
The ownership may change hands over and over again through 
death or sale of the corporation’s stock and the management 
may change as well but the corporate enterprise lives on.
The employees and the creditors may change continually but 
the corporate enterprise does not. Therefore, the corporation 
as such is not dependent on a particular group of stockholders, 
managers, creditors, or employees for its continued existence. 
With regard to corporate enterprise theory, Berle made 
an interesting statement in his book, The 20th Century 
Capitalist Revolution.
Twenty years ago, the writer had a controversy 
with the late Professor E. Merrick Dodd, of Harvard 
Law School, the writer holding that corporate powers 
were powers in trust for stockholders while Professor 
Dodd argued that these powers were held in trust for 
the entire community. The argument has been settled 
(at least for the time being! squarely in favor of 
Professor Dodd’s contention.39
Management's first obligation is to the corporate 
enterprise as a whole but " . . .  management also has a 
responsibility: (l) to the people who work for the company;
3^ Robinson, jqp. cit., p. 37.
39 Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The 20th Century Capitalist 
Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1954J,
p. 169.
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(2) to the local and federal governments; and (3) to the 
c u s t o m e r . T h e r e f o r e ,  management must persuade ”. . .  
labor, government. and stockholders to allow management to 
do the things that will keep the customers buyingr if 
the corporate enterprise is to continue in business.
Summary. Management occupies one of the leading 
positions in corporate enterprise theory today. The profes­
sional managers have taken over the duties of managing the 
corporation which were formally in the hands of the stock­
holders. With stock ownership so wide spread, some manage­
ments have been able to remain in power without any appreciable 
amount of stock in its actual possession.
In the small corporations, the stockholders are usu­
ally the managers. However, in the large corporations the 
managing groups are generally professional managers hired 
by the board of directors who are elected by the stockholders. 
The stockholders delegate to the management, authority neces­
sary to carry on the business. As long as management carries 
on the duties within the limits of the authority and to the 
satisfaction of the stockholders, they are not replaced nor 
can they be forced to leave unless they are committing
"Managements Part in Prosperity," The Stanocolan. 
XXIX (July 25, 1942), repreinted from Manage Magazine, p. 2.
Loc. cit.
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illegal acts. Also, if a stockholder does not agree with 
the policies of management, he has no recourse, except to 
sell his stock, as long as management is not acting outside 
of its scope of authority. The idea that the stockholders, 
especially the numerous stockholders who own just a few 
shares of capital stock, are not important has passed and 
management is giving full information to the stockholders 
through extensive reports and bulletins throughout the year. 
There are a great number of stockholders who do not take 
an active part in the annual stockholders’ meetings, and 
hence, the annual stockholders’ meetings have been called 
a farce.
The creditor plays no direct part in the activities 
of the business except in rare cases where bondholders have 
been given the right to elect some directors. However, 
creditors may be extremely influential in an indirect way 
by suggesting changes and even requesting certain members 
be placed on the board of directors.
The management group has not only assumed the function 
of managing the corporation b ut also the control of the corpo­
rate enterprise. In order to perform an efficient job it is 
necessary in some cases for management to exercise control 
of the organization and hence, obtain one of the rights of 
an owner. Some management groups have become so strong that 
they have perpetuated their position. However, this is not
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the usual case for unless management can produce, the stock­
holders will become displeased and vote the management out. 
The management group also decides how much income is to be 
distributed to the stockholders and in some cases manage­
ment has not declared dividends for many years. Thus, again 
the stockholder is restricted, because a right of an owner 
is usually to determine what disposition will be made of his 
income•
Although employees share in the profits of a corpo­
ration, this does not mean they are owners. The employee 
is paid extra compensation for work performed and hence, 
the so called distribution of profits is none other than an 
increased wage expense.
Although the stockholders own the corporation, they 
become the governed after the board of directors are elected 
which is true in government. Also, even though the govern­
ing body and the governed change, the government continues 
in existence. The same is true of corporations because 
even though the stockholders, management, creditors, and 
employees change, the corporate entity continues to exist.
CHAPTER VI
ECONOMIC VIEWPOINT 
OF THE PROPRIETARY THEORY AND THE ENTITY THEORY 
OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE
A study of the corporate enterprise is not complete 
until the economic aspects of the entity theory and the pro­
prietary theory are covered. Economists have led to some 
changes in both the proprietary and entity theories.
One of the leading difficulties in the study of the 
corporation is terminology. The writers in economics have 
not helped a great deal in this matter. Davis had the 
following to say.
It is common place that economists spend a dis­
couraging proportion of their working time in 
controversy over definitions. It may be less common­
place, although surely not original, that much of 
the difficulty arises from failure to recognize the 
implications of an elementary principle of taxonomy: 
when the point of view from which phenomena are 
classified is changed, alterations in both the 
composition and behavior of the groups observed must 
be expected.
Whenever a new meaning to a word is implied, a new 
word is not usually coined. However, an old word is used 
and it is expected that all the readers will grasp the new 
and expected meaning. But, this does not always happen and
^ Richard M. Davis, "The Current State of Profit 
Theory," The American Economic Review. XLII (1952), -2U5 •
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as a result, there are many confused individuals as well as 
ideas.^
The term assets from an economic point of view means,
All wealth, property and property rights, including 
claims against other persons or against their property, 
which belong to a person or enterprise. In a balance 
sheet, total assets are exactly equal to the total 
liabilities— i.e., to all claims against the property 
of a company (including surplus and undivided pro­
fits). 3
In the works of economists, businessmen, and other 
writers, the term capital (net capital) usually implies a 
source of revenue. However, the terms should have reference 
to ". . . interest of a particular proprietor in them."^
Couchman says that capital as used in accounting can 
be defined ,r. . .as the excess of asset value over the 
liabilities of any commercial entity. It is used synony­
mously with the terms 'net worth,1 'proprietorship' and 
'owner's e q u i t y . Here, Couchman is defining capital 
according to the proprietary theory, A - L = C.
^ Charles B. Couchman, The Balance-Sheet (New York:
The Journal of Accountancy, Inc., 1924), p. 173.
3 Byron J. Horton, Julien Hipley, Jr., and M. B. 
Schnapper, Dictionary of Modern Economics (Washington: Public 
Affairs Press, 194$) > p* 12.
^ John B. Canning, The Economics of Accounting (New 
York: The Ronald Press Company, 1929)» p» 54*
5
Couchman, oj>. cit., p. 173.
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Considering liabilities,
In accounting, the financial obligation or debts of 
a person or business. Proprietorship or net worth 
of a firm is the difference between assets and 
liabilities, and thus represents the residual equity 
of the owners of an enterprise in its assets. In 
the financial balance sheet, however, proprietorship 
or net worth is included among the liabilities as 
representing the claims of the owners of the enter­
prise against its assets.®
Canning says that liabilities imply ”. . .  a relationship 
between persons. One who is obliged to do something adverse 
to his own interest and beneficial to another’s has a lia­
bility to that other person."? The liabilities of the corpo­
rate enterprise are between t he corporation and the creditors 
and not between the creditors and the stockholders.
Following are some of the comments made by different 
authors in economics with respect to the ownership of the 
corporate enterprise. As can be seen, the comments vary 
widely when considering the entity theory, the proprietary 
theory, the stockholders, the management, the creditor, the 
employee, and the government. The final analysis as to the 
contribution of the authors to the complete entity theory 
and the proprietary theory of corporate enterprise will be 
presented in the eighth chapter.
6 Horton, Ripley, Jr., and Schnapper, ojd. cit.. p. 119. 
? Canning, cit.. p. 49.
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According to some economists, the corporate enter­
prise has been defined as a legal entity separate from its 
owners. This separate entity " . . .  is established under 
authority of the state and is a ’legal person or being1 
entirely separate from the owners of its stock.
There have been some comments which place economic 
thinking in the school of the entity theory.
The industrial enterprise is an autonomous 
institution. It has its own law and rationale in 
its function. It is not a creature of the State.
It does not rest its power on delegation from its 
stockholders or from any other owner; in fact, the 
divorce of control over the enterprise from ownership 
is everywhere all but complete. Its function is 
essentially beyond the control of the State and 
largely unaffected by even the most radical changes 
in political system or in political beliefs. It is 
the first autonomous local institution that has come 
into existence in our society in five hundred years.y
The inference here is that the corporate enterprise is a
complete and separate entity.
A definition for proprietor is a ", . . holder of
assets."^ Proprietorship would be all of the " . . .
beneficial interest of a holder of a set of assets in those
assets. In order to determine the net proprietorship,
^ John Ise, Economics (Revised^Edition;- New York: 
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1950), p. #2.
^ Peter F. Drucker, The New Society (New York: Harper
and Brothers Publishers, 1950)> p. 27.
Canning, op. cit.. p. 4&.
^  Ibid., p. 55»
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the liabilities would be deducted from the total proprietor-
1 p
ship or Assets minus Liabilities equal Wet Proprietorship.
„13
"Proprietorship is synonymous with ownership."
Ownership represents a residual equity in the corporate
assets and the owners would suffer the losses or reap the
gains. Primarily then, the owner undertakes the greatest
risk in the corporate enterprise.
The term entrepreneur has caused much discussion in
the field of economics. Some economists hold that the
entrepreneur isthe person (or persons) in control of the
corporate enterprise, others claim the entrepreneur is the
owner of the corporate enterprise, and still others hold
that the entrepreneur is a combination of both ownership
and control. Enke held that,
The entrepreneurial function is then conceived as 
including all productive contributions that are not 
routine human effort, do not involve the use of 
indestructible natural resources, and do not entail 
the provision of capital funds. Entrepreneurship 
according to this view is a residual function, just, 
as profits are often described as residual income. *
12 Ibid.. p. 56.
^3 Leland R. Robinson, John F. Adams, and Harry L. 
Dillin, An Introduction to Modern Economics (New York: The
Dryden Press, 1952), p. 129.
14 Stephen Enke, Intermediate Economic Theory (New 
York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950), p. 454.
lid
Another author brings out the idea of control and risk-
bearing as a mark of entrepreneurship and the combination
of the two is ,r. . . usually attributed to the ownership of
.,15a going business,"
The corporate enterprise is not necessarily a form of 
economic organization. The corporation may satisfy the or­
ganization needs of a large-scale or small-scale business.
The purpose for the union of individuals is to keep their 
own interests apart from the corporate enterprise. "Never­
theless, .the legal institution of incorporation has had 
important economic consequence."1^
The concept of the economic man was developed by 
the Classical School of economics as " . . .  an individual 
whose actions are solely motivated by economic self-interest 
or the desire to maximize his economic gain with the least
possible effort."^ This economic man may be a human or an
IS
artificial person.
15 Readings in the Theory of Income Distribution. 
Selected by a committee of the American Economic Association 
(Philadelphia: The Blakiston Company, 1946), p. 565.
16 Kenneth E. Boulding, Economic Analysis (New York: 
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941),P* 400.
1^ Byrne J. Horton, Julien Ripley, Jr., and M. B. 
Schnapper, cit., p. 106.
l $ Ralph H. Blodgett, Comparative Economic Systems 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944J, p. 35. . . . most
corporations, as artificial persons or impersonal beings,
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The concept of corporate enterprise is not economic 
but l e g a l . S i n c e  this corporation is a legal concept 
created by the state and given certain rights by the state, 
the law has stipulated that the corporate enterprise is 
separate from the stockholders and the other interested 
parties.
Considering the proprietary theory and the corpo­
ration, Haney made the following comments.
There may be little harm and much truth in regarding 
corporations as legal persons in the sense that a 
relationship among individuals has been endowed 
with endurance and given a name. But one must regard 
the personality, so-called, as derived. It is not 
fundamental nor causal; . . .  It is sound, rational 
procedure, then, to begin at the beginning and to 
grasp the concept of unity-through-association—  
of the river through the drops and the forest through 
the trees.
Stockholders. The corporate enterprise can be financed 
by two types of securities, capital stock and bonds. The 
capital stock of a c orporation represents ownership and the 
bonds represent loans to the corporate enterprise. The rights
pursue profits with greater if not utter abandon. In their 
neverending search for economic gains, they approximate, 
as closely as anything can in modern life, the classical 
concept of the ’economic man.’"
^9 Boulding, 0£. cit.. p. 400.
Lewis H. Haney, Business Organization and Combi­
nation (Third Edition; Nevrlork1: -The ‘Macmillan Company, 
I934J, p. 95.
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of the security holders may vary according to the following 
three classifications.
(1) the right to an early claim on the income;
(2) the right to the ’residual’ income, however, 
large, after others have been paid promised 
amounts; and
(3) the right to vote on the personnel and policy
in the corporation, and hence the power to control 
the corporation.21
CAPITAL STOCK
1. Represents an owner’s equity having no maturity 
date.
2. Represents a residual claim on assets.
3. Is entitled to share in all net earnings; auto­
matically obtains full title to any net income; 
distributions are called dividends.
4. Has full rights of control in corpus.
FIXED LIABILITIES (BONDS)
1. Represents a loan having a fixed maturity date.
2. Represents a prior claim on assets.
3. Are entitled to a fixed annual return called 
interest.
4. Rave no rights to control corpus earnings except 
in case of default.22
In making the bridge between capital stocks and bonds, 
Fisher2  ^compares the closeness of preferred stocks and 
revenue bonds. All elements of corporate securities involve 
risk but the degree of risk which each security (of the same 
corporation) carries is the important factor. The common
21 Mary Jean Bowman and George Leland Bach, Economic 
Analysis and Public Policy (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1949), p. 55.
22 Robinson, Adams, and Dillin, 0£. cit., p. 141.
23 Irving Fisher, The Nature of Capital and Income 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), p. #5.
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stockholder, as an owner, has the greatest risk and the 
secured bondholder has the least amount of risk. Between 
the two, the preferred stockholder is an owner but does not 
have the same amount of risk as the common stockholder 
because his position is preferred and above the common stock- 
holder. Above the preferred stockholder is the income bond­
holder who has less risk than the preferred stockholder but 
more risk than the secured bondholder. Thus, it can be 
considered that the preferred stockholder and the income 
bondholder have about the same amount of risk as to income 
with any edge going to the bondholder. One difference 
between these two securities lies in the fact that the pre­
ferred stockholder may have voting rights whereas the bond­
holder will receive voting rights only in case of default 
and the bondholders will receive their capital contribution 
on a certain date when the bonds are redeemed whereas the 
preferred stockholder is not paid his capital contribution 
until the business is liquidated or the preferred stock 
is retired.^
It can be further stated that the bondholder has the 
least amount of risk with the smallest return and virtually
24 The fundamental difference between the preferred 
stock and income bonds is a creditor-ownership relation.
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no control; the preferred stockholder has a greater return 
with increased risk and he may have some control; the com­
mon stockholder has the greatest risk with the possibility
of the highest returns and in most cases, he has complete 
25voting power.
In most of the large corporate enterprises today, 
there are virtually no cases where a single person or small 
group of persons own a majority of the capital stock out­
standing which would give positive voting control. Most 
of the ownership is spread over thousands of shareholders. 
After an individual invests in a corporate enterprise, there 
is usually little he can do if he is a bondholder with 
respect to control of the business activities. However, if 
he concentrates his wealth by purchasing capital stock in 
the corporation, and his capital stock holdings become sub­
stantial, he can usually exercise some voice in the business
activities even though he does not own a controlling interest 
27
as such.
As corporate enterprises became larger and the economy
25 Fred R. Fairchild, Edgar S. Furniss, and Norman
S. Buck, Elementary Economics (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1927), P» 104.
26 Lewis A. Froman, Principles of Economics (Chicago: 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1941), P- 212.
27 Leon Carroll Marshall, Readings in Industrial 
Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 191&),
p. 709.
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became more complex, the stockholder became less and less 
active in corporate affairs. Today, Ise states, the stock­
holder ”. . • has become a mere passive agent with no 
management functions, no control, and no responsibility.”2  ^
The stockholder hopes that his investment in the 
corporation will return him a satisfactory income but the
aotual managing of the business affairs is usually left to
po
a small group of insiders. Usually, the stockholder does 
not consider himself as the owner of the corporate enter­
prise but his interest lies only in the dividends he receives 
and the market value of his stock, especially, if he intends 
to sell.
Usually, when a person owns a thing, he controls it.
However, even, though a stockholder may own shares of capital
stock in a corporate enterprise which is evidence of his
pro rata ownership, he does not necessarily control the
corporation. With tne diversification of ownership in
corporations today, less than a majority of voting capital
31stock could conceivably control a corporate enterprise.-'
2^ Ise, op. cit.. p. 102.
^  Ralph H. Blodgett, Principles of Economics 
(Revised Edition: New York: Rinehart and Company, inc.,
1946), p. 161. • • »
30 Broadus Mitchell and others, Basic Economics (New 
York: William Sioane Associates, Inc., 195l), p. 105.
3^ - Blodgett, Principles of Economics. p. 161.
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From a theoretical point of view the control of a 
corporate enterprise rests with all of the stockholders 
who own voting stock since it is the vote of the stock­
holders collectively which governs. With the divorce of 
ownership and control, the stockholders elect a board of 
directors whose duty is to operate the corporate enterprise 
for the stockholders.32
"when stockholders elect directors, the majority of
stockholders, in most cases, know little if anything about
the directors. The main interest of the stockholders is
that the directors carry on the business of the corporation
in such a way that dividends will be declared. Hence, it
has been said that ". . • the assumption of stockholder
33control is largely moonshine."
The corporate enterprise has two major divisions as 
Clay points out. The organization is important because 
". . . in it the ownership and the employment of capital are 
separated; secondly, the work of organization is separated 
from the bearing of risk, the former being done by specialized 
workmen for regular salaries, while the latter is undertaken 
by the stockholders to whom the profits go."34
32 Ise, oj). cit., p. $7.
33 Ibid., p. 8B.
34 Henry Clay, Economics (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1926), pp. 56-57.
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Most people are under the impression that stockholders'
meetings are enormous affairs. However, this is not usually
so and in most cases, only a few people attend the meetings.
It is this small group of stockholders in attendance who
usually dominate the corporation and who some claim are
35really the true entrepreneurs.
The stockholder must have some rights in a corporate 
enterprise in order to base his claim of ownership. Hence, 
the stockholder has property rights and furnishes only 
"property services" to the corporation and usually no 
labor. The property rights of all the stockholders grouped 
together are called capital stock. The capital stock in 
turn represents the property rights of the stockholder in 
the corporation.37 These property rights ofthe stockholders 
in the corporate enterprise represent a beneficial interest 
in all of the corporate assets, and all gains which accrue 
to the corporate enterprise because of the use of the assets.3^
35 Frederic B. Garver and Alvin H. Hansen, Principles 
of Economics (Third Edition; Boston: Ginn and Company,
1947), p. 19.
36 Frank H. Knight, Risk. Uncertainty and Profit 
(Boston: Houghton Miffin Company, 1921), p. 309.
37 Fairchild, Furniss, and Buck, op. cit., p. 101.
3# Canning, op. cit., p. 101.
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When a corporation owns stocks and bonds of another 
corporation, the stocks and bonds of the second corporate 
enterprise are assets of the first corporation. To the 
second corporate enterprise these stocks and bonds represent 
capital contributions and liabilities. If a complete entity 
view is taken, the stocks and bonds of the second corporation 
are liabilities and represent the claims of t he stockholders 
and bondholders to the corporate assets of the second busi­
ness only.39
The stockholder in a corporate enterprise is a bearer 
of risk. The risk arises because of business conditions 
and the uncertainty of any returns on the stockholder’s 
investment. The bondholders and the other creditors, on the 
other hand, have some risk but they receive payment first 
and the amount of return is known. The bondholders and 
creditors usually receive their returns which are guaranteed 
by the assets of the corporate enterprise and the capital 
contributions of the stockholders.^
The stockholder is usually investing in the long run 
possibilities of a corporate enterprise when he purchases 
capital stock. Although there is no guarantee on future
39 John R. Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924), p. 160.
4-0 Fisher, op. cit., pp. 2&8-2B9,
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earnings of the corporation, the stockholder has some 
expectations for the long run which are not usually required 
for other types of securities.^
The stockholder receives dividends on his investment 
in the corporate enterprise but all of the profits are not 
always distributed to the stockholders and are not payment 
for capital contributions. Since bonds do not carry a great 
amount of risk, tne return is deemed an interest charge by 
the corporate enterprise but the common and preferred stock­
holders have too much risk at stake to receive just interest 
on their investment. The stockholders return is a distri­
bution of existing profits and as such is payment for per­
forming the entrepreneurial function.^2 However, all of 
the profits are not distributed to the stockholders, and a 
part of the undistributed income or profits earned belongs 
to the corporate enterprise.^
The purpose of the corporation is to earn income for 
its investors.^ The income that is earned by the corporate
M  William A. Paton, Shirtsleeve Economics (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1952), p. 254*
42 Enke, op. cit., P- 455.
43 Commons, op. cit., p. 162.
^  Maurice Moonitz, "The Valuation of Business Capital: 
An Accounting Analysis," The American Economic Review. XLI 
(1951), 15$.
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enterprise can be divided into two parts. The first is a 
return on the capital invested and the second is a return 
for the entrepreneurial function.45
The stockholder of a corporate enterprise is an 
owner but his ownership is not the same as the owner of a 
proprietorship or partnership. The stockholder does not 
even own the assets of the corporation but the stockholder 
shares in the equities which result after the debts of the 
corporate enterprise are subtracted from the assets.46 The 
ownership of the stockholder in large corporations is more 
capitalistic^? than operating ownership. The stockholder 
usually delegates authority to others who operate corporate 
enterprises and 'protect the stockholder’s interest. For 
the small corporation, there may be no need to incorporate 
and hence, the corporate form of business organization may 
be only a legal fiction.
Creditors. The stockholder and bondholder have two 
separate positions in the corporate enterprise. The stock­
holder is the owner of the corporation and the bondholder
45 Sergei P. Dobrovolsky, ’’Corporate Retained Earn­
ings and Cyclical Fluctuations, The American Economic Review. 
XXXV (1945), 571.
46 Mitchell and others, op. cit.. p. 92.
47 Blodgett, Principles of Economics, p. 416.
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is a creditor of the corporate enterprise. In case of de- 
fault on the interest of the bonds, the bondholder may- 
become the owner of the corporation in a reorganization by 
exchanging the defaulted bonds for capital stock of the 
reorganized corporation. Or, the bondholder may force the 
corporate enterprise to liquidate if the interest payments
i g
are passed. Hence, the position of the bondholder is 
somewhat financially stronger than the position of the 
stockholder.
From an economic point of view, the bondholder is a 
lender of funds to the corporate enterprise and all claims 
of the bondholder are against the corporation and not against 
the stockholder. The corporate enterprise has an obligation 
to pay the interest and principal of the bonds to the bond­
holders.
When speaking of preferred stockholders as creditors 
rather than as proprietors, Paton says, ”. . • there is some 
justification for viewing them as ’inferior creditors' rather 
than as providers of risk capital.”^
Some of the confusion in considering stockholders 
as creditors is in the use of terms. Schumpeter, in 
describing stockholders, says, ”. . .  they are creditors
^  Ise, op. cit.. p. 84.
4-9 Paton, op. cit.. p. 219.
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(capitalists) who forego part of the legal protection usu­
ally extended to creditors, in exchange for the right to
50participate in profits." Creditors do not participate
in the profits of the corporate enterprise but the stock­
holders do. Here, the term creditor is being used to refer 
to all claimants against the corporate enterprise.
The concept of owners and creditors is difficult to 
understand. Here are two groups who lay claim to the same 
assets ofthe corporate enterprise.51 The difficulty seems 
to ease slightly when the rights of the two groups are con­
sidered separately. The creditors have prior claim to the 
assets of the corporate enterprise and the owners have a 
residual interest in the assets.
There has been much development along the lines of 
creditor stock ownership. By having the creditors of a 
corporate enterprise invest in the corporation, there is 
usually less tendency to force payment of bills when a 
little extra time is needed. Such a condition can help a 
corporate enterprise over a poor period and hence, in the 
long run, make for greater returns to the owners of the 
corporation.
5® Joseph A.'Schumpeter, Business Cycles (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1939), I, P» 104*
51 Bowman and Bach, op. cit.. p. 74•
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The position of the creditors in a corporate enter­
prise is strong because they are protected by the law. When­
ever a corporate enterprise is in danger and cannot meet its 
obligations, " . . .  the law frequently provides for the trans­
fer of control of the assets and sometimes the assets them­
selves to a receiver chosen by law or to the creditors.52
In mutual insurance companies, the stockholders are 
also the creditors. The owners assume all the risk of the 
company and divide the profits. There are usually • • 
almost no outside creditors.”53
Management. The entrepreneur of old was the operator 
and the owner of the corporate enterprise.54 However, the 
idea of the entrepreneur (an entity approach) has taken on 
new light and M. . . the entrepreneur may, but need not, be 
the person who furnishes the capital. . . .  It is leader­
ship rather than ownership that matters.”^
The corporate enterprise is a collection of many 
units, ??. . . land, building, plant and equipment, workers,
52 Robinson, Adams, and Dillin, op. cit.. pp. 13^-139*
53 Fisher, op. cit. f p. 85*
54 Marshall, Readings in Industrial Society, p. 714*
55 Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 103»
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materials, and so on— controlled by an entrepreneur.rr56 It 
is the duty of the entrepreneur to set all of the units in 
motion so that a smooth organization exists in order to 
make a profit.
The business unit or corporate enterprise is the 
important factor and regardless of who makes the decision, 
it is the corporation which gains or looses.57 The reason­
ing is in line with the entity theory because it places 
the entity as such above all others.
Although the stockholder undertakes the greatest 
risk in the corporate enterprise, it is the management 
group which chiefly controls the organization. This manage­
ment group or controlling group usually owns only a small 
number of the total shares of capital stock outstanding 
of the corporate enterprise.^
Boulding brings out the idea that the corporation 
is not only a legal entity but psychic as well in the eyes 
of management. Management tries to enlarge the corporate 
enterprise for the sake of the corporation itself and hence,
56 Frederic Benham and Friedrich A. Lutz. Economics 
(New York: Pitman Publishing Corporation, 1941J, p. 132.
57 Robinson, Adams, and Dillin, op. cit.f pp. 442-443.
5& Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (Eighth 
Edition; London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1936)> p. 302.
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the results benefit the stockholders and all of the interested
59parties as well. '
From a purely technical point of view, the stockholders 
do control the corporate enterprise through the board of 
directors whom the stockholders elect. The board of direc­
tors in turn appoints the officers of the corporation and 
the directors also set down the policies which the corpo­
rate enterprise is to follow.^ Hence, from a purely techni­
cal point of view, the proprietary theory of corporate enter­
prise is fostered here.
The divorce of ownership and control has served a 
great purpose to the corporation and society. Before the 
separation took place, the owner as the manager worked for 
one purpose and the purpose was his own interest. With tne 
separation of ownership and control, the purpose of the 
corporation was not just for the benefit of the stockholders 
but for the consumers, workers, creditors, and society in
general. Here, the corporate enterprise is considered a
61
combination of interests.
Because a person makes decisions in regard to a 
corporate enterprise^ actions, the decision making does
59 Boulding, q&, cit.. pp. 7&2-7#3*
^  Froman, o£. cit.. p. 35•
6l Drucker, 0£. cit.. p. 35.
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not mean he should be the owner of the corporation. In 
fact, he is usually not the owner but a member of the manage­
ment group. The old idea that owners should make all the 
decisions since they are the ones who may suffer the great­
est loss does not hold true today. As a result of a poor 
decision, it is true that the stockholder may lose his 
entire capital contribution but the management will also 
suffer the loss of their p o s i t i o n s . The risk of poor 
management is one of the risks encountered by the stock­
holders of large corporations.
The earnings of management are sometimes regarded 
as high in relation to the return on invested capital. The 
reason is because of the great mental strain ”. . .in organiz­
ing and devising new methods; or because it involves great anxi­
ety and risk; and these two things frequently go together."^3
With the divorce of control and ownership, the stock­
holder is no longer in control of the corporate enterprise 
in this country. Professional managers have taken over the 
duties of actually operating the corporate enterprise and 
although the stockholders’ legal representatives are the 
board of directors, in some cases, the directors have taken
George N. Halm, Economic Systems (New York:
Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1951)> P* 50.
^3 Alfred Marshall, op. cit.. p. 612.
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less and less interest in the actual operations of the corpo­
ration. In certain instances the directors are so removed 
that management ”• . . considers them ’outsiders' and resents
/L i
any ’interference' from them.” Drucker treats the subject 
more severe here than most authors but there are cases where 
such situations do exist. However, it could not be considered 
as the general condition.
Samuelson brings up an interesting point about manage­
ment control when he says, ”. . .  there is no fully effective 
democratic control of management by the stockholders. Polit­
ical parties may go in and out of office, but most corpo­
ration managements are self-perpetuating.”65 This is an 
extremist's viewpoint and hence, not held by most people.
Because of the control exercised by some corporate 
managements, there are some abuses. At times and in cer­
tain corporate enterprises some officers may draw large 
salaries and receive other benefits which would be considered 
abusive. However, this could not be established as a 
general rule but rather the exception.
The old idea that the capitalistic system has control
64 Drucker, o£. cit., p. 34*
65 Paul A. Samuelson, Economics. An Introductory 
Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1948),
pp. 129-130.
. 66 ise> o£. cit., p. 98.
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by the owners of the corporation as a characteristic does 
not exist today. The owners are having less and less con­
trol in the corporate enterprise and the main reason ”. . .  
has been the development of the large corporation with its 
thousands of owners.”^7 Since the management owns only a 
small portion of the capital stock of a corporate enterprise 
and this portion of stock ownership is not anywhere near 
the fifty-one per cent necessary for positive control, you 
could say, ”. . .  that the same persons who own the corpo- 
rations do not necessarily control them.”
Except in corporations where there is a strong 
minority group of the corporate enterprise controlled by 
a family, the stockholder usually has little to say about 
how the corporation is to be operated. Such a situation 
does not mean that the management as such is the only group 
that makes decisions but the corporation’s policies are 
usually influenced by many interested parties. The bankers, 
bondholders, labor, and government often play an important 
part in the policy setting of the corporate enterprise.^9
Paton adds that the reason management has taken such
67 Froman, ojd. cit., p. 209.
66 Ibid., p. 213.
69 Ise, op. cit.. p. S9.
a prominent place in the corporate enterprise is because 
the stockholders are negligent. Whenever there is a dis­
pute with a corporation, it is always considered as a dif­
ficulty between the corporate management and the interested 
party. As Paton suggests, this difficulty is not between 
management and the interested party but the difficulty is 
between the stockholders and the interested party. The 
management group is just the representative of the owners 
and the owners are ". . . the ultimate authority.” Paton 
has failed to bring out the idea that if the management 
group is acting within its scope of authority, stockholders 
are bound by the decisions of management as the country is 
bound by the decisions of Congress although the actions of 
Congress may not always be the will of the majority of the
people.70
Employees. The economic position of employees in 
the large corporate enterprises is becoming more and more 
important each year. There has been a decided shift of 
some power in the corporation from the " . . .  businessmen 
to the representatives of employees.”71 With the growth
70 Paton, <2,p. cit., p. 226.
71 Summer H. Slichter. The American Economy (New 
York: Alfred A. Knoph, 1943), p. vi.
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of labor unions and the influence they possess, the employees 
of the corporate enterprises have advanced to a position of 
dignity along with the owners, managers, and creditors which 
gives weight to the entity theory.
Government. The government is now playing an impor­
tant role in corporate enterprise theory. After World War 
II, the government became a big lender of funds to corpo­
rations through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and 
in some cases, the government became the owner of large 
corporate enterprises. However, today, the government is 
lessening its interest in corporations as an owner and 
it is returning business to the businessmen. But, this 
new policy of the government may be changed in the future 
and the government may again become an active member of 
private enterprise directly. Ise has suggested that the 
government should not step out of the picture but should 
increase its interest in the corporate enterprise. One of 
the ways he suggests f.or doing this is obtaining capital 
stock of corporations ”. . .  from the estates of wealthy 
decedents under the inheritance tax, instead of requiring 
the payment of the tax in cash."*^
Ise, op. cit.r pp. 105-106.
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Balance sheet. Although the asset side of the bal­
ance sheet balances against the liabilities and net worth 
side, this does not mean that the individual items of assets 
correspond to the individual items of the liabilities or 
net worth. Usually, no two debits or credits are equal.
For example, the buildings do not correspond to the notes 
payable, the accounts receivable do not correspond to the 
bonds payable and so forth. Hence, the only valid conclu­
sion that can be drawn in comparing items of the balance 
sheet is that ”. . .  the creditors have a general claim 
against the enterprise of .a definite value, and the owners 
have a residual claim against the r e s t . ”73
The claims of the creditors against the assets of 
the corporate enterprise are actual liabilities when the 
debts become due and are not paid. However, with the assets 
on the left side of the balance sheet, it is commonly con­
ceived that the liabilities are claims against the assets 
before any obligation as such is present.7^ The obligation 
of the corporate enterprise is not necessarily when the 
entry is made but the obligation is when the contract due 
date is reached. Thus, the obligation when recorded is not 
of a legal nature but practical.
72 Samuelson, ojd. cit.. p. 135*
74 Canning, ojq. cit. r p. 53.
The use of the term capital to include liabilities 
and owners’ equity can be considered an economic concept.
The total assets which are on the left-hand side of the 
balance sheet represent all that is owned by the corporate 
enterprise. The liability or claim against these assets 
is represented by the capital invested in the business.
This capital, from an economic point of view, represents the 
". . . funds invested in all the assets of business, dividing 
the capital into that owned and borrowed."75
A further point raised by the economists is that ". . . 
the economic balance sheet derives entirely from income expec­
tations, while an accounting balance sheet can be viewed as
rj£
the basic tool for computing accounting income."'
In summing up some of the various concepts held by 
some economists, in regard to the balance sheet, Samuelson 
said that the balance sheet was always in balance because 
’’. . . net worth, i.e., the ownership of the ’residual 
claimants,’ always adjusts itself to make things balance.”77 
All of the equities on the balance sheet of a corporate
75 William H. Bell, Accountants’ Reports (Third-Edition 
New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1934), p. 20.
76 Joel Dean and associates, Managerial Economics (New 
York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), P« 15*
77 Samuelson, op. cit.. p. 134*
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enterprise, capital and liabilities, are found as assets 
on the balance sheet of other corporate enterprises or 
individuals. And in the final analysis, n. . . the real 
ownership of all 'things1 possessed by a society must be 
found in individual persons.'^ Canning has contributed 
two other concepts and the first is that the corporation 
is merely an imaginary entity and a figure of speech. In 
reality, the world of statistical analysis and synthesis 
has no place for mere figures of speech and the corporate 
enterprises have no place in the world of reality but only 
". • . have their proper place in the conceptual world of 
analysis in pure mathematics,"79 Both Samuelson and Canning 
would follow the proprietary theory of corporate enterprise 
and would not consider the importance of the corporate entity 
as such.
The going concern. Commons, in describing tne going
concern concept, says the following:
The going concern is animated by a common purpose, 
governed by common rules of its own making, and the 
collective behavior in attaining that purpose we 
distinguish as a 'going business.' It is this 
collective behavior of this collective will, this .flow 
of transactions along lines indicated by its own work­
ing rules, this going business of a going concern,
7^ Boulding, op. cit., p. 285.
79 Canning, op. cit., pp. 54-55.
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that contributes the invisible, intangible being of 
Marshall's definition. It is not an artificial 
'creature of law'— it exists prior to the law in 
the intentions and transactions of its members, and 
thus exists in the very nature of the human will as 
well as 'in contemplation of law. '°0
The reason the going concern continues to exist is
that expectations are still present. Once the expectations
drop, even though the corporate enterprise exists in the
eyes of the law, the corporation will soon fail.
The going concern concept does not include just the
stockholder but it comprises all the contributing factors.
The will of the corporate enterprise is the composite will
A ?of all, even down to the last worker.
The working rule of the corporation is like the rules 
set up by the government. The government is not the people 
as such but the government comprises a group of working 
rules set up by the duly elected officials over years past
d 3
to govern the future rulers of the society.
The ownership of capital stock and bonds of a corpo­
rate enterprise are not evidences of ownership of the physi­
cal property of the corporation ". . . but of residual shares
Commons, jog. cit.. p. 145.
^  koc. cit.
Ibid., p. 146.
23 Ibid.. p. 149.
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d i
in the expected net income," ^ The title to the physical 
property remains in the corporation.
The whole going concern concept, as described by 
Commons, is an entity approach to corporate enterprise 
theory because in considering the corporate enterprise 
Commons brings out the idea of the will of the corporation 
comprises all the contributing elements down to the last 
worker.
Miscellaneous. An excuse for the creation of a
d r
separate entity, Paton ? relates, is because the large 
corporations have many stockholders. If the stockholders 
took an interest in the affairs of the corporate enterprise 
and attended the meetings, there would be no question of 
proprietary theory or entity theory. Hence, Paton does 
follow the proprietary point of view.
The entity concept of corporate enterprise is use­
ful in some cases but is not the complete answer. The 
entity is a legal concept but the laws are made ultimately 
for natural persons. But,
• • • for many legal purposes the corporation may
be treated just as if it were a natural person, and
^4 Ibid., p. I69. This is a strong entity approach 
because both the stockholder and bondholder have a residual 
share in the income.
^  Paton, 0£. cit.. p. 220.
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we may call it an entity if we will; but for other 
legal purposes the entity concept is neither useful 
nor relevant because it does not bring out the points 
at issue between the natural persons for whom, in 
the final analysis, the law exists.
It is interesting to note that some corporate enter­
prises have total assets which are greater than the state 
in which the corporation is chartered. Some of these corpo­
rations have powers granted in the charter years ago that 
would not be granted today. Some corporations have made 
contracts with countries and with foreign companies and in 
so doing perform acts which are above and beyond the powers 
of the state which granted the original charter.^
Paton follows the proprietary concept of corporate 
enterprise when he insists that ”. . . there is no such 
thing as a rich corporation or a poor corporation. . . .
It is individuals who are rich or poor, not our institutional
dd
or physical machines.n Here, Paton assumes that all the 
wealth of the corporate enterprise is the wealth of the 
stockholders. But, this does not happen in reality because 
many large corporations have great stores of wealth which
Norman S. Buchanan, The Economics of Corporate 
Enterprise (New York*. Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1940), 
pp. 43-44.
^7 David Lynch, The Concentration of Economic Power 
(New fork: Columbia University Press, 194^), p. 95.
&& Paton, op. cit.. pp. 220-221.
will not be distributed to stockholders and it is not in­
tended that the wealth will ever be distributed to the stock 
holders because such an action may result in liquidation.
Commons, on the other hand, would be considered as 
a follower of tne entity concept of corporate enterprise 
because he held among other things that the corporation 
as such owns the assets and the income of the business.
The board of directors have the power to dispose of the 
corporate income as they see fit, and in distributing divi­
dends, the dividends must first be declared before becoming 
,f. . • a liability of the concern owing to its stockholders.
Summary. Economists have played an important part 
in the development of the entity and proprietary theories 
of corporate enterprise. They have contributed ideas and 
reasons for following either theory.
Risk is one of the factors taken into account when 
ownership is being considered. The element of risk varies 
from a slight degree (wages of employees) to a great degree 
(common stockholders) within the same corporation (degrees 
of risk will vary between corporations as well). Between 
the common stockholders and employees are found a variety 
of corporate claimants with various degrees of risk.
Commons, o j d . cit.. p. 162.
The stockholder has the greatest risks, but he also 
has the potential for receiving the greatest return or 
suffering the greatest loss. As the corporate enterprises 
become larger and larger, the stockholders usually take a 
less and less active part in corporate affairs. The stock­
holders elect a board of directors and the management of 
.the business is left in its hands. The stockholders usually 
know little about the members of the board, but this does 
not concern them for the stockholders main interest is 
income (with the high personal tax structure, capital 
appreciation is also important). The stockholder usually 
takes a passive attitude, and as a result, the annual meet­
ings are poorly attended with a small number of stockholders 
voting for the directorate. The stockholder is interested 
in the long run possibilities of the corporation and looks 
for a return on his investment. The stockholder owns the 
corporation, but this ownership is not the same as ownership 
of a partnership or a sole proprietorship, because the stock­
holder does not own the corporate assets whereas the partner 
or sole proprietor does own the assets of the business. The 
stockholder receives dividends for his entrepreneurial 
function.
Some authors claim there is almost no difference be­
tween bondholders and stockholders. However, the bondholders 
have a claim for a specific amount to be paid within a certain
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time period whereas the stockholders have no such claim.
The corporation has an obligation to pay the interest due 
bondholders but there is no obligation on the corporate 
enterprise to pay dividends. The claims of the creditors 
are prior whereas stockholders’ claims are residual. The 
position of creditors is much stronger than stockholders 
in the corporation because laws have been passed to protect 
creditors and in cases, the creditors may take over control 
or even possession of the corporate assets.
The entrepreneur of old was the manager and owner of 
the corporate enterprise. However, with the increase in 
physical and financial size as well as the complexity of 
the business, it was necessary to delegate authority to 
directors who appointed professional managers. Hence, 
management took over the physical control of the corporate 
assets which was one of the functions of the owners. Theo­
retically, stockholders control the business because they 
can remove the present management but practically, the 
individual stockholder has little to say. The usual situa­
tion is for another management group to take over the control 
and operation of the corporate enterprise. There are some 
professional managers who have obtained and thus, exercised 
extensive power which is, however, the exception rather than 
the rule. One of the reasons given for management obtaining 
so much power is because of the negligence on the part of
the stockholders.
When dealing with the balance sheet, the total claims 
against the corporation are considered liabilities. Some 
economists, however, divide liabilities into claims of 
creditors and owners’ equity. The total claims against the 
corporation represent the total capital investment in the 
corporate assets.
The going concern concept depends on expectations 
and the composite will of all the interested parties. The 
ownership of capital stock and bonds is not evidence of 
physical property but of residual shares in expected in­
come. The corporation has title to the physical assets.
CHAPTER VII
ACCOUNTING TREATMENT 
OF THE PRORPIETARX THEORY AND THE ENTITY THEORY 
OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE
One of the purposes of accounting is to supply the 
corporate enterprise with the necessary information to 
carry on the business. Accounting supplies most of the 
financial statements and records of the corporate enter­
prise. Thus, accounting procedures must be adapted to 
the business and the business conditions of the enterprise 
whenever possible and not the business enterprise adapt it­
self to accounting procedures.-*-
Although it is often thought that the corporate 
form of organization exists only for large business, the 
corporate form of organization is adaptable to small busi­
ness as well. The same is true of accounting because record 
keeping and the preparation of financial statements are not 
limited to the complex and gigantic corporate enterprise 
but accounting is also adapted to the small variety store
1 Robert H. Montgomery, the first paragraph of the 
forward to Origin and Evolution of Double Entry Bookkeeping 
by Edward Peragallo (New York: American Institute Publish­
ing Company, 193$).
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around the corner.
Some people are under the mistaken impression that 
accounting is perfected. Because the accountant presents 
statements with amounts expressed in numerical figures, 
this does not usually mean that the accounts are absolutely 
correct, but it does mean that the amounts are the most 
meaningful under the existing circumstances.^ Accounting 
is continually developing new techniques, methods, and 
ideas, in order to improve business records and to present 
the best possible statements for the corporate enterprise.
Some say that accounts are only money records^ and 
accountability is the real basis for financial reporting.^ 
MacNeal says that "The function of accounting is to record, 
collate, and present economic t r u t h s . B r o a d  remarks 
that, "Accounting is a branch of the science of economics 
and represents an attempt to measure and show by means of
^ Earl A. Saliers, Modern Practical Accounting 
(Chicago: American Technical Society, 1946}, p. 5»
3 DR Scott, Theory of Accounts (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 1925), I, p* 21.
4 Howard C. Greer, How to Understand Accounting 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1928), p. 21.
5 William J. Vatter, Managerial Accounting (New 
York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950), p. 1.
6 Kenneth MacNeal, Truth in Accounting (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1939), p» 295*
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figures economic facts, transactions, and results."?
Accounting is an important factor in the development 
of the corporate enterprise. Without accounting and the 
service it provides, the large modern corporate enterprise 
could not exist.
One of the main considerations of accounting is 
accounting for capital. The term capital has many connota­
tions which result in different usages and methods of 
handling the capital account. In the historic days of 
nobles and business ventures in England, the capital account 
of the Lord was treated as other debts of the business ven­
ture (liabilities) even though the Lord shared in the pro­
fits of the business venture.^ The term capital is sometimes 
substituted for the term net worth thus making no distinction 
between paid in capital and retained earnings.-*-0 "The 
economist generally thinks of capital as the total assets 
of a corporation or at least those assets derived from
.? Samuel J. Broad, "Some Comments on Surplus Accounts," 
The Journal of Accountancy. LXVT (193$), 215•
^ Scott, op« cit.. p..23.
9 A. C. Littleton, Accounting Evolution to 1900 (New 
York: American Institute Publishing Co., Inc., 1933), P* 193.
This is still in practice today.
10 Stephen Gilman, Accounting Concepts of Profit (New 
York: The Ronald Press Company, 1939), p. 269.
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long-term debt, capital-stock issues, and retained earn­
ings."^ From a legal point or view, capital usually refers 
to the par or stated value of the capital stock. When there 
are no liabilities present, capital is equal to the assets
of the corporation in the economic as well as the account- 
12ing sense.
Following are some of the comments made by different 
authors in accounting with respect to the ownership of the 
corporate enterprise. As can be seen, the comments vary 
widely when considering the entity theory, the proprietary 
theory, the stockholder, the management, the creditor, the 
employee, and the government. The final analysis as to the 
contribution of the authors to the complete entity theory 
and the proprietary theory of corporate.enterprise will be 
presented in the eighth chapter.
Stockholders— proprietary theory. According to
the doctrine of a capitalistic society, all capital is owned
by the government, state or federal, by individuals, or by 
13institutions. Corporations need capital in order to
Rufus Wixon, "The Nature of Corporate Capital," 
The Journal of Accountancy. UOCXII (1946), 214*
12 Charles E. Sprague, The Philosophy of Accounts 
(Fifth Edition; New York: The Ronald Press, 1922), p. 52.
13 Charles H. Porter and Wyman P. Fiske, Accounting 
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1935), p. 19*
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operate and this capital must be obtained from the govern­
ment, private individuals, institutions, or combinations 
thereof. The capital obtained by the corporate enterprise 
can be secured by loans from creditors or from stockholders. 
If the funds are obtained on a loan basis, there arises a 
debtor-creditor relationship between the corporate enter­
prise and the creditor. However, the relationship between 
the stockholder and the corporation is one of residual 
claimant rather than debtor-creditor according to the 
proprietary theory.
The proprietors or stockholders as possessors of 
capital stock of the corporate enterprise undertake the 
greatest risk.*^ If the corporation suffers any great loss, 
the stockholder suffers the loss and if there are any gains, 
the stockholder benefits by the gains. The stockholder is
the last claimant to the assets of the enterprise and hence,
15net assets equals the proprietary account.
Being the last claimant to the assets of a corpo­
rate enterprise, the stockholder is vested with some rights 
in the corporation and these rights, Sprague1^ relates, are
.1^  Y/illiam H. Moore, "Accounting for Sources of In­
come,,f The Journal of Accountancy. LXXIX (1945)> 2#$.
15 Y. G. Chow, "The Doctrine of Proprietorship,"
The Accounting Review. XVII (1942), 157•
Sprague, pp. cit.. p. 53.
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property rights in the assets.-1? The creditors on the other
•j d
hand have no property rights because they cannot order the 
assets sold if no other persons’ rights are being violated. 
The stockholders can vote to change the structure of the 
business organization and even force liquidation of a 
healthy corporate enterprise whereas the creditors have 
no such power and can usually act only when their rights 
are being violated.
Generally speaking, after the stockholders, the 
greatest contributor of capital to a corporate enterprise 
is the bondholder. Both the bondholder and the stock­
holder are considered investors but the b ondholder is a 
creditor-investor and the stockholder is an owner-investor. 
The bondholder receives his interest for money loaned to 
the corporate enterprise at regular intervals regardless 
of how much profit is made, as long as funds are available, 
whereas the stockholder receives a return on his investment, 
dividends, only if a profit is made and the directors see 
fit to declare a dividend.19 Again, the bondholder and the
1? This is in opposition to the theory that the rights 
of stockholders are in the corporation and not in the corpo­
rate assets.
1^ Whenever there is a mortgage the holder of the 
mortgage does have some contingent property rights to the 
specific mortgage property. He holds a prior lien.
19 George E, Bennett, Advanced Accounting (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1922), p. 194*
interest due him results in a debtor-creditor relationship 
whereas the stockholder is a residual claimant of the corpo­
ration except for declared dividends and then he is a credi­
tor. 20
Although the stockholder is a residual claimant of 
a corporate enterprise, this does not mean that he controls 
the corporation. Common stock of a corporation can be 
divided -into at least two types of stock, voting and non­
voting common. The investors who purchase the non-voting 
common stock are considered as stockholders even though 
they have no voting rights. Although one thinks of control
in a corporation as the majority of stock ownership, this
21is not the case when there is non-voting common stock. 
Undisputed control of a corporate enterprise or legal con­
trol requires ownership of a majority of voting common
stock which gives the stockholder a controlling voice in
22the management of the corporate enterprise.
Stockholders— entity theory. To understand better
20 Charles H. Porter and Wyman P. Fiske, Accounting 
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1935), p« 19*
21 Maurice Moonitz, The Entity Theory of Consoli­
dated Statements (Chicago: American Accounting Association, 
1944), Monograph 4, p. 24.
22 R0y B. Kester, Accounting Theory and Practice 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1922), p» 3.
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the entity theory a comparison between a slave and his 
master, as presented by Gilman, is appropriate.2  ^ Under 
the Roman lav/-, which permitted slavery, the slave v/as con­
sidered the personal property of his master, and the slave, 
as personal property, could not own property, personal or 
real, or even carry on business in his own name but only as 
an appendage of the master. This v/as the law but in reality 
the slave appeared to own the property and did carry on 
business because the master did not wish to be identified 
with the business.
Since the slave, according to law, could own no 
property, all that came into the slave’s possession belonged 
to the master and the slave was accountable and liable to 
the master for any increase in the slave’s possessions,2^ 
as well as the original amount he received from the master. 
Hence, there are two accounting procedures involved in record­
ing the transactions, the first being to record the data at a 
value and secondly, to record a liability of the slave to the 
master.2  ^ In the true sense of the word, there is no
23 In the strict sense of the word, the slave story
is not exactly valid as a comparison of the corporate enter­
prise. However, Gilman and other authors use the comparison
as an example of the entity theory which should not be con­
strued as the reason for the development of the corporate
entity theory but an aid to the understanding of the theory.
Gilman, op. cit.. pp. 40-41*
25 Ibid., p. 41•
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liability as there would be to outsiders since the master 
would be liable for his debts incurred by his slave, but 
to the slave, the debt to outsiders or to the master is 
just as great.26
Accounting today does not deal with the human person­
ality of a slave but with the impersonal entity of a corpo­
rate enterprise.27 The corporate enterprise, as such, is an 
artificial being and a legal entity which is separate and 
distinct from all its stockholders and creditors. This 
corporation has all the powers to contract business which 
&re given the corporate enterprise by the state in its 
charter. This corporation has certain rights besides the 
right to contract business and one is the right to own 
property in its own name. According to tax law, the corpo­
rate enterprise is taxed separately as are individuals. The 
corporation is taxed on its profits before dividends and the 
stockholder pays taxes on the dividends received from the
corporate enterprise.
The corporation is owned by the stockholders, that is 
to say,, the stockholders own the capital stock of the
^6 Ibid., p. 46.
27 Greer, op. pit., p. 21.
2& J. S. Seidman, "A Comparison of Tax Advantages of 
a Corporation v. Partnerships or Sole Proprietorships," The 
Journal, of Accountancy, XC (I950), 106.
corporate enterprise which represents a claim against the 
assets of the corporation. This fact has been stated over 
and over again and is read throughout the literature on 
corporate enterprise. However, the position of the stock­
holder as the owner of the corporate enterprise is a little 
over done. In the large corporations with hundreds of 
different claimants against the assets of the corporate enter­
prise (stockholders and creditors), there is little distinc­
tion made as to who comes first and in a healthy business, 
few people care who comes first as long as each receives a 
return. The stockholder lends his money to the corporation 
and he hopes for a return on his investment. However, for 
better accounting and financial reporting, the claimants 
against the assets should have a division of liabilities 
and net worth. Sprague*^ sees no reason for including 
proprietorship with liabilities and Gilman-^ divides liabili­
ties to the proprietors still further into the investment 
account and the retained earnings account. Perhaps the 
strongest reason for dividing claims against the corporate 
enterprise into liabilities and capital is because the 
creditors expect to be paid the amount due them within a 
certain period of time whereas the capital account owners
29 Sprague, op. cit.. p. 62.
30 Gilman, pp. cit.. p. 62,.
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will never receive their investment in the corporate enter­
prise directly from the corporation unless the corporation 
is liquidated.^ Some past accounting theorists held that 
since the corporate enterprise holds and uses the assets 
for all the beneficiaries of the organization,-^ all claims 
against the assets are shown as liabilities. Hence, the 
business owns property and owes debts. There are cases 
where the stockholders of a corporate enterprise do busi­
ness with the enterprise and become indebted to the corpo­
rate enterprise. On the other hand, there are times when 
the corporate enterprise becomes indebted to the stockholders 
because of private transactions.
Husband presents the following comments,
Accounting theory would probably be more realistic 
if it accepted as its basis the fact that the corpo­
ration is an association of flesh-and-blood persons 
who enjoy special privileges because they have 
complied with certain legal r e q u i r e m e n t s . 35
Husband^ also presents the idea that some assets be­
long to the corporate enterprise which is represented by the
31 Spurgeon Bell, Practical Accounting (Chicago: 
American Technical Society, 1932), p. 97.
32 c. Reinold Noyes, "A Consolidated Balance-Sheet 
for a Democracy,” The Journal of Accountancy. LXXXIII (1947), 
101.
33 George R. Husband, ”The Corporate-Entity Fiction' 
and Accounting Theory,” The Accounting Review. XIII (193$), 
242.
34 Ibid.. p. 244.
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retained earnings. These assets are given up by the corpo­
ration only when dividends are declared and paid; then, the 
assets, in the form of dividends, become the property of 
the stockholders. Since the corporate enterprise operates 
the business, all gains accruing to the corporation belong 
to the corporate enterprise. The stockholders are paid a 
return on their capital investment but their claims against 
the corporation are only for the amount of the capital 
contribution; the retained earnings belong to the corporate 
enterprise, as such.
The entity concept of corporate enterprise is not 
accepted by all. Some consider an organization as an 
entity if it is a moderate or large corporation but not 
for small corporate enterprises.35 However, if the corpo­
ration has the right to be considered an entity, whether 
it be large or small, it should be so considered because size 
alone should not be the only criterion for judging.
Creditors. The creditors of a corporate enterprise 
are sometimes considered as special owners of the corporation. 
They contribute to the corporate enterprise just as the stock­
holders do and together, total liabilities and owners’ equity, 
reveal the source of corporate capital. In liquidation,
35 Gilman, op. cit.. p. 53
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Bell relates, the creditors and bondholders are paid first, 
and then the stockholders receive the residue. Hence, from 
an accounting point of view and in all financial statements 
provided to the corporate enterprise, the creditors are 
represented here as claimants against the assets of the 
corporation.
Management. When the stockholder purchases capital 
stock in a corporate enterprise he is making an investment 
in the corporation. Evidence of this investment in the 
corporate enterprise is found in the statements that are 
prepared. Although there are numerous stockholders in the 
corporation, there is usually only one income statement 
and one balance sheet prepared per period. Also, no matter 
how many different activities the corporation is engaged in, 
there is only one set of financial statements which combine 
all activities of the corporate enterprise. Hence, it is 
one corporation, one entity, with many interested parties.37
When the auditor audits the books and certifies the 
statements of a corporate enterprise, he is not working for 
just any one group, such as management, but he is working
36 Bell, ojp. cit.. pp. 2-3.
37 William H. Moore, "Accounting for Sources of 
Income," The Journal of Accountancy. LXXIX (1945), 288.
162
36directly for the corporation. Since he is working for the 
corporate enterprise the results of his efforts, the certi­
fied statements, should be presented to all interested 
parties. Hence, indirectly and from an entity approach,
the auditor is working for all the interested parties of the
39corporate enterprise, the entity.
The stockholders elect a board of directors and the 
board appoints the officers of the corporate enterprise.
Along with the election of directors^ and the selection 
of officials, the stockholders delegate authority to manage­
ment to carry on the business of the corporate enterprise.^ 
Thus, the owners do not exercise direct control of the corpo­
ration but delegate to management the administration of the 
corporate affairs. Therefore, management exercises direct 
control over the corporation.
The audit report is usually directed to the stock­
holders but the corporation pays for the service. Someone 
must be responsible for naming the auditing firm and this 
will vary between corporations in different states.
39 John B. Inglis, "Reports to Stockholders, Manage-' 
ment and Labor," The Journal of Accountancy. LXXXIII (1947)» 
16.
An excellent summary on the powers and duties of 
the board of directors can be found in Robert C. Hardy and 
Robert D. Youle, "The Powers and Responsibilities of Corpo­
rate Directors," The Journal of Accountancy. LXXXII (194o)
280- 296.
Saliers, op. cit.. p. 203.
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There are times during the life of corporate enter­
prises when some officials take advantage of the business.
The management group fails to realize that they should help 
rather than hurt the corporation because the management 
group is supposed to represent the stockholders and certainly 
an interested party would not hurt himself.42
It is interesting to note that in England, the right 
to declare dividends rests with the stockholders. Except 
for dividends on preferred shares and interim dividends, 
which the directors may declare if the authority is granted 
in the charter, the directors can only suggest a certain 
amount of dividends to the stockholders and they in turn 
vote on it. However, the stockholders have no power to vote 
themselves dividends greater than the dividends suggested by 
the board of directors.^
Accounting evolved from three major growth periods 
in corporate enterprise theory. First, the accountant was 
concerned only with the owner who was the manager, second, 
as business grew and more capital was needed, creditors 
began to exercise more influence and began to demand state 
ments from the owner-managers. The last period developed
42 Scott, op. cit., p. 21.
43 F. R. M. dePaula, The Principles of Auditing 
(Tenth Edition; London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd., 193#),
p. 107.
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with the divorce of ownership and management. So today,
all the interested parties have come into the limelight and
the public accountant prepares statements useful to all
44interested parties.
Employees. The position of the employee has changed 
over the years in corporate enterprise theory. Today, 
corporations are adopting policies whereby the employees 
are receiving specially prepared financial statements of 
the company.^ Although the cost of these reports is great, 
the corporate managers realize the importance of having the 
employees of the corporate enterprise well-informed on corpo­
rate matters. Also, in this way, the employees do not feel 
left out.
There has been comment on the idea of separate re­
ports to the employees and some prefer to have the financial 
reports to employees and the stockholders the same. No 
matter which course of action is followed, the fact remains 
that the employees’ place is increasing in importance in 
the corporate enterprise-because of their position as an 
integral segment of the corporate organization.
Income. The usual connotation of income is an increase
44 MacNeal, op. cit.. pp. 70-71.
45 lnglis, op. cit.. p. 20.
in the net worth of the corporate enterprise through opera­
tions; a loss usually indicates a decrease in the net worth.^ 
However, a lawyer will give one definition of income and an 
economist may give another and if a second lawyer is asked, 
it is more than likely he will give still another definition. 
Hence, the meaning of income will vary among the lawyer, the 
economist, the businessman, and the accountant.
Gilman brings out some of the controversies among 
the accountants in regard to income when he says,
By some accountants ’income’ would be applied to 
such an item as gross or net sales. By others it 
would be applied to such an item as gross profit on 
the theory that net sales cannot be considered in­
come, since in part the sales total is a return 
of capital represented by the cost of the goods 
parted with.**®
The committee on terminology of the American Insti­
tute of Accountants recommends that
The terms net income or net profit refer to the re­
sults of operations after deducting from revenues 
all related costs and expenses and all other charges 
and losses assigned to the period. These deductions 
do not include dividends or comparable withdrawals.^'
MacNeal, op. cit., p. 295*
^Gilman, op. cit.. p. 597*
^  Ibid., p. 605.
■^9 Accounting Terminology Bulletins, prepared by the- 
Committee on Terminology, American Institute of Accountants, 
New York, Number 2, p. 3-
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Balance sheet. By definition, the balance sheet is 
a statement of balances. The total of all the assets must 
equal the total of all the claims against the corporation. 
The claims against the corporation are represented by either 
liabilities or owners' equity or both.^
The balance sheet is important in the study of the 
corporate enterprise for it shows the relationship between 
the assets and the claimants. It is possible to conceive 
of two different balance sheet presentations for two dif­
ferent theories, the entity theory and the proprietary 
theory, one represented by A - L = C and the other, A =
L / C  (an analysis of the formulas is given later).
Before 1900, the order of accounts on the credit 
side of the balance sheet was quite different from today.
The balance sheet credit items appeared in the approximate 
order, ,l. . . capital stock, funded debt, current liabili­
ties, reserves, profit and loss."^ There was no break­
down of proprietary items and liabilities but all the credit 
accounts were intermingled. Hence, all accounts which would 
be deducted from assets or had credit balances were shown
5® William Morse Cole, The Fundamentals of Accounting 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company"! 1921), p. 7*
51 Henry Hatfield. Accounting. Its Principles and 
Prnb]ems (New York: D, Appleton and Company, 1929), p. 6.
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52on the right side of the balance sheet.'
The main purpose of the balance sheet is to give the
financial position of the corporate enterprise on a given
53day and to show how the contributed capital is invested.
This contributed capital (liabilities and owners’ equity) 
in the balance sheet shows who has creditor and equity 
claims against the corporation.^4 Thus, the main divisions 
of the balance sheet are the assets and the equities with 
the equities being broken down into liabilities and capital.55 
From the usual way of showing assets of the corporate 
enterprise on the left side and what the corporation owes, 
liabilities and capital, on the right side of the balance 
sheet, May 56 has introduced a new form for the balance sheet. 
This new statement has capital stock and retained earnings 
totaled at the beginning of the statement. This total is 
then compared with the results of current assets less current
52 Roger W. Babson, Investment Fundamentals (Third 
Revised Edition; New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 
1935), p. 130.
53 dePaul, o£. cit., p. 73.
54 Leon Carroll Marshall, Business Administration 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1921), p. 476.
55 M. B. Daniels, Financial Statements (Chicago: 
American Accounting Association, 1939), Monograph 2, p. 10.
5^ George 0. Play, "The Future of the Balance Sheet," 
The Journal of Accountancy. LXXXIV (1947), 100.
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liabilities, net current assets, to which all other assets 
are added, less all other liabilities, which gives net assets. 
This type of statement has a tendency towards following the 
proprietary t heory since the proprietary accounts are placed 
first and hence, the impression of importance is given. In 
other words, here is the owners’ equity and this equity is 
represented by the net assets.
it was the practice a few years ago to show net worth 
under the heading of liabilities. Although many authors did 
not favor this presentation, it was explained as customary 
to show the liabilities and net worth under one caption on 
the right-hand side of the balance sheet.57 However,
William Bell, writing as late as 1934, still favored the 
terra liabilities . . a s  the heading for the right-hand 
side of the balance sheet.”
Formulas. As was brought out in the introduction, 
there are two basic formulas used in accounting, A - L = C 
and A = L / C. There are authors who make no distinction 
between the formulas and there are others who say that the 
formulas are different but do not make any attempt to explain
57 Willard J. Graham and Wilber G. Katz, Accounting 
in Law Practice (Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1932),
p. 11.
5^ William H. Bell, Accountants’ Reports (Third 
Revised Edition; New York: The Donald Press Company, 1934),
p. 20.
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the difference. The introduction also pointed out that from 
a mathematical stand point, both formulas could be different 
if L / C  is considered a complete unit and hence, as a com­
plete unit the transposition could not be made from A = 
L / C t o A - L i i C ,
If there were no liabilities against a corporate
59enterprise, a formula, assets equal capital could be formed.
The assumption made here is that all claims against the 
assets of the corporation are represented by the owners of 
the corporation’s capital stock. Another assumption could 
be made by saying that assets equal capital, that is, that 
all of the assets are owned by the owners of capital since 
assets equal capital. Hence, the first assumption would 
express either a proprietary approach or an entity approach 
since the capital represents just a claim against the corpo­
ration and the second assumption would express an extremist’s 
proprietary approach since the capital represents ownership 
of the assets and hence, the corporation would be a mere 
method of organization rather than an entity.
With • the introduction of the liabilities, the theory 
becomes more complicated. Some say that there is no difference 
in having liabilities as a deduction from the assets or added
59 George E. Bennett. Basic Accounting (New York: 
The Gregg Publishing Company, 1925), P« 25*
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to the capital. The authors contend that one reason for 
deducting the liabilities from the assets is that it is 
easier to sbutract the liabilities rather than to add the 
liabilities.^
The authors who contend that there is no difference 
in the formulas and that the reason for both is to facili­
tate statement making are usually following the proprietary 
theory. The contention of this school is to determine the 
net assets of the corporate enterprise since the stockholders 
are interested only in the net product or A - L = C. Hence,
zip
liabilities are considered as negative assets and as such, 
are not owned by the owners of the corporation but are owed 
to creditors.^ The position is that the liabilities to 
creditors can either be shown as deductions from assets or 
additions to the capital side of the balance sheet. If, 
however, the liabilities are added to capital the capital 
account does not represent liabilities of the corporate 
enterprise but it is used only in regard to accountability
Bennett, Basic Accounting, p. 26. Also, George H, 
MacFarland and Robert B. Ayars, Accounting Fundamentals (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1936J> P• 12.
Hatfield, op. cit. f p. 2.
62 Chow, pp. cit.. pp. 157-15B.
6 3 Littleton, pp. cit.. p. 13&.
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to the stockholders for their capital investment.
Considering the entity approach, liabilities must 
always be on the right-hand side of the formula and added 
to the capital, thus, showing the total claims against the
6 K
assets of the corporate enterprise. As Sprague brings 
out, A - L is not valid if capital is considered one of 
liability because if capital, as an excess of assets over 
liabilities, is considered one of liability then the formula 
must be A = L / C. It is true that the liability of the 
corporate enterprise towards its stockholders is not the 
same as against the other claimants but there is a liability 
of the corporate entity,to its stockholders. Husband and 
Thomas bring out the entity and the proprietary theories 
when they divide the two ideas by saying,
(1) Those who claim that the proprietor owns all of ' 
the assets but owes certain amounts to creditors, 
and
(2) those who hold that both liabilities and proprie­
torship are merely claims against the assets.00
Summary. One of the purposes of accounting is to 
supply the corporate enterprise with the necessary informa­
tion to carry on the business. Accounting procedures are
^  Bennett, Basic Accounting, pp. 13 and 1&-19.
Sprague, op. cit., p. 20.
66 George R. Husband and Olin E. Thomas, Principles 
of Accounting (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1935)> P* 18•
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adaptable to large corporations as well as small business 
units. Accounting has become a necessity for the large 
corporate enterprises.
The term capital has many connotations. Economists 
consider capital as all that is invested in the corporation 
or at least the long-term debt, capital stock, and retained 
earnings. Others consider capital as owners’ equity and 
still others consider capital as the par or stated value 
of the capital stock.
A corporation must obtain capital in order to begin 
operations and the sources are government, private individ­
uals, institutions, or combinations thereof. This capital 
can be loaned by a creditor or it may be equity capital 
invested by a stockholder. The corporate relationship with 
the creditor is debtor-creditor and with the stockholder, 
residual claimant rather than debtor-creditor.
The stockholder undertakes the greatest risk because 
he is the last claimant. He suffers losses but he also 
benefits by the gains. Considering the proprietary theory, 
the stockholder has some rights and Sprague^ contends that 
these rights are property rights in the assets. The stock­
holder can order the assets sold and the corporation liqui­
dated if they so desire. However, no other group can force
6? Sprague, 0£. cit.. p. 2SS.
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the corporation into liquidation unless there is a default 
in discharging its duties or the corporation is found guilty 
of illegal practices by the courts.
As an aid to understanding the entity theory, Gilman 
and others use the example of the slave in the days of the 
Roman Empire. Although the slave did not own property; it 
appeared that he did because he carried on business like 
any free person. The debts to outsiders were as much a lia­
bility to the slave as the amount of capital received from 
the master. Although the corporation is not a slave, some 
attempt to say that, like the slave, the corporation is 
liable to its stockholder for the capital contribution.
The corporation is a separate and distinct entity and can 
contract business in its own name. The stockholders receive 
a return on their capital investment only when dividends 
are declared and the payment of dividends depends on the 
board of directors.
The creditors are sometimes considered as special 
owners. The creditors contribute capital to the corporation 
as well as the stockholders do. However, the creditors have 
a claim against the corporation for a specific amount and 
for a definite period of time, whereas the stockholders have 
no claim for any specific amount which must be paid by a 
certain date. From an entity concept, some extremists have 
held that there is little or no distinction between the
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stockholders and the creditors.
The board of directors is elected by the stockholders 
and the directorate appoints the officers. The stockholders 
delegate authority to the management in order to operate 
the corporate affairs. With the authority to operate the 
business, management, in most large corporations, exercises 
direct control over the capital of the corporation. Some 
management groups have taken advantage of their positions 
at the expense of stockholders.
The employee’s position has changed over the years 
in corporate enterprise theory. Although they were not 
considered too important in the past, now they are given 
more consideration. Special financial reports are given 
the employees or in most cases they at least receive the 
same annual report that is given to the stockholders.
The balance sheet is one of the major financial state­
ments prepared for the corporation. It is a statement of 
balances and contains the assets, liabilities and owners’ 
equity. In statements of past years, the creditors’ claims
4
and owners* equity are shown as liabilities. Today, however, 
the creditors’ claims are shown as liabilities and the 
owners’ claims are shown as owners’ equity.
There are two formulas used in accounting to repre­
sent ownership, A - L = C and A s  L / C. Using a mathe­
matical foimula to try and explain a theory, A - L = C
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represents the proprietary theory and A « L / C represents 
the entity theory. Although many authors use either formula, 
they never make a distinction between the two. If L and C 
are considered completely different units, a transposition 
could be made and both formulas would be identical. How­
ever, if L / C is considered as a single unit and similar 
in nature, then neither L or C could be separated from the 
unit.
CHAPTER VIII
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS PERTAINING TO 
THE PROPRIETARY THEORY AND THE ENTITY THEORY 
OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE
This study was made in order to determine what is 
meant by the entity theory and the proprietary theory of 
corporate enterprise. After reviewing the available material, 
it is evident that neither theory has been well developed in 
the literature. Most authors will only suggest a part of 
one theory and a part of the other theory without any com­
parison or explanation. As a result, assumptions and inter­
pretations have to be made in the light of their total 
contribution for one to formulate the theories.
The entity theory. The entity theory considers the 
organization with all its component parts and hence, has 
its foundation in the function of the respective interests 
of the corporate enterprise. It is management who coordi­
nates all of these parts into a usually well organized 
operating unit. Thus, it may be said that the entity theory 
is a managerial approach to the theory of corporate enter­
prise.
The corporation is a separate entity but it is im­
personal in nature. Since it is impersonal, there must be
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a reason for its inception. The corporation’s existence, 
following the entity approach, is for the benefit of all 
the contributing persons and society in general. The 
individual contributors lose their identity because the 
main consideration is the corporation and not any particular 
group within the corporate structure. It makes little dif­
ference to the corporate enterprise who the stockholders, 
creditors, management, or other contributing parties are 
because they can be continually changing but the corporation 
exists indefinitely. The stockholders and creditors are 
the suppliers of capital to the corporate enterprise.
The professional managers perform the duties of 
operating and administering the corporate affairs. Manage­
ment has physical control over the corporate assets. All 
reductions in corporate assets represent a cost to manage­
ment and hence, to the corporation. Distribution of corpo­
rate income to the stockholders is just as much a cost to 
the corporation, according to the entity theory, as interest 
because it represents payment for the use of invested funds.
In accounting, the formula A = L / C best expresses 
the entity theory. The corporation owns assets and has 
obligations. The assets are represented by A and the obli­
gations are represented by L / C (liabilities and owners’ 
equity). From a functional standpoint, L / C  are all obli­
gations and there is little reason to separate them. Hence,
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L / C is considered a parenthetical unit, and as in algebra, 
if one wishes to transpose, the whole parenthetical expres­
sion must be transposed and not the individual parts.
The proprietary theory. The proprietary theory is 
a stockholder1s approach to the theory of corporate enter­
prise. The stockholder owns the capital stock which repre­
sents a residual interest in the assets of the corporation. 
The stockholder is the last recipient of distributed corpo­
rate assets.
The usual purpose of a corporation is to make a 
profit for the benefit of its stockholders. When stock­
holders associate themselves to form a corporation, the 
purpose is for their personal gain. The fact that many 
other, individuals may benefit from the corporations exist­
ence does not alter the original purpose of the corporation, 
i.e., to benefit the stockholders.
As the corporation grows in physical and financial 
size, it is usually impossible for the stockholders to 
perform all of the functions of an owner such as meeting 
all of the operational and financial needs of the large 
corporate organization. Hence, duties with responsibility 
are delegated to others (management) by the stockholders. 
This theory holds that the persons who perform these duties 
are directors and officers of the corporate enterprise,
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they actually are employees of the stockholders. The stock­
holders elect the directors who appoint the officers but, 
the stockholders can replace the directors and thus cause 
a change in the officers. People lose sight of the fact 
that management is performing a function; the authority 
being delegated to them by the stockholders.
The corporate enterprise is a form of organization 
which is used to protect not only the personal wealth of 
the stockholders but to protect all persons doing business 
with the corporation. The stockholders are the instruments 
behind this impersonal being and own it according to the 
proprietary theory. It takes the stockholders to set the 
wheels in motion in order to commence operations. It takes 
the stockholders to keep the wheels in motion.
In accounting, the formula A - L = C best explains 
the proprietary theory. Here, a definite distinction is 
made between the liabilities and the owners’ equity. In 
owning the corporation, the stockholders own the residue 
after all other obligations of the corporation are met. If 
one wishes to express the proprietary theory by using the 
formula A = L / C, it must be remembered that L / C is not 
a parenthetical expression but represents two completely 
different segments, one of a debtor-creditor relationship 
and the other a residual claimant relationship. Therefore, 
the transposition of the formula from A = L / C to A - L = C
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can be made.
Analysis. The corporate enterprise is an organization 
chartered by the state for a specific purpose, and it is 
impersonal in nature. Because it is impersonal, it needs 
personal beings in order to operate. It is management who 
supplies the personal factor.
Along with the personal beings who operate the corpo­
rate enterprise, capital is needed. Money or goods must be 
supplied to the corporation if anyone expects it to operate. 
Hence, other contributors to the corporate enterprise are 
the furnishers of capital (creditors and stockholders).
The creditors supply long and short term capital and the 
stockholders provide equity or owners’ capital.
One of the difficulties in understanding the entity 
theory and the proprietary theory is determining who owns 
the corporate enterprise. Some theorists claim all contrib­
utors are such an integral part of the corporation that they 
in effect own the corporate enterprise. Others say that the 
corporation is owned by the stockholders and hence, the 
stockholders are the important factor when considering the 
corporation.
To be an owner of a thing, there are three important 
factors: control, income, and risk. These three factors
must be inherent in a person if he is to be considered an
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owner. &ven though there are varying degrees of control, 
income, and risk present in all claims, the ovmer usually 
has the greatest combination of control, income, and risk.
From the inception of the corporation, the advocates 
of the association theory (a proprietary approach) hold that 
it is the stockholders who give the authority to the corpo­
rate enterprise and the state recognizes what already exists. 
This form of organization, with its limited liability and 
other benefits, is merely a method of doing business rather 
than a being per se. The stockholder is the important fac­
tor and other parties are just instrumentalities used by 
the stockholders for their benefit. This is the proprietary 
theory in the extreme sense but it is held by some. Although 
the laws pertaining to corporations expressly state that the 
corporate enterprise owns the corporate assets, the proprie­
tary theorists would claim that the corporation is acting 
like a trustee who uses the corporate assets for the benefit 
of all the stockholders.
Another contention is that the capital stock repre­
sents ownership of the corporation. The stockholders own 
the capital stock and hence, they own the corporation. From 
this point of view, what does the stockholder actually own? 
The stockholder doesn't own the assets of the corporation 
because the corporation, according to law, owns the assets.
He doesn’t own the segment of the assets represented by the
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retained earnings of the corporation because again, the corpo­
rate enterprise holds the assets and distributes them, in the 
form of dividends, only after the board of directors elects 
to declare and pay dividends. Hence, the stockholder really 
owns an anticipated or implied promise of the corporation 
to pay dividends in addition to other rights. Only when 
dividends are paid does the stockholder receive income on 
his capital contribution.
Following the entity extremists, the stockholder is 
merely an investor and not an owner. The writers who con­
tend that the stockholder is merely an investor do not define 
investor. However, they seem to hold that investor means 
stockholder rather than the usual connotation of investor 
as stockholder or bondholder. And yet, going deeper into 
the concept of a stockholder as an investor and following an 
entity approach, there is virtually little difference between 
some types of stockholders and some types of bondholders.
In this light, and following an entity approach, the stock­
holder, as a mere investor would have to be considered as a 
creditor (not as a general creditor but as a special or in­
ferior creditor).
If the stockholder is to be considered as a special 
creditor or inferior creditor, he must have a direct claim 
against the corporation. The stockholder, however, cannot 
force the corporate enterprise to return his capital
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contribution nor can he force the corporation to pay a re­
turn on his capital contribution. The stockholder’s only 
right or claim to a return on his investment is when divi­
dends are declared. The corporate enterprise cannot pay 
dividends to some stockholders and not to other stockholders 
holding the same class of stock or, in liquidation, the 
corporate enterprise must distribute to each stockholder 
his proportionate share of the corporate assets. Up to the 
point of liquidation or declaration of dividends, however, 
the stockholder has no direct claim against the corporation 
for any specific amount to be paid at any specific time.
The function of a creditor is to loan money or goods. 
If the stockholder is considered as a creditor, following 
an entity approach, his purpose would be just money lending. 
However, the purpose and function of a stockholder is greater 
than and different from a lender of funds. The stockholder 
does not lend funds to the corporation (capital contribution 
and retained earnings) but he commits funds to the corpo­
ration. The corporation, in most cases, is not indebted 
to the stockholder for any specific amount as it is to its 
creditors.
The understanding of claims against the corporate 
enterprise is a point often overlooked in the entity theory. 
Because a person is a claimant against the corporation, this 
does not mean he has a claim against the assets or even owns
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the corporation. Only in cases where the claimant has a 
lien against a particular asset can one think of a claim 
against the assets of the corporation and even here, the 
claim is only contingent. Although, in some borderline 
cases, the claims of some interested parties do not appear 
to vary considerably, the differences can be great. Ac­
cording to the entity theory, for example, the difference 
between stockholders and bondholders does not appear to be 
prodigious in the large corporation. The bondholder, how­
ever, has a claim against the corporation for a specific 
amount to be paid within a specified time. The stock­
holder, on the other hand, has a residual claim which is 
not for any specific amount nor must be paid. The bond­
holder can demand payment when the debt is due but the 
stockholder cannot demand payment for there is no debt aris­
ing from his capital contribution.
In owning a share in the corporation, a stockholder 
has title to a portion of the total corporate capital stock. 
The capital stock in turn represents a bundle of rights.
As owner of capital stock the stockholder does not own the 
corporate assets but he owns all the rights which the capi­
tal stock relays. The rights of the stockholder are in 
turn subject: first, to the rights of the government be­
cause laws can be and are passed restricting the property 
rights of individuals; secondly, to the rights of the
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creditors; thirdly, to the rights of other interested parties. 
Therefore, the stockholders’ rights in the corporation are 
residual; he receives only the residue after all other 
parties* claims are satisfied.
The right to vote in a corporate enterprise is re­
stricted to stockholders, except in unusual cases when credi­
tors are permitted to vote on all or part of the directorate. 
The purpose of the voting right is to elect the board of 
directors who act for the stockholders in the management of 
the business. The board of directors appoint the officers 
and together they perform the duties necessary to operate 
the corporate enterprise. It is the stockholders who vote 
on the directorate and hence, the stockholders have the 
legal right to replace the management group. According to 
some entity theory extremists, the stockholders need not 
have the voting right because management can and in excep­
tional cases does choose the directorate. However, it still 
takes the yes or no of the stockholder, whether by proxy or 
direct vote, to vote in the directorate.
The separation of ownership and control of the corpo­
ration has caused many to believe that the stockholder is 
an inferior creditor. When the stockholders were the managers, 
the new theories brought about because of the divorce of 
ownership and control were nonexistent. Control is necessary 
if one is to be considered an owner of a corporate enterprise.
1S6
However, it is not necessary to have physical control of the 
property to be an owner. Physical control of the property 
can be surrendered by contract. When a person leases land 
to another, he gives up effective control of the land but 
he still owns it. At the expiration of the lease, effective 
control of the land reverts back to the owner. Management 
has effective control of the corporation but this control 
is delegated by the stockholders. In order to perform the 
management function, it is sometimes necessary to delegate 
control. In the corporate enterprises, management cannot 
possibly carry out its duties if it does not have control 
of the corporate enterprise. Because management has con­
trol of the corporation and deals with the creditors, em­
ployees, government, society in general, and stockholders, 
this does not mean that management is an entity in itself 
but management is performing tasks which the stockholders 
delegate to them. Thus, management is actually performing 
a function of the organization for the benefit of the stock­
holders.
If management was working for all the interested 
parties, all the interested parties should have a voice in 
the selection of the management group and its changes. How­
ever, the stockholders are the ones who select the manage­
ment group and it is the stockholders who can change the 
management group. The management group is the employee of
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the stockholders and any action involving management is 
restricted to the stockholders or their delegated agents.
In some corporate enterprises management has been 
able to perpetuate itself. The reason is that the stock­
holders permit it and the reason is not that management is 
the deciding force behind their own perpetuation. The 
management group is able to influence enough stockholders 
into its camp and hence, management remains in power. How­
ever, as soon as the opposition is able to convince enough 
stockholders that they can perform the functions of manage­
ment better, then, the management is replaced and the new 
group takes over control. In the New York Central Railroad 
proxy fight, a group headed by Mr. Robert R. Young was able 
to unseat the management group because the stockholders 
felt that Mr. Young’s group could give superior service 
and as a result more profits to the stockholders. Although 
Mr. Young was extremely influential, it was still the vote 
of the stockholders that brought about the change in favor 
of Mr. Young's group and not the new management group per
Some professional managers are extremely influen­
tial and they are able to gather the necessary stockholders’ 
votes to maintain their position in the corporation. Their 
influence may be the result of being good managers or per­
sonal contacts. Because management is influential and
iaa
solicits the votes of the stockholders, this does not mean 
that the stockholders are relinquishing any of their rights 
as owners. The stockholders favor one group of managers 
over another to perform the tasks of managing the corporate 
affairs.
Along with a management group, the corporate enter­
prise has employees. The employees are an integral part of 
the organization because labor is necessary to operate the 
business. The question, however, is not the necessity of 
labor but what part labor plays in the entity theory and the 
proprietary theory of corporate enterprise, if any.
The employees receive wages for services rendered to 
the corporate enterprise. The employees have a direct claim 
against the corporation for their wages and they are general 
creditors when wages are owed to them by the corporate enter­
prise. These wages are considered as an expense by the 
corporation. However, some theorists following the entity 
theory believe that wages of the employee not only include 
earnings for services rendered but also a distribution of 
the corporate enterprise’s income. It is true that some 
employees and some managers receive a bonus which is con­
sidered a percentage of the corporate income. The new guar­
anteed annual wage contract of Ford Motor Company and General
1
Motors Corporation is claimed by some to be a return paid to 
the employee for services not rendered and hence, a gift
brought about by the distribution of corporate income to 
the employees. But, is it not also true that the total 
cost of labor as far as the corporation and the proprietary 
theory are concerned is the total wages paid to the employees? 
It makes little difference if one calls a distribution of 
corporate income bonuses, guaranteed annual wages, and 
other fringe benefits, for they still represent a cost to 
the corporation to have its products produced, following 
a proprietary approach. The effect of all these benefits 
results in a higher unit cost of labor to the corporation 
and ultimately to the stockholders rather than a distribution 
of the corporate income.
Some corporate enterprises have instituted the idea 
of employee stock ownership. These corporations have set 
up plans whereby the employee can accumulate funds to pur­
chase the corporate capital stock and some corporate enter­
prises have gone so far as to guarantee the purchase price 
of the capital stock purchased (this guarantee would make 
the employees’ position one of an owner and a creditor at 
the same time because the corporation would be contingently 
liable for the fluctuations downward in the market price 
of the capital stock). The purposes behind the employee 
stock purchase plan are numerous and worthy but from a corpo­
rate viewpoint, what is the significance? Since the employee 
is already an integral part of the corporate organization and
receives all the above mentioned benefits, which are con­
sidered a distribution of corporate profit, there is no 
reason for his becoming an owner of the corporation directly 
following an entity approach. As an owner, however, the 
employee takes his chances along with the other stockholders 
for income (dividends) but as an employee, he receives not 
only wages but a part of the corporate income. With strong 
labor unions and the labor laws today, the employee is in 
a better position as an employee than as a stockholder for 
receiving compensation from the corporate enterprise. Having 
the employees become direct owners of the corporation is a 
proprietary viewpoint because tne employee is now a stock­
holder and not just a segment of the corporate organization. 
Hence, along the proprietary reasoning, the employee is 
important because he is a stockholder and not because he 
is an employee.
At different times throughout the history of this 
country, the government has taken an active part in corpo­
rate affairs. The last law which permitted the government 
to loan funds directly to corporations was the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation which terminated all of its activities 
in 1954. The RFC was set up to lend money to tne small 
business organizations and in part to large corporations 
as well. In its capacity as money lender to the corporate 
enterprises, the government became a creditor of these
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corporations. The loans of money to the corporate enter­
prise were usually repaid but whenever the money was not, 
the government took its place along with the other credi­
tors. Hence, the government became an important segment of 
the corporation because in this case it was a creditor.
At times, the government has formed corporations and 
these government owned corporate enterprises take their 
place along with private corporations. The courts have 
declared that even though these corporate enterprises are 
owned by the government, any suits against these corporations 
are not suits against the government but they are against 
the corporation. Hence, the separation of the entity from 
the stockholders even when the government is the stock­
holder.
In order to operate the government, taxes are levied 
on the income of personal and impersonal beings. The pur­
pose of taxation is to raise money but the government must 
also oonsider injustices in its tax program. If a tax law 
is passed and the courts deem it unjust, it is declared 
unconstitutional and hence, not enforceable. The taxes 
levied on the income of corporations is considered consti­
tutional after many court cases.
One of the largest borrowers of government funds 
was Kaiser Motors Corporation which owed the government as 
much as #36,911,779 in 1951.
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When income taxes were levied on real and corporate 
persons, each taxpayer was considered a separate person.
The corporation, according to lav;, is taxed as a separate 
person and hence, following the entity appraoch, the corpo­
rate tax is not considered unjust in this light. However, 
the stockholders began to clamor "injustice" because of the 
tax on corporate income and dividend income (double taxation). 
Considering the stockholder as the owner of the corporation 
with the corporation merely as a form of organization, which 
is an extreme proprietary approach, one may arrive at a con­
clusion of a double tax injustice. With the corporation as 
a separate entity, however, there is no injustice and the 
stockholder is merely trying to avoid paying taxes.
After considering taxes and the complaints of double 
taxation, one is led to consider income. Since all of the 
interested parties are trying to claim the income of the 
corporation, is there any income in the corporation or, in 
other words, does the corporation make a profit? Income 
is the residue after all deductions are made. If the con­
tention of the stockholders is correct when they claim the 
income of the corporation is theirs (the proprietary extrem­
ists). then the corporate enterprise makes no profit. Or, 
if the corporation is established for the benefit of all 
interested parties, there would be no profit either (the 
extreme corporate entity viewpoint), because all of the
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gains would be distributed, either now or at a later date, 
to the benefactors (any gains would belong to them). So, 
from both extreme points of view, the corporation never 
makes a profit.
The retained earnings of the corporation are the 
accumulated gains from operations before they are distributed 
to the interested parties. In reality, who has a right to 
the assets represented by the retained earnings? The assets 
are owned by the corporate enterprise. The stockholder has 
a right to corporate earnings only when dividends are de­
clared and not until that time. According to law, the 
stockholder does not own the assets of the corporation and 
hence, his investment in the corporation represents only a 
bundle of rights paid for by his capital contribution. This 
contribution is made in anticipation of dividends but there 
is no one or nothing which can force the corporation to pay- 
dividends except in a few rare cases which were previously 
cited. Therefore, the assets represented by retained earn­
ings do not belong to the stockholders or other interested 
parties. The only way the other interested parties could 
receive a distribution of these assets would be for the 
corporation to make a gift, following the proprietary theory. 
Although bondholders and some creditors may have a prior 
lien against a few particular assets of the corporate enter­
prise, the creditors and bondholders do not own the assets
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and cannot claim the assets except in case of default of 
payment•
If the assets produced by profits belong to the corpo­
ration, then the corporate enterprise does make a profit.
It seems only logical that the assets represented by earn­
ings should belong to the corporation. The corporate enter­
prise is a separate entity established by the state and can 
sue or be sued in its own name as any natural person. Laws 
are passed by the state and federal governments which govern 
the operations of the corporate enterprise. The corporation 
obtains funds and goods from creditors and stockholders and 
places them into operation for the purpose of making a profit. 
It is true that the assets obtained because of the profits 
may ultimately go to creditors and stockholders when the 
corporate enterprise is liquidated and currently, as divi-
/
dends are paid out, but assets, up to the time of liquidation, 
belong to the corporation. Also, the consensus is that a 
corporate enterprise makes a profit.
Generally accepted opinion often plays an important 
part in theory and at times, it is used as a proof of the 
theory. The persons questioning the theory that a corpo­
ration makes a profit are extremists, both entity and pro­
prietary followers, but they are few in number. The entity 
and proprietary extremists lose sight of the fact that the 
corporate enterprise owns the assets produced by profits.
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If the corporation makes no profit, there can be no increase 
in tn'e assets owned by the corporation because of operations. 
Hence, when someone asks where the new assets come from, 
assuming the creditors and the stockholders do not contribute 
more, there can be no reply. Whenever the assets owned by 
the corporation actually increase and neither the creditors 
nor the stockholders contribute to the corporate enterprise, 
the source of the assets must be profit. Therefore, a corpo­
ration can and does make a profit.
From a corporate entity viewpoint, considering the 
corporate enterprise as an entity and separate from all inter­
ested parties, dividends, when declared and paid, represent 
just as much an expense as interest because it reduces the 
corporate assets as interest does. Dividends are the cost 
of the capital invested by the stockholders. Some theorists 
have held that dividends should be divided into two parts, 
interest and profits. The stockholder should receive a return 
for his investment in the corporation. However, the amount to 
be paid as interest and as profit is always disputed. If 
a just return would be the same as the interest paid to bond­
holders, the difference in amount would be profit. Such a 
contention would put a price tag on the cost of risk and 
hence, the cost of risk between the stockholder qnd the bond­
holder would be equal. Such reasoning does not seem logical 
because there is a definite difference if one just considers
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claims. The bondholders must be paid their interest each 
period but the stockholders cannot demand a return on their 
investment. Therefore, the dividend should include more 
interest than distributed profit or perhaps no distributed 
profit at all. The entity idea would contend that the divi­
dend represents an expense in total to the corporation.
Dividends are declared out of retained earnings and 
are payment for the use of capital funds or for the entre­
preneurial function. An entrepreneur is one who assumes 
the risk and management of a business. If the entrepreneur 
must directly assume the risk and management of the business, 
by strict definition, there are no true entrepreneurs in the 
large corporate enterprise. Hence, the meaning of the term 
has changed and today, the entrepreneur can be anyone of the 
interested parties in a corporation or all the parties in 
various combinations. The most accepted version is, however, 
that the management or the stockholders are the entrepreneur 
as both contribute to the entrepreneurial function.
4
In considering the entity and the proprietary theories, 
one is led to consider the viewpoint of management and stock­
holders. The management group is working for the stockholders 
since the stockholders elect and appoint them and can replace 
them. However, as the stockholders consider management as an 
instrumentality, so can management consider the stockholder 
as an instrumentality. Since the corporation is impersonal
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in nature, the only persons who could benefit by its exist­
ence would be the parties coming into contact with it. Thus, 
the corporate enterprise would exist for the benefit of all 
parties and not for any single group. Such reasoning would 
lead to the entity theory or a managerial approach. On the 
other hand, a stockholder*s approach would be the proprietary 
theory.
Conclusions. The entity theory and the proprietary 
theory are entirely different and serve two different pur­
poses. The entity theory serves to demonstrate the oneness 
of the corporate organization, giving weight to all the 
interested parties as claimants against the corporate enter­
prise. It is a managerial approach to accounting for the 
enterprise because as operators of the corporation, manage­
ment is interested in all contributors of capital as a 
source of capital funds and the cost of obtaining these funds 
to the corporation. Therefore, the stockholders are treated 
as a part of the whole like the creditors, employees, and 
government. The management group tries to perform its duties 
for the good of the corporation which is tne total function 
of management. From a managerial point of view, the stock­
holders perform the function of capital suppliers but this 
does not have any relationship to ownership. The stockholders 
do not own the assets of the corporation because they are 
owned by the corporate entity itself but from a proprietary
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approach, the stockholders do own the corporate entity.
The entity theory deals in assumptions which overlook 
the facts. Because most people benefit by the large corpo­
ration^ existence, this does not mean that the position of 
the stockholders as owners is lost. How much can a stock­
holder give up before he loses his position as an owner? 
Whenever a stockholder gives up his right as the ultimate 
authority, his position is weakened to a point of an in­
ferior creditor. By contract, a stockholder can relinquish 
his right to vote in corporate matters and therefore, he 
loses complete control of the corporate organization. The 
true owners of the corporate enterprise are the stockholders 
who have the right to vote in corporate matters and by so 
voting, control the activities of the corporation and there­
fore, they are the real entrepreneurs, the owners.
Along with the right to vote, another important factor 
is the position of the stockholder as to claims against the 
corporate enterprise. The stockholder has no direct claims 
against the corporation for anything except for dividends 
when they are declared. The stockholder's rights are residual 
in nature which is the usual criterion of an owner. The 
owner of anything has all rights to his property subject to 
the rights of others, or, in other words, he has the residual 
interest.
In most cases, the application of the entity theory or
199
the proprietary theory will not affect the results from an 
accounting standpoint. At times, however, the use of either 
theory will produce different results. Consider, for example, 
the idea of net worth. By definition, net means that some­
thing has been deducted and since it is net worth, something 
has been deducted from the worth. The net worth section of 
the balance sheet represents the stockholder’s interest in 
the corporate enterprise and is the residue after liabilities 
are deducted from the assets. This is the proprietary theory 
and therefore, in tnis light, the idea of net worth has 
meaning.
Following an entity approach, net worth has little, 
if any, meaning. The corporation receives funds from many 
sources and as a result is accountable to all interested 
parties for their capital investment. New laws and govern­
ment regulations have caused changes in management and account­
ing thinking and as a result the accountability to others is 
stressed more than the owner’s interest. An entity approach 
is then followed and considered-superior to the proprietary 
approach by some. Hence, management has the corporate assets 
and is accountable to all the suppliers of capital. There­
fore, assets equal equities with the main consideration being 
accountability for all the equities.
In the net worth section one may find several classes 
of capital stock and retained earnings. The capital stock is
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segregated into the various types of capital stock and 
totaled. This total represents the sura of contributed stock­
holders capital. However, the retained earnings are not 
segregated to show the relationship to capital stock but they 
dre shown as a total figure. From an entity approach, it 
makes little difference who receives the assets represented 
by the retained earnings for the entity is only interested 
in" accounting for its obligation.
The idea of net worth has changed over the years and 
today, the theory that net worth represents a trust fund for 
creditors is gaining impetus. The profits of the corporation 
cannot be withdrawn by the stockholders when they desire but 
the process of declaring dividends by the directors must pre- 
ceed. The funds of the corporation may be restricted so 
that dividends cannot be declared and hence, even a change 
in management could not cause dividends to be declared. Al­
though the net worth of the corporate enterprise represents 
the owners’ equity, the stockholders have little control over 
it and their rights are limited as to the disposition of 
corporate assets represented by the net worth.
The proprietary theory of corporate enterprise is the 
more logical. The stockholders control the corporation 
through their right to vote. The stockholders appoint and 
have the power to discharge the management group. Manage­
ment, in turn, deals with employees and creditors because of
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the authority granted them by the stockholders. There is 
nothing compelling the stockholders to perform any duties 
as long as they act within the law. Although the stock­
holders cannot force tiie corporation to distribute income, 
a new directorate can be elected which will be more favor­
able to the stockholders and hence, income would usually be 
distributed. All of the ultimate power rests with the stock­
holders and they are the recipients of the corporate residue.
Following the proprietary theory, the emphasis is 
placed on the stockholder whereas following the entity theory, 
the emphasis is placed on the corporate entity. Along the 
entity line, the corporation is considered a real person 
with assets and obligations. The entity theorists consider 
the entity as the owner of the assets but going back to 
the tnree factors of ownership (control, income, and risk), 
the corporation actual^ has only rights in the assets.
The next step is to admit that the corporation, per 
se. can have actual ownership. Actually, for legal pur­
poses and as a form of organization, the corporation owns 
the assets but considering control alone, the corporate enter­
prise never can nor does control the assets for actual con­
trol must rest in persons. Therefore, one of the factors 
necessary for ownership is missing and ownership by a corpo­
ration is a legal fiction. Although ownership by a corporate 
enterprise is a legal fiction, it cannot be overlooked in
corporate enterprise theory because actions of individuals 
are governed by tne lav;.
Although the proprietary theory is more logical, there 
is a tendency to shift more and more towards an entity ap­
proach. because of the vastness of the large corrnrations, 
the investment of the individual stockholders is decreasing 
in relation to the total contributed capital. In the past, 
the capital contributors to the corporation were made by a 
few whereas today, some corporations have almost a million . 
different stockholders. As an individual, the stockholder’s 
position is nil (this would depend on the number of shares 
held), but this does not invalidate the fact that the stock­
holders as a group control the corporate enterprise and that 
they receive the corporate residue. The entity theory would 
consider the insignificance of the individual stockholder in 
relation to all the interested parties of the corporate enter­
prise and therefore, the entity theorists would conclude that 
the important consideration is the corporate enterprise which 
is made up of many units coordinated by management. A com­
plete shift to an entity approach, however, at the present 
time, seems to be too drastic a change for such a change 
would involve a revaluation of ideas in economics, finance, 
management, taxes, law, and accounting.
CHAPTER IX
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH
ON THE PROPRIETARY THEORY AND THE ENTITY THEORY 
OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE
The corporate enterprise is chartered by the state and 
enjoys all of the privileges and rights granted to it by lav/. 
The corporate entity exists independently of its stockholders, 
managers, creditors, employees, the government, and society 
in general.
Law. In law there are two theories pertaining to the 
granting of authority to corporations. The fiction theory 
holds that the state grants the authority, and therefore, 
this being is completely independent of all interested parties. 
The association theory holds that the state merely recognizes 
what already exists. The association of the stockholders is 
the important factor and the stockholders transfer their 
rights to the corporation. Hence, there are two theories in 
law pertaining to the corporate enterprise. The fiction 
theory follows an entity approach and considers all the inter­
ested parties of the corporation and the association theory 
follows a proprietary approach and considers the stockholders 
as the important factor in the corporate enterprise.
Taxes. In taxes, there are two viewpoints of corporate
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enterprise presented. One considers the corporation as being 
owned by the stockholders and as such, whatever the corporate 
enterprise owns the stockholders own. The other viewpoint 
is that the corporation is entirely separate and distinct 
from the stockholders, and therefore, the stockholders are 
merely a part of the whole corporate organization. As expo­
nents 'of the first idea, the proprietary theorists claim that 
there is a double tax levied on income because all taxes paid 
by the corporation are indirectly paid by the stockholders.
The other idea (the entity theory) holds that there is no 
injustice because corporate income taxes are levied on a 
separate and distinct entity even though it is impersonal.
The government is not interested in the entity theory or the 
proprietary theory of corporate enterprise but when injustices 
occur, the government usually takes steps to remedy the situ­
ation. The government, however, is interested in obtaining 
funds in order to operate its facilities and levies taxes on 
all persons, natural or otherwise.
Investments. The writers in investments follow two 
lines of approach to corporate enterprise theory. One is the 
proprietary theory which holds that the stockholders are the 
owners of the corporation. The other approach is the entity 
theory which holds that the stockholders are merely investors 
and not owners. The connotation of a mere investor is that
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the stockholders are inferior creditors. The stockholders 
have lost their position as owners because of their own 
passive attitude. When buying capital stock in a corporation 
persons are not thinking usually in terms of ownership but 
they are thinking in terms of investing for income (dividends) 
and capital appreciation.
Management. Management1s importance has increased 
over the years. In early corporate enterprises, the management 
function was performed by the owners of the corporate enter­
prise but as the corporation increased in financial and physi­
cal strength, it became necessary to employ professional 
managers because the owners were not able to cope with all the 
corporate problems. Hence, the divorce of ownership and physi­
cal control became necessary in the large corporate enter­
prises. As the corporations became larger and more people 
became stockholders, the attitude of the professional managers 
changed from considering just the stockholders to considering 
all of the interested parties: stockholders, creditors,
employees, government, and society in general. Hence, manage­
ment can be considered as performing the function of managing 
the corporation’s affairs for the stockholders or as an entity 
in itself working for all of the interested parties.
Economics. In economics one finds traces of the pro­
prietary theory and the entity theory. According to a strict
206
interpretation of the entrepreneurial idea, the proprietary 
theory of corporate enterprise is favored. However, econo­
mists usually take a broader viewpoint of the corporation.
They consider the corporate enterprise in relation to society 
as a whole and therefore, they seem to favor the entity theory. 
The corporate enterprise is a combination of many factors and 
as a result many persons benefit by its existence which is 
almost immortal.
Accounting. One of the purposes of accounting is to 
supply the corporate enterprise with the necessary information 
to carry on its business activities. In supplying this infor­
mation, the accountant must make some basic assumptions with 
respect to certain transactions. He must consider if the 
corporation is the business ofthe stockholders and therefore, 
a proprietary.approach or if the corporation is a combination 
of important factors and therefore, he must account for just 
the corporate entity, which is an entity approach. Accountants 
will differ in their decisions as to the assumptions to be 
made but there are definitely two independent theories. The 
application of these two theories may not be exactly inde­
pendent, however, for parts of each may be accepted and the 
rest rejected. The proprietary theory is a stockholders 
approach and considers the corporation as being owned by the 
stockholders a nd that the residue of corporate assets over
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corporate liabilities represents the owners equity. On the 
other hand, the entity theory is a managerial approach and 
considers the entity as a whole unit. The corporation is 
accountable to all interested parties so that assets equal 
equities. The formulas used to express these two theories 
are: the entity theory, A = (L / C)j the proprietary theory,,
A - L = C.
Accounting for the corporate enterprise. There are 
two alternatives when accounting for the corporate enterprise; 
first, shall the stockholders' approach be followed (the pro­
prietary theory) or secondly, shall a managerial approach be 
followed (the entity theory).
Following the entity theory, the stockholders are 
considered as a part of the whole corporate structure that 
is combined through the efforts of management. The entity 
theory is a functional approach to the corporate enterprise 
and considers the entity as accountable to all interested 
parties. Frnphasis on ownership of the corporation is not 
important because the corporation owns the assets and has 
obligations to many parties. Hence, the main idea is to ac­
count for the corporate assets and the obligations of the 
corporate enterprise. It makes little difference who these 
parties are because the important consideration is the entity 
per se.
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Following the proprietary theory, the stockholders are 
considered as the important segment of the corporate enter­
prise. The stockholders vote for the management and in­
directly control the activities and policies of the corporation. 
The purpose of the corporate enterprise is for the benefit of 
the stockholders although others benefit as well. The ac­
countant must account for the assets of the corporation as 
well as the corporate obligations. A distinction, however, 
is made in considering corporate obligations from a propri­
etary -approach because the stockholders' capital contri­
butions are not an obligation of the corporation; there is 
no specific amount or a specified time period. The obli­
gations of the corporate enterprise are to the creditors 
and not to the stockholders. The stockholders’ interests 
are residual in nature and hence, the net worth or the 
stockholders' equity section of the balance sheet represents 
the residue of corporate assets less corporate liabilities.
After reviewing the material on the proprietary theory 
and the entity theory of corporate enterprise as presented 
in law, taxes, investments, management, economics, and 
accounting, it is evident that there are numerous conflict­
ing ideas. Because of these conflicting viewpoints much con­
fusion is caused when trying to make a clear approach to the 
corporate problems. A great deal of the difficulty could be 
alleviated and material benefit gained if a more uniform
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approach to the problems of the corporate enterprise were 
followed by theorists in law, taxes, investments, management, 
economics, and accounting.
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